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Then No and Yes, cohabiting, begat Maybe. 
Next all three, in a m~nage 1 trois, begat Guilt. 
And Guilt was of many names: 
Mine, Thine, Yours, Ours, His, Hers, Its, Theirs--
and Order. 
In time things so came to pass 
That two of its names, Guilt and Order, 
Honoring their great Progenitors, Yes, No, and Maybe, 
Begat History. 
Finally, History fell a-dreaming 
And dreamed about Language--
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Vladimir: When I think of it. All these years 
where would you be? You 1 d be nothing 
more than a little heap of bones at 
the minute, no doubt about it. 
Estragon: And what of it? 
Vladimir: It 1 s too much for one man. 1 
Thus begins the dialogue to one of the opening scenes of Samuel 
Beckett's most important play, Waiting for Godot. Since he first 
published his idea about the existence of the self in 1931, scholars 
and critics have tried to simplify the Beckett universe. His 
philosophy has become the victim of over-interpretation by quasi-
philosophers of literature, drama, and rhetoric. His philosophy 
provokes a human relationship in which two beings discover the self 
or human condition in the face of a meaningless universe. Jean-Paul 
Sartre summarizes this concept with the following remarks: 
In order to get any truth about myself, I must have 
contact with another. The other is indispensable to 
my own existence, as well as to any knowledge about 
myself. This being so, in discovering my inner being 
I discover the other person at the same time, like a 
freedom placed in front of me which thinks and wills 
only for or against me.2 
In other words, man can be defined only in relationship with his 
involvement with humanity. What happens between man and man defines 
1 
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the essence of the human spirit. Beckett views the world as a type of 
dialogical exchange between one self and the other. For Beckett, man 
is the sum total of his actions. Through the existence and exchange of 
the other, man discovers the human spirit. Thus an individual tran-
scends into a• new being creating a rhetorical self. Beckett has set 
forth a philosophical view of man's creativity and uniqueness as a 
creature who communicates. It is for this reason that I wish to under-
take this study. 
Statement of the Problem 
It is the purpose of this study to make a critical analysis of 
several of Beckett's plays, focusing on themes but also showing the 
relationship between his philosophical inquiry and a concept of 
rhetoric. The three major plays chosen for this study are Krapp's 
Last Tape, Endgame, and Waiting for Godot. References will also be 
made to several of his lesser known works as well as his major novels: 
Murphy, Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable and Watt. 
One of the major problems facing a study of these~ays is that 
the playwright pursues ends quite different from that of the conven-
tional plays. Therefore, there is a need for a different method of 
evaluation. · 
Few studies take into consideration that a dramatic situation is 
understood to be the outcome of rhetorical events and presents in 
concrete form what the playwright regards as significant contemporary 
circumstances. Drama is intimately related to the business of 
living--not in the sense that it deals with events directly in order 
to influence the handling of them, but in the sense that it formulates 
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experience symbolically. D:rama testifies to an encounter with reality 
and to one way of coming to terms with it. The relevance of drama con-
sists in formulating and reformulating the human condition in order to 
supply possible attitudes towards it. There is a great need to view 
modern plays from a rhetorical point of view. 
The Five·consistent Themes in Beckett's Plays 
The -five most consistent themes in Beckett's plays are alien-
ation, the nature of time and space, the role of habit and memory, the 
use of the comic mode, and the symbolic act as a means of corrITT1unication. 
The first--alienation--may be defined as the existential loneliness of 
man in a meaningless universe. Beckett implies that in the world 
there exists a universal human condition which presents man's absurd 
situation in the cosmos. Throughout history man has existed on an 
unequal basis, but the frustration of why man exists has remained ·on 
an equal plane. Beckett views the quest for identity and ontological 
security as a continuing dialectic between Sartean and Freudian notions 
of self. To Beckett, the essence of all mankind is what happens 
between the inner and the outer self or between two selves. 
The nature of time has been an abiding problem for the historian, 
the rhetorician, and the dramatist of this century. Beckett, too, is 
concerned with time. Beckett views time and waiting as one of the 
most significant communication characteristics of the human self. The 
flow of time confronts modern man with the basic problem of existence. 
Since man can only communicate with his personality in a "retrospective 
hypothesis", it is difficult for him to understand the nature of the 
self, and the reality of the world at the precise moment in which he 
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is living it. Thus habit and memory a1so serve as basic means of 
relating the human condition of modern man. 
The basic genre of Beckett's writing is that of the comic. 
Beckett supplies another dimension to the comic artist which is the 
combination of the tragic with the comic or the tragic-comedy. 
Beckett's humor includes "laughs that strictly speaking are not 
laughs." 
The final theme is the symbolic act as a JTleans of communication. 
Beckett, through the means of the dramatic medium, tries to show 
methods of expression beyond language. The element of language still 
plays an important part in these plays, but what happens on the stage 
transcends, and often contradicts, the words spoken by the characters. 
Beckett tries to indicate through symbolic acts, means of encountering 
reality and corning to te:rrr1s with it, In this way, he irnplies that the 
essence of drama consists of formulating the human condition in order 
to supply possible attitudes toward it. 
Critical Survey of the Pertinent Literature 
Only three studies pertinent to this investigation were discovered 
after a survey of dissertation abstracts and research studies. Ab-
stracts investigated included those listed in Dissertation Abstracts 
for Humanities and Social Sciences, International Abstracts, and Speech 
Monographs. 
A dissertation completed in 1966 by Lois Gordon, "Dialectic of the 
Beast: The Dramatic Rhetoric of Samuel Beckett," appears from the 
title to approach the problem of this research proposal. In viewing 
the abstract, this study treats Beckett's plays and novels from 
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strictly a psychological point of view. No interpretation is made in 
this study toward the rhetorical nature of Beckett's plays. 
Charles Christy Hampton, Jr. completed a dissertation in 1966 
entitled "The Human Situation in the Plays of Samuel Beckett: A Study 
in Stratagems of Inaction." This study attempts to show the use of 
the play's symbols from play to play, and their relationship to the 
development of the novel. The study further argues that while Waiting 
for Godot and Endgame continue the novel's quest for meaning, the later 
plays are unified by a new and common orientation toward the problem 
of existence. These plays turn from considering attempts to explan-
ation and escape from the human situation to attempts at successful 
accommodation toward it. 
An additional study completed in 1968 by Alexander Theroux 
entitled, "The Language of Samuel Beckett," adds more knowledge to 
the understanding of his plays. This study probes the techniques and 
methods of language in all of Beckett's novels and plays. No mention 
is made of the strategic uses of language and non-verbal modes of 
behavior of the major characters. This study is more of a descriptive 
and linguistic approach to language. 
Research studies investigated on Beckett's writing included those 
by Martin Esslin, Ruby Cohn, Hugh Kenner, Frederick Hoffman, Nathan 
Scott, William York Tindall, Ihab Hassan, Josephine Jacobsen, William 
Mueller, Richard Coe, Colin Duckworth, John Fletcher, and John Spurling. 
None of these studies provide an assessment of Beckett's rhetorical 
strategies and influence of this inquiry on modern man. 
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Justification of the Study 
Although the pertinent literature lacks any analysis of depth on 
the problem of this paper, this absence alone does not justify a study. 
I believe this research proposal is important and justified for the 
following xeasons: -
A. Samuel Be~kett's play~ and novels continue to command 
interest and attention today. Countless articles and 
books are written which include Beckett's name in 
reference to issues such as ontology, alienation, social 
consciousness, the self, and existentialism. The 
reference to the actions and characteristics of the 
two bums in Waiting for Godot is often found in writings 
of the contemporary scene. 
B. The issues of the individual and quest for a self-hood 
appear crucial principles of today's society. It is 
hoped that this study will provide a fresh look at 
viewing the rhetoric of Samuel Beckett, a rhetoric 
which is concerned with the self. 
C. Incorporation of several types of rhetorical strategies 
into the research design should result in a variety of 
insights in viewing dramatic works. Since no previous 
studies have attempted to apply the insights of Kenneth 
Burke to dramatic works of Samuel Beckett, this should 
result in a different kind of literary and rhetorical 
criticism. In the field of speech communication, there 
have been no studies published on Samuel Beckett or his 
theory of rhetoric. 
7 
For these reasons, it appears that this research proposal should 
constitute a worthwhile study. 
Methodology 
Although the basic research tools will be focused toward Beckett's 
theory of rhetoric, there will be an attempt to apply some of the 
rhetorical insights of Kenneth Burke in determining the implications 
of the themes in Beckett's plays. The advantage of using the Burke 
method is that these insights provide tools for uncovering the essence 
of the philosophy and rhetorical strategies in Beckett's plays. Burke 
has a definition of literature which comes in handy at this point. 
"Poetry," Burke writes, "is the adopting of various strategies for the 
encompassing of situations. 113 Burke gives a comprehensive analysis 
of this definition in The Philosophy of Literary Form. He writes: 
Critical and imaginative works are answers to questions · 
posed by the situation in which they arose. They are 
not merely answers, they are strategic answers, stylized 
answers. We think of poetry as the adopting of various 
strategies for the encompassing of situations. These 
strategies size up the situations, name their structure 
and outstanding ingredients, and name them in a way that 
contains an attitude toward them. 4 
What determines the meaningfulness of a poetic situation is the writer's 
general view of reality. It is the way in which a writer formulates the 
relationship between things and events according to his own thoughts and 
actions. The situations of life are reenacted symbolically in order to 
gain some truth from it. The moment a writer tries to express or 
describe a situation--it involves a choice among possible ways of naming 
the situation. This choice involves a reflection of the poet's attitude 
toward it, and the course of action implied in the attitude. 
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The strategy of identification seems the most worthwhile in pro-
viding insights to ways of looking at the themes of Beckett's plays and 
his view of the rhetorical self. The strategy of identification is the 
process of establishing a common interest, value, or form with others 
through the usage of symbols. Men are apart from one another, according 
to Burke, and strive for unity through identifying symbols. The 
identification process occurs through consubstantiality--having the 
same substance or interests in common. 5 Burke's identification process 
occurs throughout life for identification is affirmed with earnestness 
precisely because there is division. 6 This implies the search for a 
rhetorical method in order to attain the similation of "one substance" 
or identification. The term used for the fusion process by Burke is 
"strategy", which is based upon attitudinal identifications with the 
reader or the audience. This total process may be seen more clearly 
as Burke suggests: 
You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his 
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, 
attitudes, ideas, identifying your ways with hisJ 
Through this process of uniting the playwright and audience as well as 
the poet and reader, a 11 zipper effect11 occurs, wherein the teeth of 
the two sides are brought together by the joiner. Similarly, strategy 
brings the common or identifying interests of the two together. 
In arriving upon the rhetorical themes in Beckett's plays, the 
main area of focus will be on two forms of identification. Burke 
points to this type of identification as an 11 arousing and fulfillment 
of desire of form. 118 Burke indicates two major classifications of 
form: 
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A. Qualitative Progression. This places the emphasis upon 
attitudes, tones, and feelings that a playwright gives 
the spectator in order for him to move along the plot 
sequence. It may be seen in a progression such as going 
from one emotional climax to another in a plot. Since 
Beckett's plays are not conventional in plot structure, 
the critic must look at the attitudinal changes and 
developments rather than the reasoning process from 
~premise to resolution. 
B. Repetitive. This is the usage of restatement, amplifi-
cation or reiteration of a theme by additional material. 
One of the major reasons why several of Beckett's plays 
have been chosen rather than just one for analysis is 
to consider the theines in terms of repetitive form. 
Precis of the Chapters 
Chapter II. Beckett's philosophical inquiry is realized in part 
through the understanding of his plays. If one could summarize the 
basic theme in Beckett's works, it might be the sensing of man's loss 
of control. For Beckett, the disappearance of God has left a feeling 
of helplessness, alienation, and isolation among men. As a result, 
everything flies apart and the world collapses into "ontological 
insecurity." Through the vision of the absurd drama, Beckett attempts 
to legitimize the idea that the irrational and non-objective of human 
reality are just as important to existence as the rational and 
objective view. The cornerstone to the understanding of this phi-
losophy is through the reading of Wai ting for Godot and Endgame. 
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Chapter II will attempt to define Beckett's ontology and quest for 
self-hood. 
Chapter III. The basic problem of existence for modern man is 
through the presence of time, memory, habit, and perception. Beckett 
views these corrmiunication characteristics as the most significant in 
understanding the human condition of modern man. If man can be under-
stood, according to Beckett, it must come through an understanding of 
these relationships on the self, on others, and on things. The 
emphasis of Chapter III will be focused on Beckett's idea of the human 
condition, the self, and existence. 
Chapter IV. Since the Elizabethan Age to the middle of the 
Twentieth Century, language has served as the focus to dramatic works. 
The theatre of Samuel Beckett proposes that words be given a less 
prominent role in the dramao Not that speeches can be suppressed, but 
Beckett wishes to view words as taking a changing role to that of human 
acts. In this way, words take on the same character as lights, sound, 
and costumes while the symbolic acts become the reality. This chapter 
will attempt to reflect the,insights of Kenneth Burke on the strategies 
of "identification" as found in Beckett's three major plays. The 
"identification" strategies to be considered include that of "ambi-
guity," "spiritualization" or "religiousness," and "properties." This 
chapter will also attempt to discuss the major themes in Beckett's 
plays, and how he makes the spectator feel the situation through the 
language of the absurd and symbolic acts. 
Chapter v. In order for Beckett to confront his readers and 
persuade the audience, he uses the basic strategy of the comic artist. 
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Beckett goes further than the traditional genre of the comic play-
wright--he adds the dimension of tragicomedy. The main purpose of the 
chapter will be to demonstrate the basic strategies of Beckett's use 
of tragicomedy. The insights of Kenneth Burke and Hugh Duncan toward 
comedy will be used to uncover the implications of this philosophy. 
Chapter VI. It is difficult to view Beckett's interpretation of 
reality and philosophical inquiry of man as being commercially suc-
cessful and popular in the marketplace. Beckett is more concerned in 
showing the "otherness" of reality--the nonhuman side which attempts 
to engulf us each day of our lives. The final chapter will attempt 
to show the relationship of Beckett's theory of rhetoric and the 
implications of his philosophy to that of Kenneth Burke, George Herbert 
Mead, Martin Buber, and Hugh Duncan. 
Conclusion 
It is believed that a philosophical and critical study of Beckett's 
rhetorical strategies in three of his plays offers the potential of 
additional knowledge in the area of speech communication. Furthermore, 
the vital issues in dealing with the search for the self and modern 
man's philosophical inquiry of social consciousness appear to be 
particularly important today. Due to a lack of rhetorical studies on 
dramatic works of modern playwrights, and no detailed inquiry on Samuel 
Beckett's philosophy toward speech communication, it is hoped that the 
following chapters will reflect an exciting and meaningful study. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SHAPE OF THE MAN AND HIS IDEAS 
I take no sides. I am interested in the shape of ideas. 
There is a wonderful sentence in Augustine. "Do not 
despair; one of the thieves was saved. Do not presume; 
one of the thieves was damned." That sentence has a 
wonderful shape. It is the shape that matters. 
--Samuel Beckett 
It would be easy to write a biographical sketch of Samuel Beckett 
including the important facts and events of his life. Yet this infor-
mation would provide us with little knowledge of the person and the 
development of his essence. If we accept Burke's definition of man as 
a symbol-using, symbol-making, and symbol-misusing animal, then we must 
search deeper into the motives of the person rather than just recalling 
the past events of his life. 
Beckett, as well as his major characters, has been developed 
through a dialogical process of his encounters based on a Protestant 
background in Southern Ireland, an interest in the philosophy of Dante, 
Geulincx, and Heidegger, a friendship with James Joyce, an encounter 
with an assailant and the Resistance forces in Paris, and an influence 
of Bergson's theory of comedy. The encounter of Beckett with his 
reality has helped shape him as a person as well as the shape of his 
philosophical characters. "Man speaks the world," writes Gusdorf, "but 
he doesn't speak to the world, or if he does it is because the world 
13 
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has assumed for him the new form of an alter ego. It has been personi-
fied in order to become the other, the opposite participant in the 
dialogue, for example, "Nature as invoked by the poet. 111 For Gusdorf 
as well as Beckett, this does not mean that language is merely limited 
to just self and world, but includes the other toward which language is 
directed. Gusdorf.further relates: 
I speak because I am not alone. Even in a soliloquy, in 
speaking to myself, in speaking to myself as an other, I 
communicate from myself to myself. Language from its 
most rudimentary form onward, testifies to a movement of 
personal being outside of itself. Human being is not 
contained within itself. The contours on one's body 
outline a line of demarcation, but never an absolute 
limit. The existence of others doesn't appear as delayed 
result of experience and reason. Intellectually and 
materially1 the other is for each man a condition for 
existence.'.£ 
Thus the philosophical and rhetorical heroes from Beckett's writings did 
not happen by chance but have developed from an encounter with his 
emotional and intellectual historicity. 
Although some critics have attempted to interpret the major 
characters in Beckett's works as being autobiographical, these figures 
seem to reveal more of a symbolic vision of his reality. None of 
Beckett's heroes refer to him by name, but they often speak of their 
experiences in the first person. His works may prove to reveal a kind 
of "symbolic autobiography." All of Beckett's writings provide us 
with a concept of the poet's symbolic view toward reality. Conse-
quently, the truth of reality is expressed by encountering the 
character's elusiveness, voracity, inconsistencies, and their "remem-
berance of things past." Therefore, the main purpose of this chapter 
is to identify the significant acts in Beckett's life which relate to 
his ontological development as a philosopher and rhetorician. 
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The Other: Ireland 
Born in Dublin in 1906, Samuel Barclay Beckett, like Shaw, Wilde, 
and Yeats, came from a Protestant middle-class background. It has been 
suggested by some critics that Beckett has suffered anguish throughout 
his life with an identity problem based on his Protestant background 
reared from a southern Irish lineage. Martin Esslin points out that 
"Beckett's writing reveals him as one of the most tormented and 
sensitive of human beings and of whom it has been reported that ever 
since his birth suffers a terrible memory. 113 Peggy Guggenheim, who was 
once in love with Beckett, relates this depiction of him: 
Ever since his birth, he had retained a terrible memory 
of life in his mother's womb. He was constantly suffer-
ing from this and had awful crisis, when he felt he was 
suffocating. He always said our life would be all right 
one day, but if I ever pressed him to make any decision, 
it was fatal and he took back everything he had previ-
ously said.4 
Beckett's early experiences in Ireland are symbolically depicted 
in his first book of short stories, More Pricks Than Kicks, published 
in 1934. This collection of ten stories traces the various aspects of 
Belacqua Shuah's troubled existence as a Protestant living in Dublin. 
Belacqua, who is patterned after the same character in Canto IV of the 
Purgatory, studies Dante, attends parties, suffers through his marriage, 
and eventually meets an accidental death. In the opening story, "Dante 
and the Lobster," Beckett entertains his view toward the decadence of 
the mind and body of a Protestant enduring his Catholic environment. 
The short story ends with the following lines: 
"What are you going to do?" he cried. "Boil the beast" 
she said, 11what else'2 11 "But it's not dead" protested 
Belacqua "you can't boil it like that." She looked at 
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him in astonishment. Had he taken leave of his senses'I 
"Have sense" she said sharply, "lobsters always 
boiled alive. They must be." She caught QQ. the lobster 
and laid it on its back. It trembled. "They feel 
nothing" she said. In the depths of the sea it had 
crept into the cruel pot. For hours, in the midst of 
its enemies, it had breathed secretly. It had survived 
the Frenchwoman's§.!:: and his witless clutch. Now it 
going alive into scalding water. It had to. Take 
into the air !I!.Y. quiet breath. Belacqua looked at the 
old parchment of her face, grey in the dim kitchen. 
"You make a fuss" she said angrily" and upset me and 
then lash into it for your dinner." She lifted the 
lobster clear of the table. It had about thirty seconds 
to live. Well, thought Belacgua, it's~ quick death, 
God help all. It is not.5 [My italics] 
Although Beckett has been un.~illing and refuses to discuss any of his 
work as related to his own reality, this story appears to reflect his 
dialogical anguish of a Protestant coming to grips with his Catholic 
surroundings. It was Beckett's encounte:r with his own reality that 
establishes a need to write a "symbolic autobiography." Beckett could 
accomplish this only as a true rhetorician. Later on, in a story 
entitled "Yellow," Belacqua or Beckett relates the account of his 
accidental death: 
He bounced up on to the table like a bridegroom. The 
local doc was in great form, he had just come from stand-
ing best man, he was all togged up under his vestments. 
He recited his exhortation and clapped on the nozzle. 
"Are you right?" said Belacqua. The mixture was too rich, 
there could be no question about that. His heart was run-
ning away, terrible yelloi:1 yerks in his skull. "One of 
the best," he heard those words that did not refer to him. 
The expi~ession reassured him. The best man clawed at his 
tap. Christ! he did die! They had clean forgotten to 
auscultate hirn!O [Jvly italics] 
In this entire collection of short stories, Beckett speaks to the other 
by questioning the sodal reality of middle class Ireland. Belacqua 
like Beckett is condemned to live in this world which speaks to him, 
but 'he can only respond through embarrassing failures. Even though 
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Beckett did not suffer the pangs of poverty, as many of his countrymen, 
he still felt like a vagrant in a foreign land. The character of 
Belacqua as symbolic personification of Beckett is expressed by Ihab 
Hassam: 
Belacqua is also the first ironic self-image of his 
creation; for like Beckett he is a Dubliner, descendent 
of the Huguenots, a Trinity man, poet and linguist, a 
theoretical sloth, and a solipsist mangue.7 
The encounter of Belacqua with his surroundings has haunted Beckett all 
of his life. Even though he left Ireland at an early age, Beckett 
could never leave the reality of his confrontation with the environment. 
In his last major novel, The Unnamable, Beckett writes: 
The island, I'm on the island, I've never left the 
island, God help me. I was under the impression I 
spent my life in spirals round the earth. Wrong, 
it 11 s on the island I wind my endless ways. The 
island, that's all the earth I knew. I don't know 
it either, never having had tne stomach to look at 
it.8 
The Other: The Philosophers 
At the age of fourteen, Beckett was sent to Portora Royal, an 
Anglo-Irish school in Northern Ireland. Here Beckett proved to be an 
outstanding scholar and superior athlete. In 1923, he attended 
Trinity College in Dublin where he was a brilliant student of French 
and Italian. It was while Beckett studied at Trinity that he became 
interested in the reasoning of Dante, Heidegger, and Geulincx. Al-
though Beckett was not concerned with the illustration of Geulincx's 
truth, he was interested with the encounters of the mysteries of the 
body-mind dualism. The essence of this philosophy is provided by 
Colin Duckworth: 
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He [Geulincx] maintained that the mental and physical 
modes are completely distinct, the only interaction 
between them being miraculously occasional by the inter-
vention of God who, however, has control only over the 
body: the mind is free. The man of good sense, 
realizing that he has power only over his mental pro-
cesses, gives up all hope of governing any aspect or 
parts of the world outside his own mind, thus developing 
a total lack of involvement in any material or emotional 
stimuli withdrawing to the inner recesses of the mind 
which 'alone is autonomous--but only over itself. The 
body and.the mind, according to Geulincx, interacts by 
the action of God upon the mind.9 
This kind of encounter appears to haunt all of Beckett's rhetorical 
heroes from Belacqua to Vladimir. It is the dualism of mind against 
matter without the presence of God that seems to preoccupy Beckett's 
thinking. "It is the doctrine of a 'bodytight' mental world," writes 
Hugh Kenner, "around which, or perhaps attached to which, the body 
performs its gyrations according to laws the mind need not attempt to 
fathom. 1110 One of Becket"t's major characters, Molloy, indicates this 
obsession for Geulincx's philosophical position: 
I who had loved the image of old Geulincx, dead young, 
who left me free, on the black boat of Ulysses, to 
crawl towards the East, along the deck. That is a 
great measure of freedom, for him who has not the 
pioneering spirit. And from the poop, paving upon the 
wave, a sadly rejoicing slave, I follow with my eyes 
the proud and futile wake.ll 
Another great philosophical association came from the influence of 
Dante" One book in particular, The Divine Comedy, becomes a common 
place of reference in the writing of his early novels and the settings 
for his major plays. As mentioned earlier, Belacqua, the major char-
acter in a collection of early short stories, More Pricks than Kicks, 
takes his name from a person encountered by Dante and Virgil in Purga-
tory. In one of Beckett's most important novels, The Unnarnable, the 
total mood of the main character is one of torment and damnation. John 
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Fletcher points out that "with The Unnamable, Beckett constructs a 
twentieth century vision of the Inferno where the torture chambers are 
replaced by the endless struggles to find the words that may keep at 
bay the dreaded silence. 1112 The setting of Waiting for Godot on a 
barren plain where everything is dead but the tree, reflects an atti-
tude of Dante I s Purgatory. The enclosed cell of Harrrrn and Clov in 
Endgame also projects the feeling of Hell itself. Beckett greatly 
admires the writings of Dante and is much in debt to him as a point of 
reference for the settings and motivations of his major characters. 
Beckett's heroes constantly struggle in the mire, continually face a 
state of limbo, and are forever suspended in a type of Dantesque sur-
rounding. This leads Fletcher to remark that "although Beckett had 
reached artistic maturity not only did he not forget The Divine Comedy, 
he even steeped himself more deeply in its atrnosphere, and 'The Inferno' 
especially became one of his most habitual points of reference. 1113 
The final philosopher to influence Beckett's ontology was Martin 
Heidegger, the German philosopher who is credited with giving existenti~ 
alism the modern stamp of interpretation. The essence of his philosophy 
is that man does not see the world from the isolation of his own ego, 
but he experiences it through a process of total involvement. "My be-
ing is not something that takes place inside my skin," says Heidegger, 
"rather is spread over a field or region which is the world of its care 
and concern.1114 Heidegger proposes three general traits as categories 
of human existence: (1) mood or feeling, (2) understanding, and (3) 
speech. The final trait of existence, speech, proved to have the 
greatest impact on Beckett. Beckett later reflects in his writing the 
view of Heidegger that the language of silence is eloquent and provokes 
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a level of understanding. Beckett agrees with Heidegger that without 
silence all talk becomes merely chatter and a process of filling the 
void. 15 The essence of this interpretation is aptly surrmiarized by 
William Barrett: 
Two people are talking together. They understand each 
other, and fall silent--a long silence. This silence 
is language; it may speak more eloquently than any words. 
In their mood they are attuned to each other; they may 
even reach down into that understanding which as we have 
seen, is below the level of articulation. The three-
moo_d-understanding-and speech-thus intervene and are one. 
This significant speaking silence shows us that sounds or 
marks do not constitute the essence of language. Nor is 
this silence merely a gap in our chatter; it is, rather, 
the primordial attunement of one existent to another, out 
of which all language-as sounds, marks, and counters-
comes. It is only because man is capable of such silence 
that he is capable of authentic speech. If he ceases to 
be rooted in that s1lence all his talk becomes chatter.16 
Young Beckett was to wrestle with these questions of silence, words, 
space, and time in order to complete his own theory of existence. 
Coupled with the influence of the mind-body dialectic and the nature 
of language as human essence, it was no wonder that Beckett perfects 
his major characters as rhetorical heroes. It was the meshing of 
these ideas with Beckett's environment that led him to use the dia-
logical process. For it was this questioning of existence, as we will 
show in a later chapter, that conditioned Beckett to view language as 
a dead habit when all the forgotten voices refuse to remain silent. 
The Other: Henri Bergson's Theory of Comedy 
After Beckett's graduation from Trinity College in 1927, he 
accepted a post as a lecturer in English at the Ecole Normale 
Superieure in Paris, which included on its faculty roster the names 
of Bergson, Giraudoux, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and Simone Weil. Of all 
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the great names associated with the college, Henri Bergson appears to 
have had tlle most profound influence on Beckett's thinking. Beckett's 
encounter with Bergson and his subsequent reading of "Laughter," 
establishes the root for the physical and mental behavior of his comic 
characters. Bergson argues that comedy arises from the rigid, mechani-
cal, or eccentric that social life requires. "This rigidity is the 
comic, 11 says Bergson, "and laughter is its corrective. 1117 
The basic element of Beckett's comedy is that of the clownish and 
the absurd. Even the ridiculous clothing of his rhetorical heroes can 
be traced ito a passage in "Laughter": 
It might almost be said that every fashion is laughable 
in some respect. Only, when we are dealing with the 
fashion of the day, we are so accustomed to it that the 
garment seems, in our mind, to form one with the indi-
vidual wearing it. We do not separate them in imagin-
ation. The idea no longer occurs to us to contrast the 
inert rigidity of the Govering with the living suppleness 
of the object covered: consequently, the comic here 
:remains in a latent condition. It will only succeed in 
emerging when the natural incompatibility is so deep-
seated between the covering and the covered that even an 
illllmemorial association fails to cement this union: a 
case in point is our head and top hat. Suppose, however, 
some eccentric individual dresses himself in the fashion 
of former times our attention is immediately drawn to the 
clothes themselves; we absolutely distinguish them from 
the individual, we say that the latter is disguising him-
self,-as though every article of clothing were not a 
disguise!-and the laughable aspect of fashion comes out 
of.the shadow into the light.18 [My italics] 
The shoes, the hats, the baggy pants, the crutches, and the bicycles, 
which are mechanical and rigid extensions of the human body, speak to 
us in all of Beckett's plays. Only by throwing away the objects of 
extension can man transcend from merely existing to that of finding 
the essence 0£ his whole being. The role of the comic helps in this 
relationship by indicating the absurdity that we hold for social 
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objects. For Beckett, it is the comic that allows man to become aware 
of his own consciousness by noting his own foibles. 
The Other: James Joyce 
While in Paris lecturjng at the Normale Superieure, Beckett began 
his long and devoted friendship with James Joyce. At the young age of 
23, Beckett composed the opening pages to Our Exagarnination round His 
Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress, which is a col-
lection of twelve articles by Joyce's apostles in defense of their 
master. This was indeed a great honor to be chosen by the literary 
giants of the 20's to write the opening remarks. Beckett points out 
in the introciuction that writing is the thing it describes, and we can-
not or should not separate the form from the content. It is unfortunate 
that few literary critics heeded this warning. Beckett fuTtheT argues 
that it is the artist's duty to write about the total experience rather 
than skimming off the surface to make it easy for a public too lazy to 
comprehend it. 19 It is this philosophy that callouses him from adverse 
criticism. This paves the way for the rhetorical posture expressed 
following a question about the comprehension of Endgame: "If the 
audience does not understand the play, then they are too decadent. 1120 
Beckett returned to Dublin in 1930 to serve as Professor of Romance 
Languages at Trinity College. It was at this time that he commissioned 
a London firm to publish Proust, which is regarded as the foundation for 
the mature analysis of Beckett's ontological inquiry. This essay is a 
brilliant analysis of Marcel Proust's writing, but it also reveals the 
concepts of habit, time and perception, which consistently appear in 
Beckett's novels and plays. The main concern throughout the book is 
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Beckett's own preoccupation of existence from the level of habit, time, 
memory and perception. This establishes what Beckett calls the "other-
ness of reality." For Beckett, if there is no other, then communication 
fails to exist. "The attempt to communicate," says Beckett, "where no 
communication is possible is merely a simian vulgarity, or horribly 
comic, like the madness that holds a conversation with the furniture. 1121 
Beckett suggests that it is impossible for us to escape from the hours 
-and the days since time deforms us or we deform it. Beckett further 
contends that habit has laid its veto to any form of true perception.22 
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Beckett's final analysis is an explanation of reality and habit. He 
points out that "habit is the ballast that chains the dog to the vomit. 
The creation of the world did not take place once and for all time, but 
takes place every day of our lives. 1123 
While teaching in Dublin, Beckett maintained his close friendship 
and association with James Joyce through periodical visits to Paris. 
They would meet to discuss each other's ontological inquiry and rhetor-
ical style. Their meetings often took the role of communication as 
provoked by Heidegger. One such meeting is depicted by Richard Ellman: 
Beckett was addicted to silences, and so was Joyce; 
they engaged in conversation which consisted often 
in silences directed towards each other. Both suf-
fered with sadness, Beckett mostly for the world, 
Joyce mostly for himself. Joyce sat in his habitual 
posture, legs crossed, toe of the upper leg under the 
instep of the lower; Beckett also tall and slender, 
fell into the same gesture. Joyce suddenly asked 
some question as 'How could the idealist Hume, write 
a History?' Beckett replied, 1A history of repre-
sentatives. ,24 
Ellman further relates that Joyce's daughter, Lucia, had fallen madly 
in love with Beckett. This relationship was eventually broken off when 
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Beckett told her that he could no longer love and was only interested 
in visiting with her father. 25 Although Joyce enjoyed Beckett's weekly 
visits, he still maintained a certain social distance. On one occasion 
' he remarked to Beckett, "I don't love anyone except my family." This 
in translation to Beckett meant "I don't like anyone except myself." 
Yet Beckett's mind provoked a certain uniqueness and strangeness that 
attracted Joyce. 26 These encounters between Joyce and Beckett have 
often been described as the kind of relationship between a father and 
a son. This has prompted some critics to view the characters of Pozzo 
and Lucky in Waiting for Godot as well as Hamm and Clov in Endgame as 
symbolic niaster-student encounters of Joyce with Beckett. No doubt the 
friendship between the two was a deep, personal, and profound one. 
Joyce often made clear to Beckett his dislike for literary jargon. 
Once when they had listened to a group of intellectuals at a party 
discussing the merits of Kafka's literary works, Joyce commented to 
Beckett, "If only they'd talk about turnips. 1127 It is interesting to 
note that a scene in Waiting for Godot brings back in a symbolic form 
this particular encounter. 
Estragon: Give me a carrot. (Vladimir rummages in his 
pockets, takes out~ turnip and gives it to 
Estragon who takes~ bit out of it. Angrily.) 
It's a turnip! 
Vladimir: Oh pardon! I could have sworn it was a carrot. 
(He rummages again in his pockets, finds 
nothing but turnips-:-f All that's turnips. 
(He rummages.) You must have eaten the last. 
(He rummages.) Wait, I have it. (He brings 
~.2. carrot and gives it to Estragon.) There, 
dear fellow. (Estragon wipes the carrot .Q!1 his 
sleeve and begins to eat it.) Make it last, 
that's the end of them.28 
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It might be easy to conclude that Joyce and Beckett were similar in 
their thinking and writing. They both felt exiled from Ireland, they 
were both profound and sensitive thinkers, they both composed major 
works in Paris~ and they both enjoyed the symbolic nature of the 
language. Yet Beckett indicates there were basic differences in their 
thinking and \'l[I'iti~g. In an interview with Israel Shenker of the New 
York Times, he hints at these conflicts: 
The kind of work I do is one in which I'm not master of 
my material. The more Joyce knew the more he could. His 
tendency toward omniscience and omnipotence as an artist. 
I'm working with impotence, ignorance. I don't think 
impotence has been exploited in the past. There seems to 
be a kind of aesthetic axiom that expression is an 
achievement--must be an achievement. My little explor-
ation is that whole zone of being that has always set 
aside by artists something unuseable--as something by 
definition incompatible with art. I think anyone nowa-
days who pays the slightest attention to his own 
experience finds it the experience of a non-knower, a 
non-caner (somebody who cannot). The other type of 
artist--the Apollonian--is absolutely foreign to me. 29 
Although there were major philosophical and intellectual differences 
between the tt.vo, the influence of Joyce on Beckett prompted the nature 
of his first major novel, Murphy, published in 1938. This work of art 
came as a result of several critical sessions and urgings from Joyce. 
This remarkable novel is a character study of Murphy, an Irishman 
living in squalor in London. He drifts grotesquely toward annihilation 
while an assortment of minor characters, each in solemn pursuit, chase 
after him. For Murphy, who is unaware of the pursuers, the central 
situation is that his body loves Celia, who wants him to go to work and 
support the two of them, thereby taking her off the streets. Yet 
Murphy's mind abhors the implications that she introduces into his life 
in the quest for anonymity. Murphy passes from one species of despair 
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to the next and eventually takes a Job at an insane asylum. As Murphy 
grows older, he becomes convinced that his mind was a closed system, 
subject to no principle of change but its own, self-sufficient, and 
impermeable to the vicissitudes of the body. When he dies, Celia 
returns sadly to her old profession. 30 
Throughout the novel, Murphy searches for a self-hood, but finds 
himself locked in the darkness of the mind. He can find solace only in 
dying. The novel represents a quest story for Beckett in trying to 
throw off the shadow of his literary master, James Joyce. Murphy's 
quest for self-hood and identity appears as a kind of symbolic relation-
ship of Joyce over Beckett. Celia'a encounter with Murphy suggests the 
guilt complex that Beckett felt toward his relationship with Lucia 
Joyce. Since she eventually spent several years in an insane asylum, 
Beckett constantly felt a feeling of remorse in his behavior toward 
heY. As with Celia, Beckett could have saved her, but his lack of 
humanism and desire for intellectual destiny prevented him from acting. 
Like Murphy, Beckett suffered from a philosophy of inaction. Conse-
quently, Murphy serves as a quest story for Beckett to prove his lit-
erary genius as well as provide a method in coming to grips with his 
omnipresent and omnipotent reality. 
The Other: The Assailant and the Underground 
Beckett left his teaching post in 1932 with the attitude that it 
was absurd to teach others what he did not know himself. He drifted 
around Europe for several years, spent some time in a mental hospital 
in London, and eventually settled in Paris. Shortly after arriving in 
Paris, he experjenced an incident which gave him insight into the 
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otherness of reality and had an indelible effect upon his emotional 
and intellectual self. 
One evening while walking near the Latin Quarter, Beckett was 
attacked and robbed by a street bum. While recuperating in the hospital 
of a stab wound and perforated lung, Beckett was haunted by the reality 
of this experience. After his wound had healed and he was released 
from the hospital, Beckett visited the assailant in the local jail. 
When the robber was confronted with the why of the attack, he could 
only reply, "Jene sais 'pas, Monseuir." Beckett dismissed the criminal 
-charges against the assailant, but he could not dismiss the incident 
from his mind. 
This incident served as a turning point in Beckett's ontological 
inquiry and his career as an artist. For the first time, Beckett 
became a;,,are that it 11vas the other that helped shape his own destiny. 
Up to this time, Beckett had attempted to stand outside of life and 
view it as a spectacle. He was, like Joyce, the typical intellectual 
who could look at things with a degree of detachment. The encounter 
with the assailant turned his ontological position toward the inquiry 
that he was no longer a spectator of life, but he was that self in its 
reality. This incident seems to point up to Beckett that his own 
existence was no longer a speculation, but a reality which he must 
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personally and passionately confront. It was no coincidence that in 
Waiting for Godot when Vladimir confronts the messenger about the 
character and well being of Godot, he responds: "Jene sais par, 
Monsieur." The meeting of the assailant became a deeply philo-
sophical and emotional experience for Beckett, one that he could 
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not easily dismiss from his memory or his rhetorical discourse. 
/ 
"For the thinker," writes Barrett, "as for the artist, what counts in 
life is not the number of rare and exciting adventures he encounters, 
but the inner depths of that life, by which something great may be 
made out of even the paltriest and most banal of occurrences. 1131 
I 
What appears on the surface to be a banal occurrence, the stabbing 
of Beckett for no apparent reason, was for him a turning point in the 
essence of his existence. It was the shifting of his attitude from one 
of detachment to one of involvement with emphasis on the introspection 
of the self. Consequently, when the war came in 1939, Beckett could 
not sit idly by and view the cruelties and inhumanities as an objective 
spectable; he had to become involved. Beckett actively participated 
with the Resistance Forces in Belgium and France. His close friend and 
companion from Trinity, Alfred Peron, who served in the Resistance, was 
caught and executed by the Gestapo. Beckett later dedicated li.?..!:.l to the 
memory of his friend. At the war's end, Beckett received a decoration 
for his participation in the Resistance and non-combatant services. 
The novel, Watt, written m 1942 but not published until 1953, 
reflects Beckett's attitude toward the regression of thought and life 
caused by war. This story is infested with little allegorical shapes 
and tag-names about the grotesque adventures of an Irish servarit and 
his master. At times every statement between the two seems meaningless. 
Sentences have shape but lack medning. Thus Watt begins to communicate 
back to front: 
Day of most, night of part, knott with now. Not till 
up, 15ttle seems so oh, heard so oh. Night till morn-
ing from. Heard I this, saw I this then what, things 
quiet, dim. Ears, eyes, failing now also. Hush in, 
mist in, moved I so.32 
29 
Thjs passage expresses a kind of futility that Beckett felt in his hero-
ic quest to bring rational thinking to incomprehensible acts. Thought 
and life seem held in a kind of murky stasis. Beckett envisioned the 
Resistance as being the source of righteous might, but this also led 
him to despair and anguish: 
This body homeless. This mind ignoring these emptied 
hands. This emptied heart. To him I bought. To the 
temple. To the people. To the source. Of nought.33 
The entire novel reveals with futility the quest of Beckett to explain 
with logic and empiricism the cruelties, which are beyond human ration-
ality. 
The Other: The Dialogical Process 
Following the war, Beckett began his most productive period, 
wrlting a number of significant novels and plays. Molloy, the first of 
a trilogy, started in 1947 and published in 1951, presents Beckett's 
attitude toward authentic existence and a unification of the self with 
the "all self." It is the experience of an exclusive all absorbing 
unity of one's own self that prompts MoJloy to reply: 
This time, then one more I think then perhaps a last 
time, then I think it 1 1l be over, with that world too. 
All grows dim. A little more and you'll go blind. It 
doesn't work any more, it says, I don't work any more.34 
Strangely, Molloy cannot recall the town in which his mother resides, 
and equipped with a bicycle and crutches, he pursues a haphazard course. 
His adventure includes an encounter with the law, a stay with a woman, 
and an episode at the seashore. Molloy reaches such a state of decrep-
itude that when he leaves the beach he must crawl on the ground. He 
sees the spirals of a town but perhaps not the one he seeks. 
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This novel represents Beckett's attempt to come to grips with the 
"authentic self." The whole sense of the obJective world is reduced to 
a subjective debate of the inner and outer selves. The obJect of 
memory becomes stranger than the object of fact. Molloy is caught 
between the inner and outer dialogue, and it is difficult for him to 
understand whether he is alive or dead. This piece of writing indicates 
Beckett grappling with the dialogical process, and the myth behind the 
labeling of concepts. Molloy says: 
There could be no things but nameless things, no names 
but thingless names. I say that now, but after all what 
do I know now about then, now when the icy words hail 
down upon me, the icy meanings, and the world dies too, 
foully named. All I know is the words, and the dead 
things, and that makes a handsome little sum, with a 
beginning, a middle, and an end as Jn the well-built 
phrase and long sonata of the dead. 35 
Malorie Dies~ written in the same year, is a disturbing and memor-
able work of genius. It j s an attempt by Beckett to find the self by 
coming to the realization of death and nothingness. Malone is locked 
in a room, and he has only his writing to make him aware of existence. 
Malone remarks, "You have only to hear nothing but the sounds of things, 
and you begin to fancy yourself the last of the human kind. 1136 Malone 
realizes that he is slow] y dying. While dying, Malone tells himself a 
few stories--the names change, the figures blur--they may be differ-
ent persons or the same person. At the end, the nightmare becomes more 
grotesque and hallucinatory. The writing stops. Malone is dead. This 
volume suggests that Beckett is concerned about the reality that can be 
grasped only through a mutuality of man to man. When one is alone with-
out the essence of the other, the nightmare becomes a reality. Death 
soon ends the misery. 
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The last of the trilogy, The Unnamable, expresses the rhetorical 
nature of his later plays. In this brilliant piece of writing, Beckett 
gives up the fictional narrator and concentrates on the first person. 
The Unnamable tries to explore the resources of the world created by 
voices. He reflects more than once: 
I'm in words, made of words, other I s words, what others, 
the place too, the air, the walls, the floor, the ceil-
ing, all words, the whole world is here with me, I1m the 
air, the walls, the walled-in one, everything yields, 
opens, ebbs, flows, like flakes, I1m all these flakes, 
meeting, mingling, falling asunder. 37 
Beckett seems to imply by this passage that man is man by virtue of 
speech, and that all speech is an echoing of sounds. Beckett's hero 
continually trjes to answer the philosophical questions which are the 
opening words of the book, "Where Now?" "Who Now?" "When Now?" This 
novel provokes the greatest amount of inquiry about rrian as a rhetorical 
agent; that is, for Beckett, man uses speech to add himself to the 
world and to reach out to join with others. Rhetoric supplies man with 
the basic concept to awareness and the opportunity to emerge from soli-
tude. The opening passages of The Unnamable unquestionably demonstrate 
this rhetorical position: 
I shall have to speak of things of which I cannot speak, 
but also, which is even more interesting, but also that 
I, which is if possible even more interesting, that I 
shall have to, I forget no matter. And at the same time 
I am obliged to speak. I shall never be silent. Never •••• 
And all of these questions I ask myself. It is not in a 
spirit of curiosity. I cannot be silent. About myself I 
need know nothing. Here all is clear. No, all is not 
clear. But the discourse must go on. So one invents 
obscurities. Rhetoric •••• In order to speak. One starts 
speaking as if it were possible to stop at will. It is 
better so. The search for the means to put an end to 
things, an end to speech, is what enables the discourse to 
continue. No, I must not try to think, simply utter. 
Method or no method I shall have to banish them in the 
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end, the beings, things, shapes, sounds, and lights with 
which my haste to speak has encumbered this place. 38 
The ending of the trilogy was to prove to be the beginning of 
Beckett's quest into the dialogical process of the self. The finish of 
his greatest novel was to be the start of his introspection into 
language, speech, and authentic conmrunication. As a result, Beckett 
was to follow this period of his ontological inquiry with his greatest 
dramatic works: Waiting for Godot, Endgame, and Krapp's Last Tape. 
All of these plays will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, 
but it might be helR,ful to mention the basic themes as the cornerstones 
of the dialogical process. 
The most significant ontological work by Samuel Beckett is Waiting 
for Godot,published in 1953. This play is considered by many drama 
critics to be one of the most compelling and challenging pieces of 
dramatic literature of the 20th century. The plot reveals two bums, 
Estragon and Vladimir, who try to fill their days with little games as 
they hopelessly wait for Godot. The bums rely on each other to deter-
mine their own existence and find truth of self-hood. The tramps 
repeatedly discuss what to do next in order to avoid the tedium of time. 
They feel a need for contact and involvement to arri~e upon self-
awareness. 
Estragon: I've tried everything. 
Vladimir: No, I mean the boots. 
Estragon: Would that be a good thjng? 
Vladirnir: It'd pass the time. I assure you. 
Estragon: A relaxation. 
Vladindr: A recreation. 
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Estragon: A relaxation. 
Vladimir: Try. 
Estragon: You' 11 help me? 
Vladimir: I will of course. 
Estragon: We don't manage too badly, between the two of us. 
Vladimir: Yes, yes come on, we'll try the Jeft front. 
Estragon: We always find something eh, to give.!:!§. the 
impression Y:@ ex1st?39 [My italics] 
Each day a child appears from Godot and puts his arrival off until 
tomorrow. The bums wait and pass the time in hopes that Godot will 
appear to explain their significance or insignificance in the universe. 
Godot never appears, and the characters at the end of the play are 
forced to accept the responsibility of making choices without his 
presence. It is the dialogical exchange of the characters which helps 
to maintain their reality in a world that is fo:rever collapsing: 
Vladimir: We're in no danger of ever thinking anymore. 
Estragon: Then what are we complaining about? 
Vladimir: Thinking is not the worst. 
Estragon: Perhaps not. But at leasL there's that. 
Vladimir: That what? 
Estragon: That's the idea, let's ask each other questions. 
Vladimir: What do you mean, at least there's that? 
Estragon: That much less misery. 
Vladimir: True. 
Estragon: Well? If we gave thanks for our mercies? 
Vladimir: What is terrible is to have thought. 
Estragon: But did that ever happen to us? 
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Vladimir: Where are all these corpses from? 
Estragon: These skeletons. 
Vladimir: Tell me that. 
Estragon: True. 
Vladimir: \ve must have thought a little. 
Estragon: At the very beginning. 
Vladimir: A Charnel-house. A Charnel-house. 
Estragon: You don't have to look. 
Vladimir: You can't help looking. 
Estragon: True. 
Vladimir: Try as one may. 
Estragon: I beg your pardon? 
Vladimir: Try as one may. 
Estragon~ lAfe should turn resolutely towaTd nature. 
Vladimir: We've tried that. 
Estragon: True. 
Vladimir: Oh, it's not the worst, I know. 
Estragon: What? 
Vladimir: To have thought. 
Estragon: Obviously. 
Vladimir: But we could have done without it. 
Estragon: Que voulez-vous. 
Vladimir: Ah, Que voulez-vous. Exactly. 
Estragon: That wasn't such a bad little canter. 4O 
The freedom to choose provokes a feeling of forlornness, despair, and 
anguish within the main characters, as they finally realize their choos-
ing may affect all of mankind. It is the effect of this consequence and 
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the inevitable acceptance of total responsibility for their acts, that 
the characters slip into a state of "quietism" at the end of the play. 
Published in 1958, Endgame presents the theme of the master-slave 
relationship or the union of the "whole being." The two main char-
acters are Hamm and Clov, who merely exist for each other as master and 
slave. Each character desires to kill the other, but each one realizes 
this would bring about self-destruction. The servant (Clov) longs to 
kill his Master (Hamm) and remove the authority that imposes on him to 
repeat various tasks, but Clov being a creature of order and habit 
realizes this would bring about self-annihilation. The master, who is 
blind and paralyzed and has to be wheeled around by Clov, must have 
the servant carry out his duties. By killing Clov, the master would 
also cease to exist. Both of these characters are in desperation to 
com.n'\unicate and ~rove they do exist as individual hurnan beings, If 
they separated, both would cease to function, as each serves as subject 
and object for the other. In one of the memorable passages toward the 
end of the play, Clov asks: "What is there to keep us here?" and Hamm 
replies, "The dialogue. 11 41 
In Krapp's Last Tape, published in 1960, Beckett completes another 
significant stage in the development of his philosophical thinking. 
Krapp's Last Tape is a remarkable dramatic piece with only one actor. 
The hero, Krapp, is caught in the game between his conscious existence 
and his past life recorded on tape. Krapp tries to corrm1unicate with 
himself by recreating experiences that happened during his early manhood 
years, but he finds only the recording on the absurdity of love has any 
meaning for him. Krapp realizes that his conscious self can no longer 
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conmrunicate with his previous life and early experiences. As a result, 
the play ends with a feeling of futility as Krapp sits motionless star-
ing before him as the tape runs on in silence. 
And so from this introductory material, we have come to realize 
that Beckett has willed his life to a search for ontological security 
amid a meaningless universe, to discover authentic communication in the 
midst of a dead language, and to make sense out of that which by 
definition is pointless, incomprehensible, and irrational. It is from 
this search that Beckett has become more than a poet and a playwright. 
He stands as one of the foremost philosophers and rhetoricians of our 
time. It is from this posture that we undertake this study with a 
focus on the rhetorical nature of his works. 
If we could sunm1arize Beckett's life into one word, it would be 
the sense of "becoming." His life has represented u continuous effort 
of self-revelation, corrm1union, and perpetual becoming. Beckett con-
tinues to serve as a participant in the creative experience since he 
has learned from the significant encounters which have shaped him 
that he cannot remain a spectator. Beckett's rhetorical heroes, like 
himself, have never reached a point of consumation or finality; "it is 
a 1 ways the shape that matters. 11 
If we are to understand Samuel Beckett, we must come to grips with 
his own reality. And the best method to encounter Beckett is through 
the understanding of his plays. "Virtually the whole of the Beckett 
canon, 11 says Jacobsen and Mueller, "is the autobiography of one man. 
This man, a mid-century Everyman, wears many masks, and he would seem 
to try them on one after the other in an attempt to identify himself. 1142 
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Thus we have opened the books on Beckett in hopes of finding a poet, 
and we have encountered a man. And with these works as with Beckett's 
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CHAPTER III 
THE HUMAN CONDITION, THE SELF, AND EXISTENCE 
I have always wanted to be free. I don't know why. I 
don't even know what that means, to be free. You might 
tear my nails out by the roots and I still couldn't tell 
you. But far beyond words I know what it is. I still 
want it. I want nothing else. First I was the prisoner 
of others. So I left them. Then I was the prisoner of 
myself. That was worse. So I left myself. 
Eleutheria 
The true nature and object of all of Beckett's major works is the 
human condition. He is continually seeking and attempting to discover 
the basis of his own selfhood. Beckett's inquiry is not a Naturalistic 
or Romantic version, but a ruthless search with the frightening atti-
tude that at the bottom of the muckheap nothing may exist. The two 
main questions which seem to haunt Beckett are: "What is man?" and 
"What do I mean when I say I?" Therefore, the main purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss Beckett's view of man. Our discussion will 
emphasize: (1) Beckett's view of the human condition; (2) the nature 
of time, memory, habit, and perception in the Beckett universe; (3) .the 
role of the Self; and (4) the dialogical process of language and speech 
in seeking existence. 
In Proust and The Unnamable, Beckett provides us with several in-
sights about his view of man, language, and the Self. What Beckett 
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begins in these works, he brings to consummation in Godot and Endgame. 
Therefore, it may serve our purposes well to investigate these works in 
more detail o 
The Human Condition 
Man begins, for Beckett, in a sad condition with his birth being 
both tragic and sinful. In Proust, he writes: 
Tragedy is not concerned with human justice. Tragedy is 
the statement of an expiation, but not the miserable expi-
ation of a codified breach of a local arrangement, organ-
ized by the knaves for the fools. The tragic figure 
represents the expiation of original sin, of the original 
and eternal sin of him and all his 'soci malorum,' the sin 
of having been born. 1 
Once born, man is expelled not into the bright sunlight of a new day, 
but into a dull grey form of existence. From that moment on, man faces 
deprivation, sadness, and pain. The violence and the suffering of man 
remains continuous and without change. "The hell of the Beckett uni-
verse," writes William Barrett, "is the unrelenting repetition of the 
same moment with only the most occasional variation in suffering to 
raise delusive hopes." 2 For Beckett, much of life is the same~" Yet it 
is possible to have a change of muck. "And if all muck is the same 
muck, 11 replies Molloy, 11 that doesn't matter it's good to have a change 
of muck, move from one heap to another. 113 Beckett views life as having 
three essential points: beginning, waiting, and ending. "Even death," 
says Eugene Goodheart, "which all the Beckett characters await, holds 
no special terror: and there is nothing for it but to wait for the 
end, nothing but the end to come, and at the end all will be the same 
as before."4 According to Beckett, the main difference between life 
and death is the voice, which prevents the characters from being 
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nothing and slipping into the void; "I am obliged to speak. I shall 
never be silent. Never. 115 The typical man for Beckett endlessly waits, 
reminiscences, meditates, but he always has the courage to continue 
living. "Beckett presents humanity as aimlessly questioning or end-
lessly waiting," writes Colin Duckworth, "but having the courage to 
continue living even though it is far from being sure what it is search-
ing or waiting for, and far from being convinced there is anything 
anyway. 110 
God in the Beckett universe has been withdrawn which has left man 
in a state of isolation, alienation, and frustration. Man has lost 
control and can no longer rely on the old myths of the Christian world 
to give him meaning. With the demise and collapse of the traditional 
myths, the meaning of reality has been displaced. 11Reality reveals it-
self to the artist," states Barrett, "not as the Great Chain of Being, 
which the tradition of Western rationalism had declared intelligible 
down to its smallest link and in its totality, but as much more refact-
ory: as opaque, dense, concrete, and in the end inexplicable. 117 
Beckett views man as floundering in an "Epistemological wasteland" 
where humanity can no longer maintain any fluid meaning or reality. 
When the old myths collapse, everything flies apart and the world col-
lapses into "ontological insecurity." Molloy listens and "the voice 
is of a world endlessly collapsing, a frozen world, under a faint 
untroubled sky. 118 This voice is the shape of the Beckett universe. 
Beckett does not paint an inspiring picture of man. Existence is 
eked out in the mire in the pale light of man's miserable condition. 
Yet it is the courage and the struggle to continue living which is 
important. Suicide might be a means of alleviating the suffering and 
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the pain, but this could also confirm the view that man is nothing more 
than an object or a thing. Molloy provokes this sense of struggle: 
But what matters whether I was born or not, have lived 
or not, am dead or merely dying, l shall .9.Q .Q.D. doing -9..§. 
l have always done, not knowing what it is I do, nor who 
I am, nor where I am, nor if I fil!l· Yes, a little creat-
ure, I shall try and make a little creature, to hold in 
my arms, a little creature in my image, no matter what I 
say.9 [My italics] 
The key to Beckett's understanding of man is courage. It is the courage 
of man to stand in the openness of being, realizing full well there may 
not be any humanity left. It is the courage to continue living in spite 
of a world that is forever collapsing, and one that can no longer be 
explained with rational reasons. It is the courage to stand in con-
frontation with the Other in hopes of proving the essence of man. This 
is the key to the Beckett universe. A hint of this courage is provided 
us by John Killinger: 
It is interesting to note that no matter how far Beckett 
has gone in reducing the vitality of the human being 
almost to the vanishing point in much of his work--he 
never leaves one with the feeling that a character is any-
thing other than a human being. Perhaps it is his strong 
humanistic tradition, enforced, by biblical allusions and 
theology, but he really does not, for all of his sense of 
the spiritual void break with the notion of an imago dei 
in man. Even Nagg and Nell, who exist at the nadir of 
human life, at the very borderline of extinction resemble 
persons more than they do animals or reptiles. There is 
an unmistakable residue in them, something ineffaceable, 
something recognizable even in the almost terminal half-
life of the millet heap.10 
What is the residue in man that gives him the courage to continue? As 
we plan to discuss later in this chapter, it is his nature as a unique 
creature who communicates and quests for self-hood. It is man's wil-
lingness to risk identity in hopes of integrating himself with humanity 
that makes the Beckett person continue to exist. And what about the 
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role of man? Man's role in this world, according to Beckett, is one 
based on relationship. Man is an object among beings and things. Al-
though he may use and manipulate objects, he feels himself used by 
others. In short, the essence of man is his relationship from the 
inner (subjective) to the outer (objective) self, and his attitude 
toward things as well as other beings. Things for Beckett mean the 
extensions of the human body or objects that have some relationship 
in space and time to the human animal. The hats of Vladimir and 
Estragon, the luggage of Pozzo and Lucky, the wheelchair of Hamm and 
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Clov, the dustbins of Nagg and Nell, the crutches and bicycles of 
Molloy, and the tapes of Krapp are all extensions of the human body 
that help shape the role of the individual and in turn the Universe. 
Hugh Kenner analyzes Beckett's men into two maJor concepts: "Man as 
machine nnd man using machinc. 1111 "The Cartesian Centaur," says 
Kenner, "is a man riding a bicycle.111 2 According to Kenner, this helps 
to explain the typical man in the Beckett universe who regards with 
strange detachment the things their hands and feet do: their tendency 
to analyze their own motions like a man working out why a bicycle does 
not topple. "I know my eyes are open," replies the Unnamable, "because 
of the tears that pour from them. I know I am seated, my hands on my 
knees, because of the pressure against my rump, against the soles of my 
feet, against the palms of my hands, against my knees. 1113 
Beckett views man as being driven to a state in which he becomes 
alienated or separated from his true self. Man is asked to perform 
competently like a machine in motion, which separates him from 
existence. The Unnamable reminds us of this conflict: 
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Unfortunately I am afraid, as always of going on. For 
to go on means going from here, means finding me, losing 
me, vanishing and beginning again, a stranger first, then 
little by little the same as always, in another place, 
where I shall say I have always been, of which I shall 
know nothing, being incapable of seeing, moving, thinking, 
speaking, but of which little by little, in spite of these 
handicaps, I shall begin to know something, just enough 
for it to turn out to be the same place as always, the 
same which seems made for me and does not want me, which 
I seem to want and do not want, take your choice, which 
spews me out or swallows me up.14 
Beckett realizes man gains the reality of his existence through the 
relationship with objects, but feels that human contact is essential to 
maintain sanity. Without human relationship, man feels completely 
alienated from himself and his fellowman. "The worst form of alien-
ation •••• ," writes Barrett, "is man's alienation from himself. In a 
society that requires of man only that he perform competently by his 
own particular social function, man becomes identified with this 
function, and the rest of his being is allowed to subsist as best 'it 
can--usually to be dropped below the surface of consciousness and 
forgotten. 1115 The importance of human contact is expressed in all of 
Beckett's major works. The essence of this philosophy is depicted by 
Nagg in a scene from Endgame. He confronts Hamm with the importance 
of human contact: 
I was asleep, as happy as a king and you woke me up to 
have me listen to you. It wasn't indispensable, you 
didn't really need to have me listen to you. I hope 
the day will come when you' 11 really need to have me 
listen to you, and need to hear my voice, any voice. 
Yes, I hope I'll live till then, to hear you calling 
me like when you were a tiny boy, and were frightened, 
in the dark, and I was your only hope.16 
One of the methods of understanding the Beckett universe is through 
the relationship of man to objects, things, and others. Frederick 
Hoffman indicates that the most significant questions about Beckett 
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deals with the relationship of the human animal to space and objects. 
He asks the following questions: 
Is he any,vay responsibly situated, with respect to other 
objects, to space independently considered, to the forms 
of matter as it exists in space; can he consider himself 
as projected in space if he assumes to himself the privil-
eged use of other obJects (themselves geometrically per-
fect) and using thern--impose his initial situation, if 
these obJects--in his invention and use of them--do enable 
him to enhance the value of his original properties, can 
he define himself therefore as an especially endowed 
creature, communicating with the universal scheme of 
things; can he therefore establish a relationship to God 
and be assured that a God may exist with whom a relation-
ship can be established?l7 
Time-Habit-Memory-Perception 
The Beckett universe is shaped by four major characteristics of 
human existence: time, habit, memory, and perception. Beckett feels 
these four major concepts detexmine our reality and the relationship in 
which we communicate with others and perceive the world. These four 
major concepts give us a thematic focus for understanding Beckett's 
' '-dramatic works as set forth in the next chapter. There£ ore, we in-
clude them as a means to help understand the Beckett universe as well 
as for future reference to the plays. 
For Beckett, the world preceived is colored by the relationship 
of that double-headed monster of damnation and salvation--TIME. The 
nature of time confronts man with the whole essence of his existence. 
Beckett writes in Proust: 
There is no escape from the hours and the days. Neither 
from tomorrow nor from yesterday. There is no escape from 
yesterday because yesterday has deformed us or been de-
formed by us. The mood is of no importance. Deformation 
has taken place. Yesterday is not a milestone that has 
been passed, but a daystone on the beaten track of the 
years, and irremediably part of us, within us, heavy and 
dangerous. We are not merely more weary because of 
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yesterday, we are other, no longer what we were before 
the calamity of yesterday.18 
As a result of the relationship to Time, man's perception of reality 
is tempered. The element of Time is not a physical or external one, 
but an attitude based on man's temporal relationship to the world. 
According to Beckett, this appears to modify the personality so that 
reality can only b~ perceived as a "retrospective hypothesis." In 
other words, a person can only apprehend the reality in terms of the 
past. "The individual," Beckett says, "is the seat of a constant pro-
cess of decantation, decantation from the vessel c,ontaining the fluid 
of future time, sluggish, pale, and monochrome, to the vessel contain-
ing the fluid of past time, agitated and multi-colored by the phenomena 
of its'hours."19 Since language and speaking exist in time through a 
linear fashion, it is apparent to Beckett that absolute reality can 
never be explained because it occurs instantaneously. Thus, an indi-
vidual must always rely on the past and is forever imprisoned by Time. 
"No longer can man confront reality immediately," states Ernst 
Cassirer, "he cannot see it, as it were face to face; physical reality 
seems to recede in proportion as man's symbolic activity advances. 1120 
Beckett does not offer a solution to this problem, but he wishes to 
make us aware of the reality of the moment. Josephine Jacobsen and 
William Mueller attempt to point up this conflict: 
Most persons assume that their consciousness is a 
reasonab]y accurate perceiver of an essentially 
ordered world and an essentially predictable one. 
One in which events conform to strict causal laws. 
Beckett is in revolt against what he envisages as a 
scientific position in which up to the early decades 
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of the twentieth century at least, led men to assume 
that he was moving closer and closer to a knowledge of 
the world of space and time, that certain causes in the 
physical world lead to certain effects and that through 
certain relationshi~s may be unknown to us they do 
neve+theless exist. 1 
The concepts of memory and habit are for Beckett the most influential 
in relationship to Time. If Time seems as an affliction to our real-
ity, Beckett views habit as even a more deadly disease. He writes: 
Habit is a compromise effected between the individual and 
his environment, or between the individual and his own 
organic eccentricities, the guarantee of a dull enviol-
ability, the lightning-conductor of his existence. Habit 
is the ballast that chains the dog to his vomit. Breath-
ing is habit. Life is habit. Or rather life is a suc-
cession of habits, since the individual is a succession 
of individuals; the world being a projection of the indi-
vidual's consciousness (an objectivation of the individ-
ual's will, Schopenhauer would say), the pact must be 
continually renewed, the letter of safe-conduct brought 
up to date. The creation of the world did not take place 
once and for all time, but takes place every day. Habi't 
then is the generic term for the countless treaties con-
cluded between the countless subJects that constitute the 
individual and their countless correlative objects. 22 
Since all living is habit, Beckett wants us to be aware that this fil-
ters our perceptions and distorts our view of reality. "When the ob-
ject is perceived as particular and unique and not merely the member of 
a family," Beckett says, "then and only then may it be a source of 
enchantrnent. 1123 Unfortunately habit destroys this form of perception 
by hiding the essence of the idea behind 11 pre-conception. 11 For Beckett, 
memory becomes conditioned through perception. Rather than having 
memory serve as a moment of discovery and contemplation of reality, it 
becomes distorted through perception. Beckett views an individual with 
a good memory as not really remembering anything because he does not 
forget anything. Strictly speaking, we can only remember what has been 
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registered by the unconscious and stored in that ultimate and inacces-
sible dungeon of our being to which habit does not possess the key. It 
is in this "dungeon of being" 24 that the true essence of man exists. 
Beckett's view of memory and perception is close to the interpretation 
of Merleau-Ponty, a friend and colleague at the Ecole Normale Superieure. 
Ponty, a noted French phenomonologist, points out that to "remember is 
not to bring into the focus of consciousness of a self-subsis~ent of 
the past; it is to thrust deeply into the horizon of the past and take 
apart step by step the interlocked perspectives until the experiences 
which it epitomizes are as if relived in their temporal setting. 1125 
In other words, to perceive is not to remember. 
What Beckett sets forth as the theory of habit on perception and 
memory, Kenneth Burke later calls 11 terministic screens." According to 
Burke, "even if any given terminology is a reflection of renE ty; by 
its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality. 1126 
For both Beckett and Burke, man's observations of reality are explicit 
in the choice of terms he uses to describe it. The shape of man's per-
ception as well as his memory results from the structure of the 
language. "Many of the observations," says Burke, "are but implica-
tions of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations 
are made. 1127 Beckett agrees with Burke thdt because of language man 
shapes his own structure and perceptions of events which involves the 
selection, distortion, and assimilation of all information. 
Thus, the relationships of Time, habit, memory, and perception 
shape the symbol-using capacity of man. It is these relationships 
which form his conception of existence and attitude toward others. 
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Language as Essence 
Beckett wants to make us aware that a fixed tongue,like a living 
habit,serves as a source of decay to society as well as to the human 
essence. Beckett wishes to guard against a determined reality whjch 
language imposes upon the individual. "They have noth,ing to fear," says 
the Unnamable, "I am walled round with their vociferations, none will, 
ever know what I am, none will ever hear me say it, I won't say it, I 
can't say it, I have no language but theirs. 1128 
])oes this mean that Beckett is agains,t a formalized language? Not 
at all. His desire is for us to be aware that we may take refuge be-
hind the controlling concept of habit. In this way, we do not have to 
think or experience the reality of the world. Only a man who is freed 
from a compelling habit can enter into life as a creative process. 
Beckett is not degrading language, but the system which imposes a fixed 
and inflexible tongue. He is interested in a living language and not 
one that will serve as a facade to hide our reality. The mind of man 
must be willing to view the essence of an idea with a new impression 
rather than with an old tired out expression. Beckett wants us to 
guard against the attitude of language as cliche. This happens when 
words and phrases become so much a part of the external world that we 
use them as mere habits of expression. 
If language loses its reality, then the self becomes merely an ob-
Ject or a third person. This establishes what Gusdorf calls the 
struggle between personal creativity and corrmion meaning: 
If I speak it is less for myself than for the other; I 
speak in order to address myself to the other, in order 
to make myself unde:rstood. Herej speaking is like a 
hyphen. But for the other to understand me my language 
must be his--it must gjve precedence to the other over 
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me. It is all the more intelligible the more it is a 
common denominator. Others have taught me to speak, 
have given me speech. But in doing this, they have 
perhaps suffocated an original voice in me, a voice 
both weak and slow to free itself. To say that lan-
guage is other people is tantamount to saying that we 
are from childhood on reduced to captivity by our 
forced submission to the ready-made formulas of the 
established language •••• On the one hand, we have the 
expressive function of language: I speak in order to 
make myself understood, in order to emerge into real-
ity, in order to add myself to nature. 29 
Beckett also feels that language must serve as a form of self-revelation. 
It must serve as a link to our fellow man rather than an instrument or 
" tool to be used for manipulative purposes. Beckett1 s view of language 
follows that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: "As soon as man uses language 
to establish a living relation with himself or with his fellows, lan-
guage is no longer an instrument, no longer a means; it is a manifes-
tation.1130 Language, for Beckett, must begin with human reality which 
provides an attitude of self-affirmation and identity of the world. 
Beckett is also against the Logical Positivists, who wish to make 
the study of language a scientific and external phenomena. Beckett 
questions the process that language and thinking are identical. The 
Unnarnable remarks: 
But how can you think and speak at the same time, how 
can you think about what you have said, may say, are 
saying, and at the same time go on with the last-
mentioned, you think about any old thing, you say any 
old thing, more or less, more or less, in a daze of 
baseless unanswerable self-approach, that's why they 
always repeat the same thing, the same old litany, the 
one they know by heart, to try and think of something 
different, of how to say something different from the 
same old thing, always the same wrong thing said always 
wrong, they can find nothing, nothing else to say but 
the thing that prevents them from finding, they'd do 
better to think of what they're saying, in order at 
least to vary its presentation, that's what matters, 
but how can you think and speak at the same time.31 
[My italics] 
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Thus, Beckett is not against words and language, but only if they are 
used to ignore human reality. If language is only recognized as a 
logical system, then it fails to encompass irrational behavior. And 
silence may be the only means to provide a self-reflection on the event. 
Beckett cautions us that words and language cannot give us truth 
but can only point the way. He feels that only a self that receives 
absolute identity can remain silent. Since an individual is constantly 
changing, there is a continual need to look for a living language. 
Beckett also cautions us that words may serve as a wall to keep us from 
our identity. This process Gusdorf calls the theory of indirect com-
munication. "The theme of indi vidua 1 comrnunica tion," says Gusdo-rf, 
is bound up with a conception of man that insists on the 
secret core of each life. Silence is truer than speech. 
The poets and often writers have insisted on a wall of 
inexpressibility which their greatest efforts of expres-
sion run up against •••• Baudelaire, borrowing an image from 
Poe, expresses under the title, "my heart stripped bare," 
this desire for an epiphany, for a total self-revelation 
which would also be the long-sought salvation. But the 
darkness is not dissipated. The more one speaks the more 
one says nothing. The more one strives to say something, 
the more one is buried in an irremediable silence. 32 
For Beckett, the power of language is the sense of "becoming." It is 
the living relationship to reality that makes a true language. 
With the classical philosophers and sages of the early tribes, 
power was contained in the Word. Ernst Cassirer points out that in 
"almost all great cultural religions, the Word appears in league with 
the highest lord of creation; either as the tool which he employs or 
actually as the primary source from which he like all other Being and 
order of Being is derived. 1133 The early tribes had pondered over the 
mystery of origin, but the Word had a creative power all of its own. 
The Word had lived before earth, sun, or moon came into existence. 
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Cassirer indicates that Uitoto opens characteristically enough in this 
way, "In the beginning, the Word gave origin to the Father." The Word 
was thought to precede the creator, for the primitive mind could not 
imagine a creation from nothingness. 
Beckett views the nature and power of language in just the opposite 
position. He feels that language cannot begin with God or society, but 
it must be a living example to a living reality. Language, for Beckett, 
cannot be just a collection of words from a dictionary, but a creation 
of personal existence. In other words, man is different from other 
creatures in his ability to create and understand symbols. Language 
supplies the basic concept of man's awareness and the opportunity for 
him to emerge from the Muck,and to reach out to touch his fellow man. 
Beckett agrees with Burke that "language serves as the symbolic means 
of inducing cooperati~11 in beings that by nature respond to symbols. 1134 
As a result, we argue that Beckett's characters are rhetorical heroes 
since they establish a value or form with others through the use of 
symbols. In this approach, we see the implication of the search for 
rhetorical methods in order to attain the assimilation of merging a tti-
tudes, beliefs, and values into one substance. This process is not the 
absorption of one human essence into another, but a merger of s~iliolic 
substances to create harmony, unity, and order between individuals. 
For Beckett, man uses language in order to add himself to existence 
and to reach out to his fellow man. To name is to call into existence 
and to draw out of the Void. If we cannot name an item or substance, 
how can it exist? For Beckett, it is words that make things and define 
the relationship to which the world is constituted. Consequently, 
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Beckett's last major novel is uniquely titled The Unnamable. The main 
character in this novel 1s called into existence, and he must strive to 
find a name as well as a~ essence. The Unnamable is constantly being 
watched by his friends and scrutinized by his family. He is continually 
probing and searching for a name, which might give him the semblance of 
existence. By finding a name, the character can draw himself from 
nothingness and add himself to reality. As Hugh Duncan points out, "a 
thing or a person named exists for itself and for me. Until I name it 
and it responds it has no existence, because it cannot be addressed, but 
neither do I have any existence because I cannot be addressed. 1135 The 
Unnamable provides us with a hint of this quest: 
All these Murphys, Mol loys, and Mal ones do not fool me. 
They have made me waste my time, suffer for nothing, 
speak of them when, in order to stop speaking, I should 
have spoken of me and me alone. But I just said I have 
spoken of me, am speaking of me. I don't care a curse 
what I just said. It is now I shall speak of me, for 
the first time. I thought I was right in enlisting their 
sufferers of my pains. I was wrong. They never suffered 
my pa ins, their pa ins are no thing, compared to mine, a 
mere title of mine, the title I thought I could put from 
me, in order to witness it. Let them be gone now, them 
and all the others, that I have used and I have not used, 
give me back the pains I lent them and vanish, from my 
life, my memory, my terrors, and shames. There, now 
there is no one here but me, no one wheels about me, no 
one comes towards me, no one has ever met anyone before 
my eyes, these creatures have never been, only I and 
this black Void have ever been.36 
In the Unnarnable's desire to destroy the presence of Murphy, Molloy, 
Malone, and Mahood, he discovers that he is without a self. He attempts 
to throw off the mask of the others which tend to engulf him. The 
Unnamable probes, peers, and argues in questing to find an honest and 
authentic self. He argues: 
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I'll call him Mahood instead. It was he told me stories 
about me, came back to me, entered back into me, heaped 
stories on my head •••• It is his voice which has often, 
always mingled with mine, and sometimes drowned it com-
pletely. Until he left me for good, or refused to leave 
me anymore, I don't know. Yes, I don't know if he' s here 
now or far away, but I don't think I am far wrong in say-
ing that he has ceased to plague me. When he was away I 
tried to find myself again, to forget what he had said, 
about me, about my misfortunes, fatuous misfortunes, 
idiotic pains, in the light of my true situation, revolt-
ing word. But his voice continued to testify for me, as 
though woven into mine, preventing me from saying who I 
was, what I was, so as to have done with saying, done 
, with listening. And still today, as he would say, though 
he plagues me no more his voice is there, in mine but less, 
and less. And being no longer renewed it will disappear 
.Q.!}§_ day, l hope, from mine, completely. But in order for 
that to happen! rrrust speak and speak.37 [My italics] 
The use of this form of inquiry by Beckett receives its basis from the 
Cartesian legacy. No doubt Beckett admires the Cartesian process, but 
he expresses doubt on its closed system. In The Meditations, Descartes 
gives us a picture of the philosopher in quest of true knowledge by 
turning to the introspection of the self. Paul Zwieg indicates that 
Descartes provides us with "an image of the philosopher who has closed 
his eyes, plugged his ears, blocked all his senses, in order to converse 
with himself in his own mind. 1138 In this way a self begins to know and 
become more familiar to his own reality. In the First Meditation, 
Descartes imagines that all perceptions and feelings about the world 
are a lie. He writes: 
I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly 
good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant 
demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, 
has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I will sup-
pose that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, figures, 
sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than 
the illusions of dreams, by means of which this being has 
laid snares for my credulity; I will consider myself as 
without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or any of the senses, 
and as falsely believing that I am possessed of these •••• 
I shall at least do what is in my power, and guard with 
settled purpose against giving my assent to what is false, 
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and being imposed upon by this deceiver, whatever 
be his power and artifice.39 
Descartes argues that if this wicked person exists and tries to destroy 
me, then "I" exist. Cogito ergo Sum. According to Descartes, the 
philosopher must look from within in order to find any true knowledge 
of self. For Beckett as well as Descartes, the intimate "I" is dis-
covered in self-reflection and relationship with others. The ''I" is not 
born but emerges into an existing relationship. Zweig suggests that 
"the 'I' in The Meditations casts no shadows and because of the inquiry 
on self becomes a truly rhetorical instrurrient. 1140 [ My italics] 
Although Becke~t is fascinated by Descartes' theory, he objects to 
the closed system of a mind which is purely spiritual and a body which 
is purely mechanical. Beckett asserts that man's existence can only be 
understood in terms of his "wholeness." Man cannot be partitioned into 
segments and studied as isotopes, but can only be defined in terms of 
his entire being. If mind and matter are totally different substances, 
then, as Beckett asserts, it is impossible for any interaction to take 
place. The Unnamable suggests the frustration of this inquiry: 
I'll have said it inside me, then in the same breath out-
side me, perhaps that's what I feel, an outside and an 
inside and me in the middle, perhaps that's what I am, 
the thing that divides the world in two, on the one side 
the outside, on the other the inside, that can be as thin 
as foil, I'm neither one side nor the other, I'm in the 
middle, I'm the partition, I've two surfaces and D2. thick-
~, perhaps that's what I feel, myself vibrating, I'm 
the tympanum, on the one hand the mind, on the other the 
world, I don't belong to either.41 [My italics] 
Beckett suggests that in order to understand the mind and body we must 
go to the center of existence. "How all becomes clear and simple when 
one opens an eye on the within," says the Unnamable, "having of course 
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previously exposed it to the without in order to benefit by the con-
trast. 11 42 It is a search for the irrational process of human reality 
and seeing the world through the process of the body as well as the 
mind. "For if it is true that I am conscious of my body via the world," 
writes Merleau-Ponty, "it is true for the same reason that my body is 
the pivot of the world; I know that objects have several facets because 
I could make a tour of inspection of them, and in that sense I am 
conscious of the world through the medium of my body. 1143 
Rather than beginning his study with systems, Beckett begins with 
man himself. The only true study is one concerned with the total man 
and his symbol-using capacity. It is the study of man in relationship 
to things, objects, and others. Thus, language serves as the essence 
of man and symbolic acts as the key to all verbal acts. Yet at the 
center of this entire process must be the emphasis on the Self. There-
fore, this discussion brings us to the nature of the Self and existence. 
The Self and Existence 
The Self may be interpreted from several different levels. Cases 
can be made to study the Self from a sociological, psychological, bio-
logical, or a philosophical interpretation. For us, the most feasible 
is to approach the Self from a philosophical point of view. 
Al though a number of critics express the fallacy of placing Beckett 
into one philosophical position, nevertheless, his views represent an 
existential interpretation. Consequently, it might be helpful to inter-
pret briefly two of the leading Existentialists who may shed insight on 
the Beckett universe and the role of the Self. 
58 
The basic attitude of the existential philosophy is one of involve-
ment. This means participating in a situatjon with the total sense of 
one's existence--which includes all the temporal, psychological, his-
torical, and biological conditions of man. For the Existentialists, a 
self which becomes an obJect for measurement, calculation, and manipu-
lation ceases to exist. It is a thing which is absent of existence or 
being. 44 In existential knowledge, the being is changed through the 
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acts of encountering and participating. Man faces two alternatives in 
this relationship: he may choose to treat the Other as an object and 
discover nothing, or he may atternpt to treat the Other as a person and 
in turn gain valuable knowledge about the Self. Only by participation 
in reality and finding a center to his own being, can an individual find 
a true existence.45 
We may ask ourselves the question of how discussion about exis-
tentialism relates to the Beckett universe? One could speculate with-
out distortion to Beckett that he adopts this form of philosophy in 
the dialogical process of his rhetorical heroes. As mentioned earlier, 
Beckett warns us about a dead language that may serve as a facade to 
hide our authentic behavior. When speech is used to merely pass the 
time and avoid the discovery of the Self, it serves as an external to 
hide the authentic Self. Thus silence becomes the only true form of 
communication. This is illustrated by the Unnamable's desire to find 
a true Self: 
It's of me now I must speak, even I have to do it with 
their language, it will be a start a step towards silence 
and end of madness, the madness of having to speak and 
not being able to, except of things that don't concern 
me; that don 1 t count, that I don't believe, that they 
have crammed me full of to prevent me from saying who l 
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am, where I am and from doing what I have to do in the 
only way that can put an end to it, from doing what I 
have to do. 46 
Self, for Beckett is discovered in relationship to others and man can 
only be comprehended in confronting his own reality. Man, according to 
Beckett, cannot exist for long without some form of relationship with 
his fellow man. Man can only be human because others make him human. 
He in turn makes others human. The discovery of the Self comes in the 
presence of another, and the Self cannot exist for long without the 
other. 11 Man is the creature that cannot come forth from himself," 
writes Beckett, "who knows others only in himself, and who if he asserts 
the contrary, lies. 11 Ll 7 It is the discovery of the Self as others in 
tmn discover who they are that makes the communion important. 
The basic attitude for this philosophy comes from the writings of 
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Jean-Paul Sartre. "Man,'· says Sartre, "is nothing else but what he 
makes of himself. 1148 Sartre implies in his philosophy that man is the 
sum total of his actions. He suggests that if we realize ourselves 
truly by our actions, we must also realize ourselves by our indecisions, 
inactions, by what we do, as much as by what we fail to do. In applying 
this concept to Godot and Endgame, the vacillation of the rhetorical 
heroes is as much a part of the human self as the final scene when the 
characters are in a state of immobility. The characters' indecisions, 
their vacillation, and their inactions are unquestionably part of the 
human self. Toward the end of each play, these characteristics give way 
to a decisive conscious and acceptance of self-awareness as responsible 
egos of the "terrible freedom. 11 Perhaps the nature of the "dreadful 
freedom" helps explain the last few lines of each act in Godot which 
ends as follows: 
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Estragon: Well, shall we go? 
Vladimir: Yes, let's go. 49 
(They do~ move.) 
It is the nature of the choice and the responsibility that it bears 
which determines individual freedom. In order to be authentic, the 
individual must choose what is best for him rather than what society 
expects or demands: Consequently, the responsibility of the choice may 
lead to dreadful freedom, or what Sartre calls a state of II quietism." 
For Sartre, the Self is that which raises questions about being, and 
by these questions man defines himself as being different from a thing 
or object. 
If man attempts to hide from the reality of others, then he will 
never find the true Self. The undisclosed and undiscovered Self cannot 
reach out to others. It can only form words and sounds without the 
\ 
presence of genuine communication. As the Unnamable proclaims: 
I'm all these words, all these strangers, this dust of 
words, with no ground for their settling, no sky for 
their dispersing, coming together to say, fleeing one 
another to say, that I am they, all of them, those that 
merge, those that part, those that never meet, and 
nothing else, yes, something else, that I'm something 
quite different, a quite different thing, a wordless 
thing in an empty place.50 
Beckett agrees that a risk is involved, but one that must be undertaken 
to move from non-being into being. Discovery of self is a risk, but it 
involves the nature of "becoming." 
Beckett indicates that we must be aware of two kinds of behavior 
in speech communication; "that either we speak and act for ourselves in 
which case speech and actions are distorted or we speak and act for 
others in which case we speak and act a lie. 11 51 Does this mean that 
Beckett holds a pessimistic view toward speech communication? The 
61 
answer must be "No." His concern is that if we are merely depending on 
outward appearances and objects for corrm1unicating, then we are unaware 
of the true essence of the self. Beckett receives support for this 
attitude from Soren Kierkegaard, who argues that man must be aware of 
his own existence before concerning himself with reason. Kierkegaard 
concedes that his existence is not something he can speculate about, 
but a reality in which he encounters each day of his life. For 
Kierkegaard, the individual is higher than the universe, and man is 
only defined by his capacity to act. According to Kierkegaard, an 
individual who ties himself to an objective truth without an awareness 
of his own existence binds himself to a life of detachment. For 
Kierkegaard, truth serves as the mark of the whole being--not what he 
has (intelligence), but what he is (existence). With this view of man, 
the common individual can carry truth much better by living it than the 
intellectual by thinking it. Kierkegaard feels that as an individual 
obtains selfhood it becomes increasingly more difficult for him to find 
relief in speech. 52 The Unnamable aptly summarizes Beckett's as well 
as Kierkegaard's feelings: "A parrot~ that's what they're up against, 
a par:rot. If they had told me what I have to say, in order to meet 
with their approval, I'd be bound to say it, sooner or later. 1153 
Beckett feels that man continually strives to have his existence 
reaffirmed, and this can only be done in relationship to the Other. 
Thrust into a world where man can no longer depend on the laws of the 
universe, he needs to have his own being confirmed. Objects, chatter, 
and things can only lead to more anguish about a selfhood. Man yearns 
to enter into a dialogical process because he knows that only in dia-
logue can the anguish of nothingness and the void disappear. Thus, it 
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is up to another person to reaffirm his sense of existence. The pro-
cess of being passes from one human essence to another. 
Although the theory of this concept is provided in Beckett's 
novels, we see the consummation of this process in his plays where all 
the rhetorical heroes exist in pairs or what Duckworth calls "pseudo-
coupleso" Some of these characters are: Pozzo and Lucky, Vladimir 
and Estragon, Harrmi and Clov, Nagg and Nell, and Winnie and Willie. The 
need to reaffirm the self and find essence forms a bond with each char-
acter that is never broken throughout each play. It is the relationship 
that Beckett views as being important to the discovery of the individ-
ual's reality and existence. This is examined in more detail in the 
following exchange from Godot: 
Estragon: We're not tied? 
Vladimir: I don't hear a word you're saying. 
Estragon: I'm asking you if we're tied. 
Vladimir: Tied? 
Estragon: Tied. 
Vladimir: How do you mean tied? 
Estragon: Down. 
Vladimir: But to whom? By w}:lom? 
Estragon: To your man. 
Vladimir: To Godot? Tied to Godot! What an idea! 
No question of it for the rnoment. 54 
The essence of this theory can best be summarized by Hugh Duncan. He 
states: 
Dialogue between the self and the other makes society 
possible, because in such relationships, expression, 
communication, naming, and the struggle for consistency 
-
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in meaning originate. Meaning is always a social mean-
ing, because men create symbols in dialogue, not to 
measure or to witness a world, but to act in it. And 
since all such action is dramatic, the life of dialogue 
is dramatic life. Like actors on the stage, we address 
each other to find out what we are. We commit ourselves 
to each other, and this commitment becomes our social 
covenant, for, as we address another and he responds to 
us, we discover that we exist in terms of each other. 
So long as~™ bound, exist. 55 [My italics] 
Speech and Existence 
Beckett views speech communication as the means of discovering 
reality, but only if it comes from the inner depth of the person. "Man," 
writes Proust, "is not a building that can receive additions to its 
superficies, but a tree whose stem and leafage are an expression of in-
ward sap. 1156 Speech communication is a process of confronting the inner 
man bringing forth the inner sap. True or genuine speech communication 
for Beckett is a process of "becoming." "Ah, if I could only find a 
voice of my own in all this babble," says the Unnamable, "it would be 
the end of their troubles and mine. 1157 It is the process of one human 
essence to the Other. True speech consists only when one being tries 
to bring a true sense of his existence and "wholeness" to the Other. 
It is a seeking to find the authentic voice. 
It might be wise to pause to define the nature of speech communi-
cation. Since we earlier discussed language as a form of living real-
ity, confusion may develop toward the differences between language and 
speech communication. For Beckett, speech communication is man's use 
of signs and syrnbols to link one person's essence to the Other. Beckett 
feels that speech communication is crucial to all beings because it 
allows for an element of humanness and establishes a communion of 
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sharing. Beckett contends that speech communication provides the means 
or the vehicle for man to live in relationship with the Other. In order 
to share his thoughts and feelings with others, man relies on speech. 
Man's potentiality, according to Beckett, is only realized through 
speech communication, and this sets him apart from other creatures. 
Beckett sees the most obvious and the most distinct form of communi-
cation between individuals in the use of langua'ge. A study of language 
serves as the root or focus to all studies on speech communication. 
Language provides a means of structuring an act, naming the contents, 
and indicating an attitude toward the situation. For Beckett, language 
provides the key to all human acts while speaking is the act itself. 
Language gives us, Beckett feels, the theoretical and potential con-
ditions while speech communication gives us the relationships. 
Beckett views the English speaking world as being deceived by 
speech and language. It is Beckett's feeling that speech is used as a 
process of manipulation, power, and control. In other words, Beckett 
sees the attitude of most speaking in the English world as a method of 
stealing the essence of the Other and language serving as the instru-
ment. "Speak yes," states the Unnamable, "but to me, I have never 
spoken enough to me, never listened enough to me, never replied enough 
to me, never had pity enough for me, I have spoken for my master, 
listened for the words of my master. n58 
A number of critics feel that one of the major reasons why Beckett 
composes all his works in French is the process of the language serving 
as a self-revelation and a creative discovery for him. Jean-Jacques 
Mayoux provides us with the essence of this feeling: 
65 
I 
Is not Beckett's use of French at one and the same time 
an acknowledgment of the fact of solitude and assertion 
of the right to be free? •.•. At this point an artist, a 
determined poet, even a rhetorician, arose in Beckett, 
to seize on this new language, to tame and internalize 
it, to draw from it a new music that is still Irish, or 
at least Celtic. I sometimes feel I am listening to a 
new and darker Chateaubriand. 59 
For Beckett, all authentic speech moves toward the attitude of finding 
the inner self. In short, Beckett views speech as moving towards the 
inner regions of the Self and attempting to 1avoid the solitude of 
nothingness. Thus, man is compelled to speak in order to find his 
essence. It is a continued striving for transcendence not in the Buber-
ian relationship to the Almighty, but a basic desire to preserve the 
Self from the Void. "And if it is the living, existential experience 
of the individual that matters," writes Esslin, 11 and has precedence 
over any abstract concepts it may elicit, then the very act of con-
fronting the void, or continuing to confront it, is an act of affi'rma-
tion. 1160 
At first glance, this appears in contradiction to the previous 
discussion as we were arguing that only authentic speech can develop 
from one human essence to the Other. In this particular interpretation, 
Beckett views the Other as the non-existence of his own being. This 
attitude finds the basic rationale in the arguments from The Medita-
tions. 
I am, however, a real thing, and really existent; but 
what thing? The answer was, a thinking thing. The 
question now arises, am I aught besides? I will stimu-
late my imagination with a view to discover whether I 
am not still' something more than a thinking being. Now 
it is plain I am not the assemblage of members called 
the human body; I am not a thin and penetrating air dif-
fused through all these members, or wind, or flan1e, or 
vapour, or breath, or any of all the things I can 
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imagine; for I supposed that all these were not, and, 
without changing the supposition, I find that I still 
feel assured of my existence. But it is true, perhaps, 
that those very things which I suppose to be non-
existent, because they are unknown to me, are not in 
truth different from myself whom I know. This is a 
point I cannot determine, and do not now enter into 
any dispute regarding it. I can only judge of things 
that are known to me: I am conscious that I exist, and 
I who know that I exist inquire into what I am •••• But 
what, then am I? 61 
It is surprising how closely this excerpt from Descartes' writing ap-
pears to Beckett's thinking. The following passage from The Unnamable 
uses the same basic argument and strategy irr relating that man is a 
rhetorical animal: 
Do they believe I believe it is I who am speaking? 
That's theirs too. To make me believe I have an ego 
all my own, and can speak of it, as they of theirs. 
Another trap to snap me up among the living. It's how 
to fall into it they can't have explained to me suf-
ficjently. They'll never get the better of my stupid-
ity. Why do they speak to me thus? Is it possible 
certain things change on their passage through me, in 
a way they can't prevent? Do they believe I believe 
it is I who am asking these questions? That's theirs 
too, a little distorted perhaps. I don't say it's not 
the right method. I don't say they won't catch me in 
the end. I wish they would, to be thrown away. It's 
this hunt that is tiring, this unending being at bay. 
Images, they imagine that by giling on the images 
they'll entice me in the end.62 
Beckett feels it is the basic motivation of man to find knowledge of the 
Self and continually confront rather than join the Void. Speech in this 
instance serves as a means to establish a basic relationship with the 
Void and come to gr,ips with the truth. "For the only way one can speak 
of Nothing," says Watt, "is to speak of it as though it were some-
thing.1163 
Thus speech is a means of grasping being if it comes from the inner 
soul. It is evident that what Beckett considers as important is the 
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process of "becoming" throughispeech. It is not speech as most of us 
conceive it; a process of argumentation and persuasion. It is not 
rhetoric as some define it; a verbal mode of judgments and choices. 
It is not a behavior viewed as an operation necessary to the transfer 
of ideas. True speech for Beckett is the process of becoming so the 
self is transcended into a discovery of reality and existence. Risk 
must be taken, but for Beckett these obligations' and commitments are 
worth the efforts. The truth of one's self may be difficult to accept, 
but in Beckett's mind, we must commit ourselves to this struggle in 
order to establish authentic communication. Without this commitment 
and state of risk, then communication is absurd like a conversation 
with a table or a chair. In short, the whole process of our existence 
is a phony performance or a total lie. Martin Esslin capsizes the 
r.oture of Beckett's thinking with the following remarks: 
It is the shape of the thouqht, the shape of the experi-
ence that matters, for the shape is 'its own significance, 
the experience its own meaning. It is the quality of the 
experience that, communicated, can change the quaJ,.ity of 
another human being's experience. Beckett himself may be 
skeptical as to the possibility of such communication. 
The obligation to express is not dictated by any idea of 
utility to others. But the fact that the obligation is 
felt leaves open the pos-sibility of genuine human communi-
cation.64 
For Beckett, to know the essence of man I s existence, we must also know 
the nature of speech communication. True speech provides a sense of 
becoming. And with Beckett, it is the sense of becoming and the shape 
that matters. 
The Quest in the Comic Frame 
Beckett's rhetorical heroes always set out on journeys to find the 
essence of existence, which is the authentic voice. Their pilgrimages 
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are painful, slow, and often hampered by blindness or lameness. Does 
this imply that Beckett's heroes are mere figures of motion? However 
painful and slow moving the Quests may be, the heroes still continue the 
search to find ontological security. The journey may be reduced to a 
crawl, but it is, n~vertheless, man still in action. And the action 
involves character, which involves choice, and the choice is perfected 
in the distinction between the living and the Void. 65 The action may 
be a limited one and the distinction between Yes and No a barely audible 
one, but nonetheless, it is a choice which determines character. 
Beckett sets the Quest for man to seek existence in the framework 
of the comic genre. Beckett's comic frame includes "laughs that strict-
ly speaking are not laughs"--since he emphasizes the bitter and mirth-
less laughter. The bitter laugh comes when a person views his actions 
as bejng noble, serious, and for the good of all mankind. In a sense, 
Beckett characterizes this kind of person pretentious, tragic, and what 
Burke calls helping out with the holocaust. 
Beckett pokes fun at the self-righteous who constantly look for 
guilt and a means of gaining catharsis. Beckett feels that the com-
passion for the human spirit comes through the technique of the comic 
through an ability to show man in his base and naked self. Beckett 
sees the serious and self-righteous individual as refusing to come to 
grips with his own reality. 
Although Becket-1:'s comedy may not strike the impulse of the gag-
seeker, he believes that man must know his rags and perhaps even exult 
in them. The means to help make man aware of his own foibles is the 
technique of the comic. "He [ Beckett] directs his laughter," summar-
izes Jacobsen and Mueller, "against that which is not good, against 
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that which is not true. That laughter is his testament--his legacy to 
that which is good, that which is true, that which is compassionate. 1166 
In summary, Beckett is interested in man in his totality and his 
symbol-using capacity. Time, habit, memory, and perception help shape 
and define the Beckett universe. If man can be understood, according 
to Beckett, it must come through an understanding of these relation-
ships with the Self and others. The power of language for Beckett 
serves as the sense of 11 becoming. 11 Man is different and unique from 
other creatures because of his ability to create and understand symbols. 
Language provides man the opportunity to emerge from nothingness and to 
reach out to join others. For Beckett, language serves as the essence 
of man and symbolic action as the key to all human acts. Language pro-
vid~s the structure and the attitude toward a situation while speech 
gives us -che vehicle of communion. Man is des Llned to live in com1w.mion 
with others and speech provides the process of sharing. Speech provides 
man with the means to live to his fullest potentiality. Beckett feels 
that all authentic speech must move toward the attitude of finding the 
inner self. Man, for Beckett, is continually striving to find a voice 
and avoid a state of nothingness. Beckett views true speech as a pro-
cess of transcendence into a discovery of reality and existence. 
Beckett views man as an actor, acting out his life in trying to 
understand his reality. While Burke places man in the context of seek-
ing the Ultimate Good, Beckett views the Ultimate as understanding the 
intellectual and emotional selves. Each of Beckett's rhetorical heroes 
attempts to find a voice and ontological security. The Quest story is 
set against the framework of the comic backdrop in hopes that this 
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technique will help man to transcend to a discovery of reality and 
existence by noting his own foibles. 
We have attempted in this chapter to analyze Proust and The 
Unnamable in detail to provide a theoretical base to understand the 
shape of the Beckett universe. We have also attempted to use these 
works as a basis for understanding Beckett's rhetorical theory and for 
a criteria to evaluate his plays in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BECKETT: THE LANGUAGE OF THE ABSURD 
I use the words you taught me. 
thing anymore, teach me others. 
If they don't mean any-
Or let me be silent. 
--EndgamEt 
The modern writer is faced with the baffling problem of 
picturing a self that seems to have lost its reality. 
Dwelling in a universe that seems to him alien and 
hostile, man today retreats within the fastness of the 
self, only to discover that he does not know himself; 
but the curse or the glory of being hurnan is that h9 
musL at all custs su1ve to know. He cannot; enc.lure 
existence without some light, however uncertain, of self-
knowledge •1 
This quoted passage from the opening pages of The Self in Modern Liter-
ature by Charles Glicksberg, reflects in essence the aesthetic practices 
of the modern writers' view toward reality. This point of view is often 
called the "language of the absurd." Although a strong case can be made 
for the literary quality of Beckett's novels, it is to the plays that 
he owes his international reputation. Furthermore his reputation as a 
dramatist largely stems from the drama of the Absurd. It is the nature 
of the Absurd which serves as the central focus of Beckett's plays. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is: (1) to define and explain 
the form of the Theatre of the Absurd; (2) to use Kenneth Burke's in-
sights to help explain the language of the Absurd; and (3) to evaluate 
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the themes of existence, time, habit, and memory as found in Waiting 
for Godot. 
The Form of The Theatre of the Absurd 
The Theatre of the Absurd has received a variety of interpretations 
in recent yearso A few critics have denounced it, while others have 
attempted to praise· it as a new form of theatre. A few critics have 
attempted-to analyze and categorize each playwright of the Absurd while 
others have dismissed the plays as a passing phenomenon. Regardless of 
whether we accept or reject it, like or dislike the plays, one thing is 
certain, we must recognize the Theatre of the Absurd as having a pro-
found impact on the form of writing in the past two decades. 
The first writer who attempts to explain the philosophy of the 
Absurd is Albert Camus. In The Myth of Sisyphus, he analyzes the human 
animal in face of the world crumbling. He writes: 
A world that can be explained even with bad r8asons is 
a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe 
suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an 
alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he 
is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of 
a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, 
the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of 
absurditye2 
Camus contends that the basic assumption of the Absurdist movement is 
that facts and events do not have meanings until man assigns meanings 
to them. The feeling of Absurdity comes as a result of the divorce 
between the basic fact and man's reality: 
Likewise we shall deem a verdict absurd when we contrast 
it with the verdict the facts apparently dictated. And, 
similarly, a demonstration by the absurd is achieved by 
comparing the consequences of such a reasoning with the 
logical reality one wants to set up •••• I am thus Justified 
in saying that the feeling of absurdity does not spring 
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from the mere scrutiny of a fact or an impression, but 
that it bursts from the comparison between a bare fact 
and a certain reality, between an action and the world 
that transcends it.3 
Another basic assumption of the Absurdist movement is that man's ideals 
lack a basic foundation. Sfnce there can be no objective truth, each 
man must find a set of values in which to base his own life. Eugene 
Ionesco points out the basic understanding of Absurdity "as that which 
is devoid~of purpose •••• cut off from his religious, metaphysical, and 
transcendental roots, man is lost, all his actions become senseless, 
absurd, useless. 114 The Absurdists view man as possessing no fixed 
character or essence. Man's personality is constantly changing and his 
consciousness is forever plagued with contradictions. Man is adrift 
in a chaotic universe, constructing whatever reality he needs to help 
him survive. The Absurdists view man as being homeless, aliena-ced, 
and meaningless in a universe of things. Man can gain no clue to his 
identity nor can he appeal to any universal law for justification of 
existence. This leads Edward Albee to speak of the Theatre of the Ab-
surd as "an absorption-in-art of certain existentialist and post-
existentialist philosophical concepts having to do in the main with 
man's cittempt to make for himself out of his senseless position in a 
world which makes no sense--which makes no sense because the moral, 
religious, political and social structures man has erected to illusion 
himself have collapsed. 115 
What these writers mean by the Absurd springs from the perception 
that human existence is without intrinsic purpose and reason. For most 
of the writers in The Theatre of the Absurd, there is an absence or at 
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least a withdrawal of God. When this absence is noticed, the world col-
lapses into anarchy and madness. As a result, the major characters of 
these plays can embrace no slogans and certainties. They are stripped 
of ontological truth and are mere forms of existence attempting to 
justify themselves. In short, they lack ontological security. R. D. 
Laing proposes an explanation of this phenomenon: 
If the individual cannot take the realness, aliveness, 
autonomy, and identity of himself and others for granted, 
then he has to become absorbed in contriving ways of try-
ing to be real, of keeping himself or others alive, of 
preserving his identity, in efforts, as he will often put 
it, 1to prevent himself losing his self.6 
When it is no longer possible to face life with certainties and objective 
systems, then man must face life in a stark reality. The Theatre of the 
Absurd reveals man stripped of social and historical significance. Man 
is faced with the basic choice of existence as found in time between 
birth and death. Camus indicates the conflict of the choice: 
We live on the future: "tomorrow," "later on," "when 
you have made your way," "you will understand when you 
are old enough." Such irrelevancies are wonderful, for, 
after all, it's a matter of dying. Yet a day comes when 
a man notices or says that he is thirty. Thus he asserts 
his youth. But simultaneously he situates himself in 
relation to time. He takes his place in it. He admits 
that he stands at a certain point on a curve that he 
acknowledges having to travel to its end. He belongs to 
time, and by the horror that seizes him, he recognizes 
his worst enemy. Tomorrow, he was longing for tomorrow, 
whereas everything in him ought to reject it. That revolt 
of the flesh is the absurd. 7 
This is one of the reasons why Time serves as the central theme of 
Beckett's plays. The essential dialectic charcteristic of Waiting for 
Godot is not Godot but the act of waiting. Man faced with waiting must 
make certain choices to give an awareness of existence. 
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This change in the philosophical position from the classical 
philosophers has also brought about the fundamental change in the form 
of expression. Most of the drama from the Greeks to Ibsen expresses a 
generally accepted metaphysical system. The Theatre of the Absurd 
expresses the absence of any generally known system of the cosmos. 
"The Theatre of the Absurd," says Martin Esslin, "makes no pretense at 
explaining the ways of God to man; it can merely present, in anxiety or 
/ 
with derision, an individual human being's intuition of the ultimate 
realities as he experiences them; the fruits of one man's descent into 
the depths of his personality, his dreams, fantasies, and nightmares. 11 8 
Since The Theatre of the Absurd is not interested in solving 
problems or narrating events, the plays take on the characteristic of 
poetic situations. "The formal structure of such a play is," Esslin 
says, "merely a device to express a complex total image by unfolding it 
in a sequence of interacting elements."9 
In the classical plays, the spectators were aware of the situation 
and the characters relationship to each other. The plots for Greek 
audiences brought no surprises or new ideas. The audiences experienced 
catharsis by the feelings of fear and pity toward the tragic hero who 
was caught in the forces of fate. The Theatre of the Absurd attempts 
to show the situation of modern man in his grimness and despair. The 
attempt is to make the audiences more conscious and aware of their own 
reality. As a result, the characters and plots are not clear-cut. The 
audience may not be aware of what is going to happen next, or if any-
thing is going to happen at all. "The Theatre of the Absurd," says 
Esslin, "which proceeds not by intellectual concepts but by poetic 
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images, neither poses an intellectual problem in its exposition nor 
provides any clear-cut solutions." Many of the absurd plays, he con-
tinues, "have a circular structure, ending exactly as they began; others 
progress merely by a growing intensification of the initial situation. 1110 
Esslin hints at the change in the fundamental form of writing. ''The 
audience can ask," he writes, 
"What is going to happen next?" But then anything may 
next, so that the answer to this question cannot 
be worked out according to the rules of ordinary proba-
bility based on motives and characterizations that will 
remain constant throughout the play. The relevant 
question here is not so much what is going to happen next 
but what is happening? "What does the action of the play 
represent?" This constitutes a different, but by no 
means less valid, kind of dramatic suspense. Instead of 
being provided with a solution, the spectator is chal-
lenged to formulate the questions that he will have to 
ask if he wants to approach the meaning of the play. 11 
Kenneth Burke indicates that the main change in the form of writing from 
the classical to the modern is one of "expectation." Burke feels that 
in the old classical formula the audience understood exactly the roles 
of the characters and what was expected of them. In the modern drama, 
Burke points out that the audience may only be interested in not knowing 
what to expect. "In Waiting for Godot the theme of Christian vigil is 
not tnus romanticized," writes Burke, "but deliberately burlesqued. 1112 
Burke goes on to indicate that "form involves the arousing of expecta-
tions and in Godot the audience is quite uncertain what to expect; but 
in effect the formal principle of expectation is transformed into a 
problematical theme. 11 13 
In one of Burke's early writings, The Book of Yul, the story opens 
on the theme of "expectation as expectation." It is interesting to com-
pare the structure and theme of the opening passages to that of Waiting 
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for Godot. "While waiting," writes Burke, "two men carried on a con-
versation that flapped like an old newspaper. And a thtrd was silent. 
Finally, the conversation gained in intensity, culminating in some dis-
agreeable figure or image •••• 'Do you think she will come? 11114 The 
characters, according to the story, remained silent while the sounds 
from the outside came in dampened by the snow. Finally, the first man 
turned to the other and said: 
"If we're going to wait around here we might as well be 
comfortable." "Too late now, she'll be along any min-
ute." ••• Out of the high windows the snow could be seen 
falling diagonally across a street lamp. "This waiting 
outside the gates of Heaven jg cold business." "Why in 
the name of God do you call it the gates of Heaven? 1115 
Like Waiting for Godot the major figure for whom the men are waiting 
never appears. The transformation of the story like Godot coJlles from 
the actions, games, and sounds they encounter while v,,ai ting. "The 
story [Book of Yul]," writes Burke, "undergoes symbolic transforma-
tion; certain sounds that the men had heard while waiting ("scraping" 
and "thump") enigmatically reveal their unanticipatable implications 
by turnlng up again later, in a quite different context. 1116 
Burke views this fundamental change in form to "expectation as ex-
pectation" as one of the basic features with the Absurdist plays. As a 
result, form is not imposed on the characters and the audience, but it 
evolves as the play progresses. The "Nothing happens" of Godot and "What 
can we expect next?" brings about a certain suspense which captures the 
attention of the spectator. This rhetorical strategy captures the imag-
ination a& well as the attention of the audience. "It has been said of 
Waiting for Godot," writes Alfonso Sastre, "with destructive intent, 
that it is a drama which absolutely nothing happens. And does that 
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seem a small accomplishment'?" But while many dramas of intrigue may 
leave us cold, Sastre continues, "this nothing happens of Waiting for 
Godot keeps us in suspense. 1117 Sastre further explains the basic 
rhetorical strategy of Godot, which provides a sense of revelation for 
the spectatox. He writes: 
These men who are bored cast us out of our own boredom; 
the:ix boredom produces our catharsis, and we follow their 
adventure breathlessly, for they have suddenly placed us 
_ be£ore the "nothing happens" of our liyes. The gray and 
meaningless mass of our everyday existence is suddenly 
illuminated, disclosing its true structure, naked and 
desolate. That is the great revelation •••• Thus, "nothing 
happens" can be the form in which'the most extraordinary 
and profound events are presented, just as "many things 
happen" can be a f orrn of emptiness .18 
The process o:f "nothing happens" transcends the audience into an aware-
ness of "expectation as expectation." "The modern spectator," writes 
Jacques Guicl-...arnaud, "is led, more than ever in the history of theatre 
to consider each play as a possible metaphor, an objectivized hypo-
thesis of man's and the world's condition. 111 9 In the past, writers 
simplified the universe and wrote about what was considered a known and 
closed system. The modern spectator must regard the Absurd writers, 
one might say, '11 as makers of metaphors and tangible symbols of a truth 
that is always transcendent. 1120 
The change of form in modern drama leads Frederick Hoffman to argue 
that the shift is from a metaphysical center to a epistemological one. 
Hoffman feels that in the modern plays the author disappears and is 
replaced by the consciousness of his characters. According to Hoffman, 
the author gives in to the scene, which is the ground of his art; or he 
explores the consciousness of his characters, but he remains outside 
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of them. 21 This insight supports the view of Burke that the modern 
play takes on a position of "expectation as expectation." Hoffman 
argues: 
This is what I mean when I say that the philosophical 
ground of twentieth-century literature has shifted from 
metaphysics to epistemology. Characters who were for-
merly maneuvered within an accepted frame of extraliter-
ary reference are now represented as seeking their own 
definitions and their own languages. This is not to say 
that metaphysics is abolished; it is always implicit, 
but the principal course taken by characters is the move 
toward an awkward and a hesitant initial assumption. 22 
The task of the modern artist is an attempt to find a form that will 
allow his characters freedom but not bore the audience. Although 
Beckett and other critics from the Theatre of the Absurd are criticized 
as being against form or pl.ot, their plays still adhere to a form-
making structure. The focus is different, but the form or plot still 
exists. This idea is expressed in the words of Beckett: 
What I am saying does not mean that there will hence-
forth be no form in art. It only means that there will 
be new form, and that this form will be of such a type 
that it admits the chaos and does not try to say that 
the chaos is really something else. The form and the 
chaos remain separate. The latter is not reduced to the 
former. That is why the form itself becomes a preoc-
cupation, because it exists as a problem separate from 
the mate1'ial it accornmoda tes. To find a form that accom-
modates the mess, that is the task of the artist now. 23 
What Beckett implies is that if we are to understand man we must con-
sider the chaos as much as order, we must consider the irrational as 
much as the rational, and we must understand man's inactions as well as 
his actions. The job for the artist is attempting to place these con-
cepts into some kind of meaningful pattern. The writers of the Theatre 
of the Absurd profess to do this. 
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The major dramatists of the Absurd wish to form a work of art that 
transports the reader or spectator into a feeling for the absurdity. 
Rather than talking about absurdity, modern dramatists attempt to get 
the reader or spectator to experience the absurd situation. This, of 
course, requires a definite form of writing. "To begin negatively," 
writes William Mueller and Josephine Jacobsen, "we may say that Beckett's 
style is not real is tic. His characters are marked by the grotesque." It 
appears that his characters are not taken from realistic situations before 
we read his plays, continue Mueller and Jacobsen, but "what is remarkable 
is the degree to which these same real persons come to resemble Beckett's 
characters after we have read the plays. For his style, not realistic 
is realer than reai. 1124 It is the basic strategy of Beckett to involve 
the spectator not from the exterior detail of character, but what he 
conceives to be the inner life of his heroes. Thus the spectator tends 
to recognize how closely the characters come to project the inner-most 
condition of individuals within contemporary society. 
Although there have been a number of influences on the form for the 
Theatre of the Absurd, none seems to have received greater impact than 
Antonin Artaud and his book The Theatre and Its Double. This is not 
the place to evaluate Artaud's ideas, but there are some fundamental 
issues which need mentioning because of their influence on Beckett and 
the Theatre of the Absurd. It is also interesting to note that Artaud's 
student and disciple, Roger Blin, directed the first successful pro-
duction of Waiting for Godot. 
Artaud criticized the contemporary theatre as being too psycholog-
ical and concerned with "art for art's sake." In other words, he viewed 
art on one side of life and the reality of existence on the other. 
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Artaud proposed that a cure for this sickness was a 11 Theatre of cruel-
ty." He writes: 
[ The] "Theater of cruelty" means a theater difficult 
and cruel for myself first of all. And, on the level 
of performance, it is not the cruelty we can exercise 
upon each other by hacking at each other's bodies, 
carving up our personal anatomies, or, like Assyrian 
emperors, sending parcels of human ears, noses, or 
neatly detached nostrils through the mail, but the 
much more terrible and necessary cruelty which things 
can exercise against us. We are not free. And the 
sky can still fall on our heads. And the theater has 
been created to teach us that first of a11. 25 
The Theatre of the Absurd is, as John Killinger points out, such a place 
where the sky does fall on our heads. "The otherness of reality, 11 says 
Killinger, "the undomesticated, less human side of life, which is 
naturally far weightier and more extensive than the human side, closes 
in on us and threatens us with obliteration. 1126 
Artaud, like Beckett, wishes to strip theatre of its Aristotelian . 
concepts and restore it to the magic of the works themselves. They wish 
to show the interior and the irrational side of man. "The Theater will 
never find itself again, 11 Artaud says, "except by furnishing the spec-
tator with the truthful precipitates of dreams, in which his taste for 
crime, his erotic obsessions, his savagery, his chimeras, his utopian 
sense of Jife and matter, even his cannibalism, pour out, on a level 
not counterfeit and illusory, but interior. 11 27 
In order to reach his objective, Artaud proposes what he calls a 
\ 
"theatrical language" where the signs or symbols can be as important 
as the spoken word. In this way, the audience can directly experience 
gestures, lights, and sound as well as the spoken word. He argues: 
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It has not been definitively proved that the language 
of words is the best possible language. And it seems 
that on the stage, which is above all a space to fill 
and a place where something happens, the language of 
signs •••• The grammar of this new language is still to 
be found. Gesture is its material and its wits; and, 
if you will, its alpha and omega. It springs from 
the NECESSITY of speech more than from speech already 
formed. But finding an impasse in speech, it returns 
spontaneously to gesture. In passing, it touches upon 
some of the physical laws of human expression. 28 
What Artaud proposes is not that words be abandoned in the theatre, but 
that we become aware of how words can be used as obJects. Like Beckett, 
he is not interested in suppressing speech, but of understanding how 
words may cover the internal self or obscure the relationship of man to 
man. Both Artaud and Beckett are interested in revealing man, his 
ideas about reality, and his poetic place in reality. 
Is this approach not contradictory to what we argued in the last 
chapter about the essence of language? For Artaud as well as Beckett, 
it is not a question of suppressing speech, but of making us aware of 
the "thingness" of words. The so called "communication breakdown" in 
the plays of Beckett is a satirical magnification to show the existing 
state of affairs. Both Artaud and Beckett wish to show how words 
become barriers between persons to whom they should join. Words can 
stand between persons much the same as a wall or a piece of furniture 
to the physical relationship of the Self. And the restoration of lan-
guage to its expressive function can only be accomplished by man's 
reverence to the written or spoken word. "And this," according to 
Martin Esslin, "in turn can be achieved only if the limitation of logic 
and discursive language are recognized and respected, and the uses of 
poetic language acknowledged. 1129 The best method to present this 
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awareness is in the drama and through Artaud's idea of a "theater of 
cruelty." This is illustrated in a scene from Waiting for Godot: 
Estragon: All the dead voices. 
Vladimir: They make a noise like wings. 
Estragon: Like leaves. 
Vladimir: Like sand. 
Estragon: Like leaves. 
Silence 
Vladimir: They all speak at once. 
Estragon: Each one to itself. 
Silence 
Vladimir: Rather they whisper. 
Estragon: They rustle. 
Vladimir: They murmur. 
Estragon: They rustle. 
Silence 
Vladimir: What do they say? 
Estragon: They talk about their lives. 
Vladimir: To have lived is not enough for them. 
Estragon: They have to talk about it. 
Vladimir: To be dead is not enough for them. 
Estragon: It is not sufficient. 
Silence 
Vladimir: They make a noise like feathers. 
Estragon: Like leaves. 
Vladimir: Like ashes. 
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Estragon: Like leaves. 
Long Silence30 
It seems reasonable to assume from this dialogue that Beckett is refer-
ring to a dead and fixed language. Only through a restoration of an 
authentic contact can a living language be restored. The strategic use 
of silence aims at encompassing a symbolic illusion of the spoken, and 
by utilizing it makes it speak to us. Silence becomes a kind of sym-
bolic gesture that takes on meaning. Another example of this technique 
occurs when Pozzo is about to make his first exitrin Act I. 
Pozzo: I must go. 
Estragon: And your half-hunter? 
Pozzo: I must have left it at the manor. 
Silence 









Pozzo: And thank you. 
Vladimir: Thank you. 
Pozzo: Not at all. 
Estragon: Yes, yes. 
Pozzo: No, no. 
Vladimir: Yes, yes, 
Estragon: No, no. 
Silence31 
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This rhetorical strategy)by Beckett of brevity of line and the frequent 
use of silence indicates the difficulty of communication with Just words. 
Beckett appears to adopt the philosophy of Martin Heidegger that without 
silence all speech becomes chatter and a process of filling the Void. 
By strategically placing the gesture of silence, Beckett emphasizes an 
important symbolic means of language. Perhaps this strategy supports 
the idea of Beckett's that the final and inevitable answer may be 
silence. William Barrett summarizes the essence of Beckett's concept: 
In any case, silence can be expressed only through lan-
guage. Indeed, only through language does silence come 
to be at all. If there were no language, there rnight be 
an absence of sound waves in this universe but there would 
not be silence, For silence speaks to us only through 
language. And conversely, without such silence authentic 
language disappears. The staccato chatter of the loud-
speaker neither knows nor invokes silence. Nor is this 
silence within language a mark of its deficiency. On the 
contrary, where it is most adequate language brings us 
into the silent presence of what it has uttered, No 
further words are needed, "the rest is silence. 1132 
One of the most significant aspects about Artaud's theory is the 
language beyond words. He proposes that the theatre needs to adopt a 
visual language of obJects, movements, gestures as well as those of 
sound and speech. "And what the theater can still take over from 
speech," says Artaud, "are its possibilities for extension beyond words, 
for development in space, for dissociative and vibratory action upon 
the sensibility. This is the hour of intonations, of a word's particu-
lar pronunciation. 1133 Artaud feels that the theatre must become aware 
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of the language in space, sounds, cries, and lights. He concludes his 
theory of the language in theatre with the following remarks: 
The question, then, for the theater, is to create a 
metaphysics of speech, gesture, and expression, in 
order to rescue it from its servitude to psychology 
and "human interest." But all this can be of no use 
unless behind such an effort there is some kind of 
real metaphysical inclination, an appeal to certain 
unhabitual ideas, which by their very nature cannot be 
limited or even formally depicted. These ideas which 
touch on Creation, Becoming, and Chaos, are all of a 
cosmic order and furnish a primary notion of a domain 
from which the theater is now entirely alien. 34 
The ideas of Artaud may help explain the emphasis on stage movement, 
gestures, and action in Waiting for Godot. Perhaps there is no other 
play from the Theatre of the Absurd that includes as much description 
about the stage action than Godot. The two props which seem to receive 
the most attention are Estragon's boots and Vladimir's hats. The open-
ing of Act II gives us a sampling of this feeling: 
Estragon's boots front center, heels together, toes 
splayed. Lucky's hat at same place. The tree has four 
EE, five leaves. V}adimn agitatedly. He halts 
and looks long at the tr~i, then· suddenly begins to 
~feverishly~ the stage. He halts before the 
boots, picks ..2.!2§. ~, examines it, sniffs ll, manifests 
disgust, puts it back carefully. Comes and goes. 
Halts extreme right and aazes into distance off, shed-
ing his eyes with his hand. Comes and goes. Halts 
extreme left, as before. Cornes and goes. Halts sud-
denly and begins to sing loudly. 
Vladimir: A dog came in--
Having begun too high he stops, clears his throat, resumes: 
A dog came in the kitchen 
And stole a crust of bread. 
Then cook up with a ladle 
And beat him till he was dead •••• 
He remains~ moment silent and motionless, then begins to 
move feverishly about the stage. He halts before .!J:lg_ tree, 
comes and goes, before the boots, comes and goes, halts 
extreme right, gazes into distance, extreme left, gazes 
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into distance. Enter Estragon right, barefoot, head bowed. 
He slowly crosses the stage. Vladimir turns and~ him.35 
One of the fin est comedy sketches comes later in Act II when the 
stage action revolves around the exchange of hats. This scene clearly 
reveals the importance of the language of the visual and the emphasis 
on the gesture in the Beckett theatre. 
Estragon takes Vladimir's hat. Vladimir adJusts Lucky's 
hat .2!! his head~ Estragon puts .Q!l Vladimir's hat in 
place of his~ which he hands .:t,Q. Vladimir. Vladimir 
takes Estragon' s hat. Estragon adjusts Vladimir's hat .Q!l 
his head. Vladimir puts .Q!l Estragon's hat in place .Q,f 
Lucky's which he hands to Estragon. Estragon takes 
Lucky's hat. Vladimir adjusts Estragon' s hat .Q!1 his head. 
Estragon puts .£!l Lucky's hat in place of Vladimir's which 
hands to Vladimir. Vladimir takes his hat. Estragon 
adjusts Lucky's hat .£!l his head. Vladimir puts .Q!l his hat 
in place of Estragon's which he hands to Estragon. Estra-
gon takes his hat. Vladimir adjusts his hat .Q!l his head. 
Estragon puts .Q!l his hat in place of Lucky's which he 
hands to Vladimir. Vladimir takes Lucky's hat. Estragon 
adjusts his hat .Q!! his head. Vladimir puts .Q!l Luc1<:y' s 
hat in place of his owl"l \l'rhich he hands to Estragon. Es-
tragon takes Vladimir's hat. Vladimir adjusts Lucky's 
hat .Q!1 his head. Estragon hands Vladimir's hat back to 
Vladimir who takes it and hands it back to Estragon who 
takes it and hands it back to Vladimir who takes it and 
throws it down. 36 
Although Artaud's dramatic works were never successful, his con-
cepts influence the substance or the form in the writing of the Theatre 
of the Absurd. A playwright like Beckett attempts to break down the 
habitual in order to describe a reality that is irrational and non-
Aristotelian. Beckett relies principally on the technique of brutal 
slapstick, distortions of language, incongruities, and man in his misery 
to bring about a shocking reality. All these methods indicate a close 
relationship to the basic theory of Antonin Artaud. Jacques Guicharnaud 
suggests that Beckett's theatre creates a shattering experience which 
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not only deeply moves the spectator, but distorts his very being. He 
writes: 
Almost all the great playwrights of today try to pre-
vent the spectator from drowsing in a peaceful defin-
ition of man. Few of course go as far as Artaud in 
rejecting Western thought as a whole, but all question 
the basic values of our world, the conceptions of Good 
and Evil, the satisfactions of rationalism. Although, 
except for certain poets, they do not invoke the return 
to a totally magical and mystical vision of the world, 
they do use violence, cruelty, derangement, and crime 
as methods for awakening in the spectator a conscious-
ness of his falsifications of civilization, what is 
truly man--man being situated at a level that would 
traditionally be called inhuman. 37 
It is interesting to note that Kenneth Burke sees modern man's nature 
as basically a killer. Oftentimes, according to Burke, the victimage 
of man's resistance is Nature. Burke feels that nothing gives man 
greater pleasure than to rip through a mountain with a giant bulldozer 
or to bulld a bridge over a beautiful river.38 The basic strntegy for 
the writers of the Absurd is to show man in his baseness and naked 
reality without hiding behind societal masks. 
As a result, Beckett turns to playwriting since it is more dramatic 
than the novel. The nature of this genre also provokes a more direct 
and influential power on the audience. Therefore, it is easy to see why 
Beckett uses the Theatre of the Absurd to dramatize his philosophy 
toward reality and man's symbol-using capacity. 11 The Theatre of the 
Absurd has frightened audiences around the globe," says John Killinger, 
"in proportion as the vision on stage has corresponded wi.th the sense 
of emptiness and confusion within and has verified to the heart of the 
spectator the possibility he has already felt that the world is not 
precisely the way he has seen it. 1139 
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The major ideas of Artaud as well as Beckett is to have us face 
some of the issues-which are inhuman and hopefully raise a sense of 
consciousness and aliveness in the world. "And this is essentially 
what the drama of the fifties and sixties has managed to do," says 
Killinger, "its achievement may be a new order of consciousness. 1140 
The ideas by Artaud lead us to another assumption about the form 
of the Theatre of the Absurd. Although the playwright gives a drama 
a certain'meaning and form, the play is ultimately received or inter-
preted in an auditorium before an audience. The Absurdists realize 
they must reach and affect a total audience within a given period of 
time. "The theatre is the only place in the world," says Artaud, "the 
last general means we still possess of directly affecting the organism 
and, in periods of neurosis and petty sensuality like the one in which 
we are immersed, of attacking the sensuality by physical means it can-
not withstand."41 The Theatre of the Absurd must provide an experience 
whereby the audience can respond to the mood and tone of the play. If 
the audience fails to respond within the parameters of ~he length of 
time, it is quite unlikely they may never respond to the ideas of the 
playwright. The basic appeal of this theatre is that the audience is 
in the physical presence of the characters, which involves its total 
sensuality. The persuasive function of the modern theatre is indicated 
by William Barrett: 
The theater is beginning to discover that it has resources 
of its own as powerful as those of the cinema. The basis 
of all its resources is that we are in the same room in the 
physical presence of the actors, and therefore the action 
going on there can involve us more directly. Moreover, 
there is an opportunity for a kind of direct theatrical 
metaphor that could not be so effective from a moving 
picture. Thus when Beckett, in Endgame, puts the two aged 
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parents on stage in ashcans, he gives us the immediate and 
direct theatrical image of what the life of this old couple 
has become.42 
Another function about the Theatre of the Absurd is that it depends on 
the collaboration of playwright, actor, scene designer, director as 
well as the spectator. The playwright provides the potentiality of giv-
ing the audience an experience. He provides the form for the character, 
dialogue, and situation. It is the duty of the actors and the stage 
technicians to bring the ideas alive and make it a worthwhile living 
experience for the audience. 
Since the success of the theatre depends in part on audience 
response, the plays must provide some kind of meaningful experience. 
Theatre provides a sense of feeling for the times and a barometer of 
contemporary thought. Thus, an audience must be able to identify with 
the themes and characters that give significant experience to their 
lives. Without the process of identification, the play is going to 
fail as theatrical enjoyment. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to 
look at Beckett's plays from his use of identification strategies. 
The Rhetorical Insights of Kenneth Burke in Viewing the 
Identification Strategies in Beckett's Plays 
As we 4 discussed in the opening chapter, we plan to apply some of 
the insights of Kenneth Burke in determining the implications of themes 
in Beckett's plays. We further stated that the strategy of identifi-
cation seemed the most worthwhile in providing insights to these plays. 
The process of establishing a common interest, value, or form 
with others through the usage of symbols, describes the process of 
identification. Burke writes: 
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In pure identification there would be no strife. Like-
wise, there would be no strife in absolute separateness, 
since opponents can Join battle only through mediatory 
ground that makes their interchange of blows. But put 
identification and division ambiguously together, so that 
you cannot know for certain just where one ends and the 
other begins, and you have the characteristic invitation 
to rhetoric.43 
Burke believes that the use of words by human agents to form attitudes 
or to induce actions in other human agents is the basic role of rhetoric. 
The identification process occurs through consubstantiality--having the 
same substance or interests in common. In this approach, we see the 
implication of the search for rhetorical methods to help merge atti-
tudes and values into one substance. This process is not the absorption 
of one human essence into another, but a merger of symbolic substances. 
"In being identified with B, 11 writes Burke, "A is substantially one 
with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains 
unique, an individual locus in motives. Thus he is both joined and 
separate at once a distant substance and consubstantial with another. 11 44 
Since man is constantly changing, there is a need to continually 
look for new methods. Rhetoric provides the means for man to seek new 
ways of identification of interests to establish a rapport between him-
self and his fellow man. The basic motivation of rhetoric is the exer-
cise in satisfying the basic needs of man in the search for internal 
and external order. Thereby, rhetoric is a continual and ongoing pro-
cess of seeking new ways of unifying the human spirit. 
The term used for the fusion process by Burke is strategy, which 
is based upon attitudinal identification with the participants in a 
rhetorical activity. By using this concept, we try to view the acts 
of man as a strategic linguistic attempt to encompass a situation. 
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Burke points out that imaginative and critical works are strategic 
answers posed to situations. Thus a play or any work of art, is a 
strategy inasmuch as it offers an answer or response to assertions 
current in the situation from which it arises. When a playwright or 
poet names and identifies, he attributes certain motives to a thing 
or situation. Motives in this sense are simply "shorthand terms" for 
situations. The motivations out of which a playwright composes his 
works of art are synonymous with the structural way in which he puts 
events and values together.45 As a result, a writer develops as many 
strategies as situations in which he is asked to respond. Although 
there are many strategies of identification, there are three dominant 
ones worth noting in our study of Beckett's plays. 
The Strategy of Ambiguity 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Beckett is against a dead and 
fixed language. The vitality and dynamic quality of language creates 
a certain degree of ambiguity. Beckett views the ambiguity of language 
similar to the interpretation of Burke, that it is a necessary attribute 
to keeping language alive and fresh. Language carries with it an ele-
ment of abmiguity and this allows for the process of identification. 
It allows the latitude of meaning necessary to share with the Other. 
Ambiguity becomes a process of resolving differences by transcending 
them to a higher level of awareness. 
The title of Waiting for Godot establishes the most obvious level 
of ambiguity. Estragon and Vladimir wait for the ultimate meaning in 
hopes that when Godot arrives he can save them from nothingness. Until 
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Godot arrives we cannot say with any certainty whether he is God, and 
by the same token it is impossible to say with any certainty that he is 
not God because of the constant Christian references to him. The 
description of Godot carries with it the ambiguity of him being a 
Savior but living with a family and having friends as well as a check-
ing account. We are never certain as to the exact purpose of Godot, 
the exact nature for the meeting, and his character traits. Yet he 
constantly influences the actions and behavior of the two tramps. 
Vladimir: Let's wait and see what he says. 
Estragon: Who? 
Vladimir: Godot. 
Estragon: Good idea. 
Vladimir: Let's wait till we know exactly how we stand. 
Estragon: On the other hand it wight be better to strike 
the iron before it freezes. 
Vladimir: I'm curious what he has to offer. Then 
we'll take it or leave it. 
Estragon: What exactly did we ask him for? 
Vladimir: Were you not there? 
Estragon: I can't have been listening. 
Vladimir: Oh ••• Nothing very definite. 
Estragon: A kind of prayer. 
Vladimir: Precisely. 
Estragon: A vague supplication. 
Vladimir: Exactly. 
Estragon: And what did he reply? 
Vladimir: That he'd see. 
Estragon: That he couldn't promise anything. 
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Vladimir: That he'd have to think it over. 
Estragon: In the quiet of him home. 
Vladimir: Consult his family. 
Estragon: His friends. 
Vladimir: His agents. 
Estragon: His correspondents. 
Vladimir: His books. 
Estragon: His bank account. 
Vladimir: Before taking a decision.46 
At the end of the play, we are no more certain about Godot than when 
the play opens. The only hope is that he might appear tomorrow. 
Vladimir: What does he do, Mr. Godot? 
Do you hear me? 
Boy: Yes Sir. 
Vladimir: Well? 
Boy: He does nothing, Sir. 
Silence 
Vladimir: How is your brother? 
Boy: He's sick, Sir. 
V-ladimir: Perhaps it was he came yesterday. 
Boy: I don't know, Sir. 
Silence 
Vladimir: Has he a beard, .Mr. Godot? 
Boy: Yes Sir. 
Vladimir: Fair or ••• (he hesitates) ••• or black? 
Boy: I think it's white, Sir. 
Silence 
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Vladimir: Christ have mercy on us! 
Silence 
Boy: What am I to tell Mr. Godot, Sir? 
Vladimir: Tell him .•. (he hesitates) ••• tell him you saw 
me and that .•. (he hesitates) ••• that you saw me. 47 
Beckett obviously had a good reason to establish the ambiguity of the 
name Godot. Beckett has remarked on more than one occasion that the 
name Godot can mean whatever we wish it to mean. 
Without the "ot" suffix to Godot, we have the word God, which has 
spurred debate that the play is a modern religious allegory. It has 
also been suggested that the name Godot could be linked with the little 
man in France called Charlot. (He was the predecessor to the Charlie 
Chaplin character.) It has also been argued that the title Wa:itfog for 
Godot contains an allusion to Simon Weil's book, Waiting __ for God. 
Although it seems easy to associate the name of Godot with God, 
Colin Duckworth proposes that Godot can be associated equally as well 
with several unpleasant words in French: godailleur, 'loafer'; godenot, 
1 a jugglers puppet'; godiche, 'lout'. The word godet in French means a 
receptacle, according to Duckworth, hence something that might hold any 
meaning put into the word. 48 Ducbvorth further indicates there might 
even be some connection between Godot and the rn Godot de Mauroy in 
Paris, a notorious place for expensive prostitutes. In this street, 
there is a shop named Godot. 49 This interpretation might be in keeping 
with Beckett's sardonic humor that Godot is no more than a keeper of 
expensive vices. 
The name Godot may also come from a character in a play written 
by Balzac. This play is entitled Mercadet, and the plot revolves around 
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Godeau, who absconds with the funds from the Stock Exchange. The return 
of Godeau is a constant hope in order to pay off the creditors and save 
the town from financial ruin. As the play draws to a close, there is a 
rumor that Godeau has returned with a huge fortune. The play ends with 
one of the characters saying, "Allons soir Godeau." 
Hugh Kenner points out that Godeau was a champion racing cyclist 
in France. Therefore, according to Kenner, Godot "typifies Cartesian 
man in excelsis, the Cartesian Centaur, body and mind in close har-
mony •••• Cartesian man deprived of his bicycle is a mere intelligence 
fastened to a dying animal."5o 
The ambiguity of the use of Godot in the title can serve as an 
endless debate. It appears that Beckett uses this strategy of identifi-
cation to provoke transcendence by providing a sharing in the inter-
pretation of Godot in the manner of our own feelings. Duckworth writes: 
Godot can be looked upon either as a constant or an 
indeterminate variable. Considered as a variable, 
Godot "will be an unspecified thing or state or pro-
cess waiting to be defined by some constant the 
interpreter may elect to supply." Any role, any 
function, can be assigned to Godot--a challenge to 
self-improvement, an anchor in a sea of doubt an 
uncertainty, or perhaps the hope of extrahurnan help 
in a world likely to be totally destroyed by humans 
if they are left to their own devices.51 .. 
The names of Beckett's rhetorical heroes in all his major novels are, 
like Godot, presented with a degree of ambiguity. Most of his heroes 
names start off with the capitol M (Man or perhaps a word play of Sam) 
Murphy, Malone, Mahood, Malloy, Moran, Macmann, and W(M)att. Although 
each narrie gives a hypothetical suggestiveness to the behaviors of his 
characters, the background, purpose, and descriptions are, like Godot, 
wrapped with ambiguity. The names of the heroes in Waiting for Godot 
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might suggest the cosmic nature of man. The nationalities for these 
names are Estragon-French, Vladimir-Russian, Pozzo-Italian, and Lucky-
English. Endgame also offers a field day of interpretations with the 
\ 
major characters. Hamm is often associated with Ham-let or ham actor. 
He sometimes makes references to warming up for his last soliloquy or 
making a dramatic e_xit. Hamm may also stand for the hammer as the 
driving and authoritative force over Clov. Hamm may also serve as an 
identification with the author, Samm. Oftentimes Hamm refers to him-
self as a poet and playwright as well as an actor. Clovis associated 
with clown or the French term of clou, which means "nail." Nagg might 
refer to the German term of Nagel or nagger while Nell is another 
variation of the German term for "nail." To know this information may 
not add any additional insights, except that Beckett is a word-man 
and enjoys the ambiguity of the language. Beckett, of course, did.not 
invent the ambiguity of language, he merely exploits the strategy to 
his own advantage. He once said: 
The confusion is not my invention. We cannot listen to 
a conversation for five minutes without being acutely 
aware of the confusion. It is all around us and our only 
chance is to let it in. The only chance of renovation 
is to open our eyes and see the rness.52 
In other words, Beckett views ambiguity the same as Burke that it is 
not our task to "dispose of" ambiguity but to "clarify the resources of 
ambiguity."53 "Accordingly, what we want," says Burke, "is not terms 
that avoid ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots 
at which ambiguities necessarily arise. 1154 
One of the most significant aspects of Waiting for Godot deals with 
the ambiguity of waiting. The nature of waiting is a type of suspended 
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action in limbo. Estragon and Vladimir's lives are dominated by the 
suspense of wondering if Godot will arrive. Six different times the 
following dialogue takes place: 
Estragon: Let's go. 
Vladimir: We can't. 
Estragon: Why not? 
Vladimir: We're waiting for Godot. 
Godot simply represents the object of their waiting. "It is the act 
of waiting that we experience the flow of time," says Martin Esslin, 
"in its purest, most evident form; if we are active, we tend to forget 
the passage, we pass the time, but if we are merely passingly waiting, 
we are confronted with the action of time itself. 11 55 
The word-games, the pantomimes, and the confrontations help pass 
the time while the tramps wait for Godot. It is the waiting which 
permeates the tramp' s behavior and actions throughout the play. 
Vladimir: That passed the time. 
Estragon: It would have passed in any case. 










What do we do now? 




56 We're waiting for Godot. 
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In the second act, Estragon and Vladimir even take a hand at role-
playing to help pass the time. While playing this game, they hear an 
offstage noise. Naturally they assume as well as the audience that it 
must be Godot. Again, the use of the Burkeian strategy "expectation 
as expectation" to help keep the audience in suspense. 
Vladimir: Will you not play? 
Estragon: Play at what? 
Vladimir: We could play at Pozzo and Lucky. 
Estragon: Never heard of it. 
Vladimir: I' 11 do Lucky, you do Pozzo. 
Estragon: What am I to do? 
Vladimir: Curse me. 
Estragon: Naughty! 
Vladimir: Stronger! 
Estragon: Gonococcus! Spirochete! 
Vladimir: Tell me to think. 
Estragon: What'? 
Vladimir: Say, Think, pig! 
Estragon: Think, pig! 
Silence 
Vladimir: I can'tl 
Estragon: That's enough of that. 
Vladimir: Tell me to dance. 
Estragon: I'm going. 
Vladimir: Dance, hog! I can't! Gogo! There you 
are again at last! 
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Estragon: I'm accursed! 
Vladimir: Where were you? I thought you were gone forever. 
Estxagon: They're coming! 
\Vladimir: Who? 
Estxagon: I don't know. 
1ffladimir: How many'? 
Estragon: I don't know. 
It's Godot! 
We're saved! 
At last! Gogo! It's Godot! 
Let's go and meet him! 57 
"Waiting is the crucial experience of the Beckett character," says 
Frederick Hoffman, "it involves enduring the world's nonsense, its 
absurdity, without clear hope of immediate or direct help. 1158 Waiting 
creates two possible alternatives, either Godot will appear to stop the 
accursed Tiirne, or he will fail to appear, which means the only salvation 
to waiting is death. 11Waiting is therefore a condition of man," writes 
Hoffman, "it involves an acceptance both of death and life. 1159 
Endgame carries the same type of ambiguity in waiting. In this 
play, we are never certain if this is the final game or if this drama 
represents a continual game between Hamm and Clov. We are not certain 
if we are at the end of the world ("there's nowhere else") or at the 
end of life ("outside of here itis death"). The opening lines of the 
play establish the point where the characters are. "Finished, it's 
finished, nearly finished, it must be nearly finished. Grain upon 
grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly, there's a heap, a little 
heap, the impossible heap. I can't be punished anymore. 1160 In this 
play, rather than having Godot make an entrance, we are waiting for Clov 
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to make an exit. Although Nagg and Nell, parents of Harrll"n, pop up from 
their ashcans from time to time, there are no characters who make any 
entrances or exits during the course of the play. The play ends as it 
begins in a tableau with Hamm seated motionless in the center covered 
with a white sheet •. The only change is that Clov stands motionless by 
the door with his eyes fixed on Harrm1. Throughout the play, we wait to 
see if Clov has the will power to leave his master. When the final 
curtain closes, we a:re still waiting and wondering if Clov can make 
his exit. 
Beckett is able to attain consubstantiality through the merger of 
symbolic substances created by the ambiguity of "Endgame", "Godot" and 
"waiting." Beckett's language contains much ambiguity and through this 
we gain identification. "For one thing," says Burke, "if the image 
employs the full resources of imagination, it will not represent merely 
one idea, but will contain a whole bundle of principles even ones that 
would be mutually contradictory if reduced to their purely ideational 
equivalents. 1161 Through the process of identification, the audience, 
the actors, and the playwright gain merging attitudes of belief and 
values into one substance. They can share various interpretations of 
the play' s motifs due to their own feelings and €,'·?eriences. This pro-
cess. is explained by John Fletcher and John Spurling: 
In Waiting £or Godot, two men, usually dressed as tramps, 
though they might equally well be dressed as Irish liter-
ary types (tramps have no monopoly of stinking feet, bad 
breath, ill-fitting boots, prostrate trouble), fill in 
time on successive evenings on a blasted heath while wait-
ing to keep an appointment with somebody called Godot; on 
the stage actors fill in time on successive evenings while 
waiting to go home when the curtain falls; in the auditor-
ium an audience fills in the same time on the same suc-
cessive evenings while waiting for a denouement; in his 
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study a little previously the author has filled in time 
day after day while waiting to complete a play. The 
three real waitings, those of the author, actors and 
audience, are brought together in the metaphorical wait-
ing for Godot, and the time that is filled in the process 
is the 'shape' of the theatrical experience. 62 
Through the process of identification by "ambiguity," Beckett involves 
the participants in a total theatre experience. The feelings of the 
actors, playwright; and spectator form an attitude of consubstantiality 
that begins with the opening remarks of the play and continues until 
the final curtain. 
The Strategy of Spiritualization 
The next important strategy is that of spiritualization or relig-
iousness. In this interpretation, religiousness is not equated with any 
institution but with an attitude of identification. Man can reach out 
to "transcend upward" or "transcend downward", according to Burke, 
depending on the choice he makes. Although the word "God" is seldom 
used in Godot, there is an assumption that certain words spoken by the 
rhetorical heroes result from the Deity. Kenneth Burke indicates the 
nature of language to form a negative or positive balance in persuasion. 
He writes: 
. 
Whether or not there is a realm of the supernatural, there 
are words for it. And in this stage of linguistic affairs 
there is a paradox. For whereas the words for the super-
natural realm are necessarily borrowed from the realm of 
our everyday experiences out of which our farniliari ty with 
language arises, once the terminology has been developed 
for special theological purposes the order can become 
reversed. 63 
Estragon's choice of words in talking about existence without the 
presence of a supreme being indicates the generic concept of Purgatory. 
For example, "Nothing to be done"; "certainly they beat me"; "There's 
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nothing to show"; "What about hanging ourselves"; "We've no rights any-
moren; "No use struggling"; "No use wriggling"; "No nothing is certain"; 
"Nothing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, its awful"; and "There's 
no lack of void." Vladimir uses the antithesis of these words in speak-
ing about the arrival of Godot to explain their significance in the 
universe; for example, "We're waiting for Godot"; "He said by the 
tree"; "He said Saturday"; "Let's wait till we know exactly how we 
stand"; "I'm curious to hear what he has to offer"; "Tied to Godot! No 
question of it"; "To everyman his little cross"; "Tomorrow everything 
will be better. He said that Godot was sure to come tomorrow"; "And 
we are blessed in this, that we happen to know the answer. Yes, in 
this immense confusion one thing alone is clear. We are waiting for 
Godot to come--"; "Everything's dead but the tree11 ; and "We'll hang 
ourselves tomorrow. Unless Godot comes." 
The positive and negative qualities emerge as the play progresses, 
and they constitute a structural pattern of 11 expectation as expectation." 
The formal principle of expectation is transferred into a problematical 
one in wondering whether Godot will arrive to explain the significance 
of their lives. The main rhetorical heroes, Estragon and Vladimir, also . 
grow in their awareness of Self and the compassion for the Other. This 
stru~tural pattern constitutes a method of linking the past with the 
future. The present is experienced by the participation of the roles 
within the dramatic action of the play, and the immediate response to 




"Godot" or "Salvation" 
Time will stop (waiting) 
Involuntary memory 




No reliance on objects 
or things 
The tree {knowledge, life) 
~Tomorrow (Sunday) 




Habitual time (endlessly 
waiting) 
No memory--
Disorder and chaos 
Blathering (To ward off 
silence) 
Fixed and dead voices 
The same muckheap 
Reliance on things and 
objects (hats, boots, 
carrots) 




It is interesting to note that the dialectical nature of the heroes pro-
voke a consistency by which Vladimir represents the optimistic and 
future Self while Estragon presents the pessimistic and past Self. Al-
though each provokes an attitude of presenting the structural pattern 
of waiting, they seldom vary from their respective dialectical positions. 
Endgame provokes a more difficult problem in the analysis of "word 
clusters." This play is often called a static drama and there is not as 
much plot development or personality growth as Waiting for Godot. Never-
theless, there are some interesting language and structural patterns. 
Clov represents the optimistic self in search of individualized . 
freedom. Yet many of his remarks give the impression of impending doom. 
! 
Clov,may represent the son or Self in search of a new God. His speeches 
provoke a degree of positive quality for the future; for example: 
"Finished, it is finished, nearly finished, it must be nearly finished." 
(Words of Christ at the crucifixion) "I can't be punished anymore"; "All 
life long the same question, the same answers"; "When there were still 
bicycles I wept to have one. I crawled at your feet. You told me to 
go to hell. Now there are none"; "There's no more nature"; "Mean 
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something! You and I mean something! Ah, that's a good one"; "I use 
the words you taught me. If they don't mean anything anymore, teach me 
others. Or let me be silent"; "I love order. It's my dream. A world 
where all would be silent and still and each thing in its last place, 
under the last dust." 
HanITT1's choice of words in talking about existence indicates the 
past and perhaps the dead myths. Hamm might represent the God that is 
slowly dying • .Most of his speeches represent the past; for example: 
"Can there be misery loftier than mine" (Biblical reference, Old Testa-
ment); "outside of here its death"; "Accursed progenitor"; "Nature has 
forgotten us"; "We lose our hair, our teeth! Our bloom! Our ideals"; 
"One day you'll be blind, like me. You'll be sitting the:r::e, a speck 
in the void, in the dark, forever, like me"; "Get out of here and love 
one another. Lick your neighbor as yourself"; ''Ah, the old questi?ns, 
the old answers, there's nothing like them"; "It's finished, we're 
finished"; and "There'll be no more speech." The structural pattern of 
Endgame placed on a past-future continuum appears as follows: 
Future Time 
"Salvation" or "Death" 
Time will stop 
Game will end 
Involuntary memory 
Meditative Silence 
Order and Form 
Living Language 




Freedom from Authority 








Soliloquy (Long speeches) 
Disorder and chaos 
Fixed and imposed words 
Externals (Bicycle wheels, 
toy dog, pap, pain-killer) 
Our ideals 
Accursed progenitors 
(Nagg and Nell) 
Presence of Authority 
(Old God and Myth) 
"I--It" 
110 
By linking the strategies of language in regard to past and future, the 
rhetorical heroes indicate a movement toward an ultimate goal. "To 
expose linguistic strategies of rhetoric," writes Herman Stelzner, "one 
needs thus to see language as 'moving' as 'linking' and as 'ordering a 
hierarchy."64 
Although the plays fail to conform to the theatrical ideal of the 
classical form, the language gives us a sense of linkage and movement. 
The rhetorical heroes cannot adopt any slogans and certainties, but 
they can utilize language to provide them with a rebirth. Without 
language, the characters realize they might slip into a state of nothing-
ness. William H. Rueckert explains: 
So just as Christians say that all men suffer from 
11 original sin," Burke in his secularized, drarnatistic 
version of the Genesis "myth" says that all men suffer 
from "catagorical guilt"; and just as all Christians 
begin in a fallen state, needing and yearning for the 
redemption made possible by the sacrificial Christ, so 
all men, according to Burke, begin in a fallen state 
bxought on by their distinctive trait--language--need-
ing and yearning for the redemption made possible by 
the dramatistic equivalent of the sacrificia! Christ, 
symbolic action and the rhetoric of rebirth. 5 
In the strategy of religiousity, language takes on a unique double role 
as "sin" and "redemption." "Language," says Rueckert, "is equivalent 
of the fort'unate fall; it not only makes redemption possible but pro-
' vides a means for that end. 1166 Burke contends that man feels the need 
of redeeming himself from his own failures and ineptness to communicate. 
Language provides Estragon and Vladimir with the means to gain an aware-
ness of their own reality in face of the sky falling down on them. 
According to Burke, man establishes a scapegoat (tragic or comic) 
to explain his failures, which gives him a symbolic rebirth of life. 
The "rebirth" gives man a new hold on life and new insights for 
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justifying his own behavior. It seems only fitting that when Lucky 
finishes his silly little dance, Estragon responds by calling it "The 
Scapegoat's Agony." Beckett uses the scapegoat strategy as part of 
his philosophy toward the religiousness of language. He projects most 
of his characters into the framework of the comic scapegoat. In our 
next chapter, we plan to discuss in more detail this technique by 
Beckett. 
The Strategy of Properties 
The third strategy important to the rhetorical insights of Beckett's 
plays is that of ''properties." As Burke points out, "Metaphysically, 
a thing is identified by its properties. 11 67 
I".., .... ' .,, 
In the nature of rhetoric, 
identification occurs by property in the materialistic sense of the 
terms. Burke feels that "in surrounding himself with properties that 
name his number or establish his identity, man is ethical. 11 68 As a 
result, "man's moral growth is organized through properties, properties 
in goods, in services, in p,osition or status, and in citizenship. 11 69 
Burke feels that by "acting-together," men have common sensations, con-
cepts, attitudes, and ideas, that make them consubstantial. 1170 Thus 
the stage properties of the characters (hats, boots, tree, tapes, arm-
chair) and the stage settings may be said to be consubstantial. One of 
the playwright's duties may be to identify these "properties" with that 
of the characters on stage as well as with the properties of the 
spectator. 
When the curtain opens on Waiting for Godot, we face the setting 
of an empty road with a leafless tree in the background. Estragon is 
found sitting on a low mound painfully tugging at his boot. Before a 
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line is·spoken, the "properties" suggest empty space, bareness, and 
suffering as themes to associate with the character. The property of 
the tree provides Estragon and Vladimir with a means of escaping their 
suffering. While the tree seems lifeless when we first view it, this 
property takes on significance as it becomes a means of reconstructing 
the past, a means of identifying this as the place to wait for Godot, 
and even a prop to serve as a game to pantomime while waiting to pass 
the time: In the second act, the tree sprouts a few leaves and becomes 
a substance associated with the affirmation of life ("everything's dead 
but the tree"). Richard Lee Francis provides insight into the use of 
the tree as a means of symbolic language. He writes: 
If, as R. P. Blackmur has suggested, language is gesture, 
then this seemingly absurd gesture that is the tree con-
stitutes a means of communication--a symbolic language--
between Vladimir and Estragon that transcends ordinary 
cognitive language. In contemplating it as they do in the 
final scene of the act, they achieve a silent insight into 
the "either/or" nature of their interdependence. They must 
either hang together or go on waiting together. As at the 
end of the first act, their initial attempt to act decisive-
ly by committing suicide fails when the rope breaks, and 
their indecisive alternative of waiting becomes a wholly 
new, if ironic, affirmation of life. The servitude of their 
mutual existence is symbolically servered by the broken 
cord. In their new freedom--beyond death--they find a 
natural bondage to one another as human beings.71 
While the setting of Godot suggests space and emptiness, the open-
ing .of Endgame reveals the inside of a bare room. The only furnishings 
are two ash cans covered with sheets and Hamrn's chair in center stage 
similarly covered. High up on the back wall are two windows revealing 
a kind of skull-like appearance of two closed eyes. There is on one 
side of the room a single door, which leads to the kitchen and the out-
side. The property of empty space and bare simplicity in Godot is 
- replaced by conf inernent and enclosure with Endgame. 
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Hamm's armchair on castors provides the significant property in 
this play. The armchair gives Hamm the degree of movement as well as 
the impression of the master of the house or the God on his throne. 
Hamm: Take me for a little turn. (Clov goes behind the 
chair and pushes it forward.) Not too fast! (Clov 
pushes chair.) Right round the world! (Clov pushes 
chair.) Hug the walls, then back to the center 
again. (Clov pushes chair.) I was right in the 
center wasn't I? 
Clov: (Pushing.) Yes. 
HarrITTt: We'd need a proper wheel-chair. With big wheels. 
Bicycle wheels! (Pause.) Are you hugging? 
Clov: (Pushing). Yes. 
HarrITTt: (Groping for wall). It's a lie! Why do you lie 
to me? 
Clov:. (Bearing closer to wall.) There! There! 
Hamra: Stop! (Clov stops chair close to back wall. Hamm 
lays his hand against wall.) Old wall! (Pause.) 
Beyond is the, •. other hell. (Pause. Violently.) 
Closer! Closer! Up against! 
Clov:. Take away your hand. (Hamm withdraws his hand. 
Clov rams chair against wall,) There! (HanITTI 
leans towards wall, applies his ear to it,) 
HarrITT1:. Do you hear? (He strikes the wall with his knuck-
les.) Do you hear? Hollow bricks! (He strikes 
again.) All that's hollow! (Pause. He straightens 
up. Violently.) That's enough. Back! 
Clov: We haven't done the round. 
Hamm: Back to my place! (Clov pushes chair back to 
center,) Is that my place? 
Clov: Yes, that's your place, 72 
Krapp's Last Tape is set in Krapp's den with only a table, a tape-
recorder, and a chair. The table and a small area around the chair are 
bathed in a "strong white light" from above. The rest of the stage is 
in darkness. '!:,!hen Krapp moves away from the light and into the dark-
ness, we hear the sound of him opening a bottle, clinking the glasses, 
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and drinking. The restrictions of the stage properties make us feel 
the confineness of space and in turn the limited memory of Krapp. The 
tape-recorder and tapes serve as a means of communication by recreating 
experiences that happened during his early manhood years. He finds that 
the only tape which has any significance for him is a recording of an 
intimate experience thirty years earlier. 
I said again I thought it was hopeless and no good going 
on, and she agreed, without opening her eyes. I asked 
· her to look at me and after a few moments--after a few 
moments she did, but the eyes just slits, because of the 
glare. I bent over her to get them in the shadow and they 
opened. Let me in. We drifted in among the flags and 
stuck. The way they went down, sighing, before the stem. 
I lay down across her with my face in her breasts and my 
hand on her. We lay there without moving. But under us 
all moved, and moved us gently, up and down, and from 
side to side.73 
Toward the end of the play, Krapp realizes even this recording on love 
has no meaning for him anymore. Krapp knows that he can no longer com-
municate with a mere recording of his previous life. As the curtain 
closes, Krapp sits staring into space as the tape runs on in silence. 
Thus, the "properties" of the plays become identified with the 
actions of the characters and provokes images in the minds of the 
spectators. The decor of the Beckett theatre is one reduced to a bare 
essential with strong lighting and simplicity in staging. John Fletcher 
expl_ains how the "properties" of Beckett's theatre helps create identi-
fication and consubstantiality with the audience. He argues: 
This extreme simplicity, this deliberate bareness, pro-
vokes in the spectator a state of mind appropriate to 
the theme of the play he is about to see. Sin1ilarly, the 
picture with its face to the wall, the sheets covering 
the characters and the two small windows set high in the 
wall announce the tone of Endgame before a single word has 
been uttered. Moreover, the kitchen that Clov so fre-
quently refers to has no existence as far as we are 
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concerned, but remains imaginary. In much the same way, 
the plain, which Vladimir and Estragon would have us 
believe extends as far as the eye can see, is for the 
spectator only the wings where the other actors await 
their cue. We are thereby made to feel the feebleness 
of the convention that a whole world exists across the 
footlights. 74 
The stage scenery of the traditional theatre holds no interest for 
Beckett. He is not interested in a faithful reproduction of the real 
world on stage, but a symbolic image through the use of 11 properties" 
to create the bare starkness in the spectator's mind. 
The Themes of Existence, Time, Habit, 
and Memory in "Wai ting for Godot" 
Since the first American production of Waiting for Godot in 1956, 
Beckett's play has created critical reviews that range from describing 
it as a 11 profoundly anti-Christian play" to those who view it "as a 
modern morality play on permanent Christian themes." S1;ill others have 
classified it as ari "Atheistic existentialist play" and "a dramatic 
representation of man without God. 1175 When Alan Schneider, the first 
American to direct Godot, asked Beckett the meaning of the play, he 
received the answer, "If I knew, I would have said so in the play. 1176 
The most eloquent statement was echoed in the editorial of the "San 
Quentin" after a performance of the play to the prisoners: 
It was an expression, symbolic in order to avoid all per-
sonal error, by an author who expected each member of his 
audience to draw his own c6nclusions, making his own 
errors. It asked nothing in point, it forced no dramatized 
moral on the viewer, it held out no specific hope ••• We're 
still waiting for Godot, and shall continue to wait. When 
the scenery gets too drab and the action too slow, we'll 
call each other names and swear to part forever--but then, 
there 1 s no place to 90!77 
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The Theme of the Self and Existence 
With all the ink that has been spilled in writing about this play, 
what can we say about Waiting for Godot~ There is widespread agree-
ment that Godot concerns the search for the Self. The two trarnpish 
clowns, Estragon an9 Vladimir, hope that the quest for meeting with 
Godot will provide them with some form of ultimate meaning. Godot is 
their salvation and his arrival might save them from non-existence. 
In the meantime, Estragon and Vladimir must discover each other in the 
face of a world that is collapsing. Beckett views man as floundering 
in an epistemological void where he can no longer maintain any fluid 
meaning of reality. Therefore, Estragon and Vladimir continually 
search for the Other, which might give some kind of permanence. Thus, 





When I think of it ••• all these years ••. but for 
me ••• where would you be ••• You'd be nothing more 
than a little heap of bones at the present min-
ute, no doubt about it. 
And what of it'? 
78 It's too much for one man. 
Through the communion and exchange with the Other, the tramps discover 
the compassion of the human spirit. Without the Other, the Self falls 
into· a state of stasis and no longer continues to exist. The relation-
ship of Vladirnir and Estragon with each other as well as with the hats, 
the boots, the carrots, Pozzo and Lucky, and the tree, shape their 
roles and their view of the universe. Yet the reciprocal contact of 
Vladimir with Estragon is important to maintain awareness of Self. 
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Vladimir: So there you are again? 
Estragon: Am I? 
Vladimir: I'm glad to see you back. I thought you 




Together again at last! We'll have to celebrate 
this. But how? Get up till I embrace you.79 
Vladimir expresses in this quoted passage the need for human contact 
with Estragon in order to get any truth about himself. As a result, 
Estragon is indispensable to the existence of Vladimir. Additional 
proof of this concept is pointed out by Vladimir. He is frustrated by 
Estragon' s failure to speak with him and he remarks: "Come on Didi, 
return the ball, can't you once in a way? 11 80 A few lines later there 
is an interesting juxtaposition of their roles as Estragon now needs 
the human contact of Vladimir. 
Estragon: I had a dream. 
Vladimir: Don't tell me. 
Estragon: I dreamt that--
Vladimir: DON'T TELL ME! 
Estragon: It's not nice of you, Didi. Who am I to tell 
my private nightmares to if I can't tell them 
to you} 
Vladimir: Let them remain private. You know I can't bear 
that. 
Estragon: There are times when I wonder if it wouldn't 
be better for us to part. 
Vladimir: You wouldn't go far.Bl 
Estragon and Vladimir perceive each other through the dialogical pro-
cess as the means of uncovering their essence. Language supplies the 
basic concept for their awareness and the opportunity for both of them 
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to emerge from their solitude to touch each other. As a result of this 
dialogical bond, they are both indispensable to each other, and they 
must remain together in order to discover existence. Through the ex-
change of the Other, Estragon and Vladimir discover the essence of the 
human spirit. As the play progresses, they transcend into different 
beings creating mature and responsible selves. This transcendence is 
depicted toward the end of the play when Vladimir replies: 
~Let us not waste our time in idle discourse! Let us do 
something, while we have the chance! It is not every day 
that we are needed. Not indeed that we personally are 
needed. Others would meet the case equally well, if not 
better. To all mankind they were addressed, those cries 
for help still ringing in our ears! But at this place, 
at this moment of time, all mankind is us, whether we 
like it or not. Let us make the most of it, before it is 
too late! Let us represent worthily for once the foul 
brood to which a cruel fate consigned us! What do you 
say? It is true that when with folded arms we weigh the 
pros and cons we are no less a credit to our species. 
The tiger bounds to the help of his congeners without the 
least reflexion, or else he slinks away into the depths of 
the thickets. But that is not the question. What are we 
doing here, that is the question.82 
A few lines later when Vladimir is asked by Pozzo what they represent, 
he responds by saying: "We are men." 
Beckett proposes in Estragon and Vladimir a move toward the 
Buberian "I-Thou" relationship. The move is toward the acceptance of 
the Self, and uperhaps" (the key word according to Beckett about his 
plays) a world without the presence of God. It is the realization of 
the relationship with the Self by encountering reality, which is one of 
both despair and the possibility of salvation. The play moves from a 
selfish one on the part of the ego of each character to a reality of 
their relationship to Others. As Martin Buber argues: 
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The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man. 
What is peculiarly characteristic of thehl.lfficm world is 
above all that something takes place between one being 
and another the like of which can be found nowhere in 
nature. Language is only a sign and a means for it, all 
achievement of the spirit has been incited by it. Man 
is made man by it; but on its way it does not merely un-
fold, it also decays and withers away. It is rooted in 
one being turning to another as another, as this particu-
lar other being, in order to communicate with it in a 
sphere which is co1T11T10n to them but which reaches out be-
yond the·special sphere of each. I call this sphere, 
which is established with the existence of man but which 
is conceptually still uncomprehended, the sphere of 
"between. 1183 
The relationship of Estragon and Vladimir develops as the play progres-
ses. This provides Vladimir with courage at the end of the play to say, 
"We are men." Although they tend to treat each other as equals, the 
dramatic tension is heightened by their differences. As mentioned 
earlier, Vladimir views the hope of Godot coming to save them while 
Estragon remains pessimistic. Vladimir is more intellectual in his 
anguish and more demanding in the selection of his words. Estragon 
dreams more and reacts emotionally, with passion. Vladimir remembers 
important events while Estragon tends to have a poor memory. Vladimir 
seems to be more responsible and practical while Estragon is victimized. 
Although they argue and disagree on many things, they refuse to part 
because of ~eir complimentary natures. Discovery of Self is provoked 
thrqugh acts of encountering and participating. Buber gives us an in-
sight to this: 
Human life touches an absolution in virtue of its dia-
logical character, for in spite of his uniqueness man 
can never find, when he plunges to the depths of his life, 
a being that is whole in itself and as such touches on the 
Absolute. Man can become whole not in virtue of a rela-
tion to himself but only in virtue of relation to another 
self. This other self may be just as limited and conditioned 
as he is, but in being together the unlimited and the uncon-
ditioned is experienced.84 
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Vladimir and Estragon's mutual compassion is offered through the dia-
logue. Without the dialogue, the characters might slip into the Void 
and a state of nothingness. 
Estragon: In the meantime let us try and converse calmly, 
since we are incapable of keeping silent. 
Vladimir: You're right, we're inexhaustible. 
Estragon: It's so we won't think. 
Vladimir: We have that excuse .••• 
Long Silence 
Vladimir: Say something! 
Estragon: I'm trying. 
Long Silence 
Vladimir: (In anguish) Say anything at all! 
Estragon: What do we do nov/2 
Vladimir: Wait for Godot. 85 
The affection of Estragon and Vladimir's relationship is also expressed 
in their word-games and slapstick quality of their actions. Not only 
does this develop a relationship between the characters, but it helps 
to pass the time while waiting for Godot. 
Vladimir: Moron! 











Estra9on: Now let's make it up. 
Vladimir: Gogo! 
Estragon: Didi! 
Vladimir~ Your handl 
~Estragon: Take it! 
Vladimir: Come to my arms! 
Estragon: Your arms? 
Vladimir: My breast! 
Estragon: Off we go! 
They embrace. They separate. Silence 
Vladimir: How time flies when one has fun! 
Silence 
Estragon: What do we do now? 
Vladimir: While waiting. 
Estragon: While waiting. 
Vladimir: We could do our exercises. 
Estragon: Our movements. 
Vladimir: Our elevations. 
Estragon: Our relaxations. 
Vladimir: To warm us up. 
Estragon: To calm us down. 
Vladimir: Off we go. 86 
The nature of the dialogical process grows between the two characters 
as the play progresses. It provides them with the courage at the end 
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to face the fact that "perhaps" Godot has been withdrawn, but they plan 
to return and wait for him tomorrow. This relationship is suggested by 
Richard Lee Francis: 
What we encounter in Godot is a repetitive ritual drama 
of words in which we may discover what Phillip Wheelright 
calls the "tensive" quality of language--that language 
reflects, no matter how trivial it seems, the tensions of 
the individual self as it attempts to define itself and 
its relation with other selves and with the world around 
itself.87 
Pozzo and Lucky represent a different kind of relationship. Pozzo 
(master) and Lucky (slave) are inextricably tied to each other. This 
symbolism is made even more apparent with a long rope tied around 
Lucky's neck and attached to Pozzo's belt. In the first act, Pozzo 
appears powerful, demanding, and boastful, while Lucky is the meek, 
quiet, and obedient servant. Lucky's needs are satisfied by the 
authority of duties dictated to him by Pozzo. He relieves his state 
of tension by fulfilling menial tasks for Pozzo, which includes carry-
ing his whip and luggage as well as entertaining him with silly dances. 
Pozzo: (To Lucky) Coat! (Lucky puts down the bag, ad-
vances, gives the coat, goes back to his place, 
takes~ the bag.) Hold thatt7°Pozzo holds out 
the whip. Lucky advances and, both his hands 
being occupied, takes the whip in his mouth, then 
goes back to his place. Pozzo begins to put~ 
his coat, stops.) Coat! (Lucky puts down bag, 
basketand~l, advances, helpsPozzo on with 
his coat, goes back to his place and takes~ 
bag, basket and stool.) Touch of autumn in the 
air this evening. (Pozzo finishes buttoning his 
coat, stoops, inspects himself, straightens~ 
Whip! (Lucky advances, stoops, Pozzo snatches 
the whip from his mouth, Lucky goes back to his 
place.) Yes, gentlemen, I cannot go for long 
without the society of my likes (he outs .Q!l his 
glasses and looks at the two likes) even when the 
likeness is an imperfect one. (He takes off his 
glasses.) Stool! (Lucky puts down bag and basket, 
advances, opens stool, puts it down, goes back to 
his place, takes~ bag and basket.)88 
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Estragon and Vladimir attempt to treat Lucky with compassion, but they 
are repulsed. Lucky is vicious to anyone who treats him with sympathy. 
He reacts with violence to human acts of compassion and care. 
Estragon: He's crying! 
Pozzo: Old dogs have more dignity. (He proffers his 
handkerchief to Es tragon.) Comfort him, since 
you pity him. (Estragon hesitates.) Corne on. 
(Estragon takes the handkerchief.) Wipe away 
his tears, he'll feel less forsaken. (Estragon 
hesitates. ) 
Vladimir: Here, give it to me, I' 11 do it. 
Estragon refuses to give the handkerchief. 
Childish gestures. 
Pozzo: Make haste, before he stops. (Estragon §.Q:. 
preaches Lucky and makes to wipe his eyes. 
Lucky kicks him violently in the shins. 
Estragon drops the handkerchief, recoils, 
staqgers about the stage howling witD pain.) 89 
This type of human relationship is the opposite of the compassion that 
Estragon and Vladimir feel toward each other. This kind of relationship 
moves toward the Buberian concept of the "I-It. 11 As Vladimir responds: 
"To treat a man ••• like that ••• I think that ••• no ••• a human being .•• no ••. 
it's a scandal!" With Lucky and Pozzo, each is treated as a subject 
and object for the other. Consequently, there is no Thou. Buber pro-
vides us with the basis of analyzing this relationshjp: 
The I of the primary word I-It, that is, the I faced by 
no Thou, but surrounded byamultitude of 11 contents, 11 
hasn<)present, only the past. Put in another way, inso-
far as man rests satisfied with the things that he exper-
iences and uses, he lives in the past, and his moment has 
no present content. He has nothing but obJects. But ob-
jects subsist in time that has been. The present is not 
fugitive and transient, but continually present and en-
during. The object is not duration, but cessation, sus-
pension, a breaking off and cutting clear and hardening, 
absence of relation and of present being. True beings 
are lived in the present, the life of objects is in the 
past. 90 
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The meeting of Pozzo with other beings only adds to his collection of 
objects. He is not interested in authentic communication or finding the 
essence of the Self, but in treating beings as things. Thus, he can 
only respond to an "I-It" relationship: 
I too would be happy to meet him [Godot]. The more people 
I meet the happier I become. From the meanest creature one 
departs wiser, richer, more conscious of one's blessings. 
Even you ••• even you, who know, will have added to my store.91 
The reference to the richer and more conscious of one's blessings does 
J 
not mean a human relationship, but one built on materialistic growth 
and possessions. In a sense, Pozzo represents the sociological myth, 
which relies on the acquisition of objects and materialistic goods. 
Pozzo is not interested in forming a different kind of relationship with 
Estragon and Vladimir. As a result, the sociological myth of the Pozzo-
Lucky relationship rests upon history because the life of objects is in 
the past. The myth of Pozzo's authority is preserved by his need to 
maintain his possessions. His salvation, as opposed to Estragon and 
Vladimir, is finding ways of acquiring more godly goods. Pozzo's 
seeking of God is through the terms of a sociological myth and social 
illusion. Burke provides us with a valuable insight in this quest: 
To the extent that dignity is attested by monetary advan-
tage, there seems to be a "magical" need for the higher 
officials in the typical business corporation to receive 
an income .. awesomely" greater than that of any ordinary 
worker. It comes to seem dubious whether "authority'' 
could be preserved by any other means. The "pursuit of 
happiness" is thus transformed into the search for "more 
magic", a condition of endless persecution besetting the 
successes and the failures, and the underlings who do 
not figure greatly in the race, but are prodded by its 
goading ••• To seek for God in godly ways might be striving 
enough; all the more must the striving be endless, when 
men are "seeking for God" in terms of a social illusion, 
a "reverence" that attains its sympathetic, doctrinal 
counterpart in a cult of the "Absurd. 11 92 
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Beckett picks up this theme to poke fun at modern man's reverence for 
social success and status based on monetary values. Not only does 
Beckett make Pozzo and Lucky the comic scapegoats, but he proJects his 
own ideas toward modern man's sociological progress and scientific 
thinking. Luckyns long oration presents a theological-scientific mis-
mash which he spurts out with little understanding. 
Given the existence as uttered forth in the public works 
of Puncher and Wattmann of a personal God quaquaquaqua 
with white beard quaquaquaqua outside time without exten-
sion who from the heights of divine apathia divine ath-
ambia divine aphasia loves us dearly with some exceptions 
fox reasons unknown but time will tell and suffexs like 
the divine Miranda with those who for reasons unknown but 
time will tell are plunged in torment plunged in fire 
whose fue flames if that continues and who can doubt it 
will fire the firmament that is to say blast hell to 
heaven so blue still and calm so calm with a calm which 
even though intermittent is better than nothing but not 
so fast and considering what is more that as a result of 
the labors left unfinished crowned by the Acacacacademy 
of Anthropopopometry of Essy-in-Possy of 1estew and Cun-
ard it is established beyond all doubt.93 
This speech of Lucky's, which is nothing more than scientific jargon, 
expresses a vim~ of words as things. The thingness of language tends 
to deny the human contact. Beckett shares with Burke the view that we 
need to break the sinister identification of scientific thinking as 
being false and dehumanizing. Beckett is criticizing the Logical 
Positivists who wish to relegate language to a scientific process. 
Lucky can only speak the language which is imposed upon him, a scien-
tific and theological jargon. As mentioned earlier, Beckett is inter-
ested in a dynamic and living language. 
During the first act, Pozzo contemplates selling Lucky at the 
fair, as his creative powers are becoming decadent. Although Lucky 
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causes Pozzo to suffer and Pozzo seems inhuman toward Lucky, they can-
not break their bond of master-slave relationship. 
In the second act, Pozzo who appeared powerful and boastful in the 
first act is now blind, and the submissive Lucky is now dumb. They are 
firmly bound to each other by a short rope, and they cannot move with-
out tumbling and falling to the ground. The blindness of Pozzo and the 
muteness of Lucky suggest the degradation of the master-slave relation-
ship or the decadence of just using only the "I-It" way of life. The 
symbolic manifestation of blindness and muteness indicates their 
inability to meet others and provoke a sense of "becoming." "And in all 
the seriousness of truth hear this"; says Buber, "without It man can-
not live. But he who lives with il alone is not a man. 1194 
While Pozzo and Lucky can only meet their reality without any form 
of vis ion, Est:ragon ond Vladimir have tho cour'nge to encounter their 
situation. They continue to await Godot without knowing whether his 
arrival will bring salvation or disappointment. Thus, Estragon and 
Vladimir develop into responsible selves with the desire for the human 
spirit. They represent a unique metaphoric expression of the relation-
ship of man to man in the sense of "becoming." 
The Theme of Time 
If waiting serves as the focus of the play's action in Godot, Time 
is associated with one of the maJor themes. The games and activities 
provide the tramps a means of passing the Time while waiting. ~stragon 
and Vladimir wish to fill in Time in hopes that Godot will come to stop 
this "double-headed monsteT," 
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Estragon: I've tried everything. 
Vladimir: No, I mean the boots. 
Estragon: Would that be a good thing? 
V) adimir: It'd pass the time. 
Vladimir: Shall I tell it to you? 
Estragon: No. 
Vladimir: It' 11 pass the time. 95 
When there is "nothing to be done" or no stories to tell, the tramps 
are confronted with the damnation of Time. This moment of consciousness 
is palnful and one they wish to avoid. Yet this encounter is necessary 
to their awareness of existence. The tramps a1re like the absurd hero, 
Sjsyphus, who continually strains to roJl a huge rock up the side of a 
hill. At the end of his long effort, measured by a skyless space and 
time without depth, he watches with grimness and despair as the rock 
rolls back to the plain. It is in the moments when Sisyphus returns 
to the plain to begin the toil all over again, that he faces the hour 
of consciousness. At this point in time, he is stronger and greater 
than the force of the rock. "Likewise," says Camus, "the absurd man, 
when he contemplates his torment, silences all the idols, 11 96 
When there are no more games or stories to show, the tramps are 
like Sisyphus confronted with the consciousness of their existence. 
Richard Scheckner points out "that the tramps attempt to shield them-
selves from a direct consciousness that they are at the appointed place 
at the prescribed time. If the center of the play is Time, dozens of 
activities fling Estragon and Vladimir away from this center. Yet 
even ts at the outside force them back to the center so they are not 
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able to forget. 1197 The consciousness of waiting makes the tramps 
experience the action of Time in its purest and most evident form. 
In the words of Samuel Beckett: 
Waiting is to experience the action of time, which is 
constant change. And yet, as nothing real ever happens, 
that change in itself is an illusion. The ceaseless 
activity of time is self-defeating, purposeless, and 
therefore null and void. The more things change, the 
more they are the same. That is the terrible stability 
of the worlct. 98 
The past is difficult for Estragon and Vladimir to remember since "there 
is no escape from the hours and the days neither from tomorrow nor from 
today because yesterday has deformed us." 
Estragon: What did we do yesterday? 
Vladimir: What did we do yesterday? 
Estragon: Yes. 
Vladimir: Why ••• (Angril9~ Nothing is certain when you' re about. 
"They are hoping to be saved from the evanescence and instability of 
time," according to Esslin, "and to find peace and permanence outside 
it. Then they will no longer be tramps, homeless wanderers, but they 
will have arrived at home. 11100 
If Estragon and Vladimir attempt to step outside of Time, Pozzo 
and Lucky become the victims of the decadence in Time. At the beginning 
of Pozzo's journey, he is in full control of his mental and physical 
powers. He constantly consults his watch and often refers to the time 
of day. 
Pozzo: No doubt you are right. (He sits down.) Done 
it again! (Pause.) Thank you dear fellow. 
(He consults his watch.) But I must really be 
getting along, if I am to observe my schedule. 
Vladimir: Time has stopped. 
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Pozzo: (Cuddling his watch to his~-) Don't you 
believe it, Sir, don't you believe it. (He 
puts his watch back in his pocket.) What you 
like, but not that.l'OI 
A few moments later Pozzo loses his watch which creates terror for him. 
Not only does this scene provide an element of the burlesque and the 
slapstick comic, but it provokes a symb,alic means of indicating that 
Pozzo no longer has any control over the memory of time. 
Pozzo: What have I done with my watch? (Fumbles.) A 
genuine half-hunter, gentlemen, with deadbeat 
escapement! (Sobbing.) Twas my granpa gave it 
to me! (He sea:rches on the ground, Vladimir and 
Estragon likewise. Pozzo turns 0!![£_ with his 
foot lhe remains of Lucky's hat.) Well now isn't 
that just--
Vladimir: Perhaps it's in your fob. 
Pozzo: Wait! (He doubles in §..rl. attempt to §.22.ly his 
ear to his stomach, 1 is tens. Sile0c e.) I hear 
nothing-.-(He beckons them to approach. VJ adirnir 
and Estraqon .9.2. over to him, bend over his stom-
ach.) Surely one should hear the tick-tick. 
Vladimir: Silence! 
All listen bent double. 
Estragon: I hear something. 
Pozzo: Where? 
Vladimir: It's the heart. 
Pozzo: (Disappointed). Damnation! 102 
When we see Pozzo and Lucky in the second act, Time has over~helmed them 
and their senses have become decayed. As Beckett has cautioned, "Yes-
terday has deformed or been deformed by us." Pozzo bursts forth his 
anguish on man in Time: 
Have you not done tormenting me with your accursed time! 
It's abominable! lrlhen! When! One day, is that not 
enough for you, one day he went dumb, one day I went 
blind, one day wetll go deaf, one day we were born, one 
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day we shall die, the same day, the same second, is that 
not enough for you? They give birth astride of a grave 
the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more.1o3 
If Waiting for Godot provides us with the confrontation of Time 
while waiting for Salvation, Endgame presents what happens when Time 
is at an end. "In line with the elemental character of Beckett's 
vision," says Barr~tt, "time does not present itself in a contempla-
tive luxury of various temporal perspectives 'a la Virginia Woolf'. 
The plainest and elementary way in which time shows itself is in all 
those withered and decaying bodies of his tramps. 11104 Shortly after 
Endgame opens, Hamm confronts Clov with the time of day. 
Hamm: What time is it? 
Clov: The same as usual. 
Hamm: Have you looked? 
Clov: Yes. 
Hamm: Well? 
Clov: Zero. 105 
The moments between the opening and the closing of the play is one of 
passing the Time. As we mentioned earlier, Beckett views the human 
animal passing through three stages: being born, waiting, and dying. 
The process of being born and dying may even come within the same day. 
Hamm says, "Moment upon moment patterning down, like the millet, 
grain ••• of that old Greek, and all life long you wait for that to mount 
up to a life.11106 Toward the end of the play Hamm closes his long 
oration with these words: "Moments for nothing, now as always, Time 
was never and Time is over, reckoning closed and story ended. 11 107 Time 
becomes a kind of stalemate at the end where the millet grain has been 
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added moment upon moment but still adds up to a little heap at the most. 
"On the one hand, 11 says Barrett, "man is helpless before the destroying 
rush of time; on the other hand, in his impotence to act he cannot bind 
time together, and it falls apart into tiny bits, like Zeno's grains of 
sand that can never add up to a heap. 11108 
· The Themes of Habit and Memory 
Habit and memory serve as the major themes in how man functions 
within the framework of Time. Since life is a succession of habits, 
Time functions to make man's actions habitual and routine. Even living 
from one hour to the next creates an element of routine. As Vladimir 
remarks: 
All I know is that the hours are long under these con-
ditions, and constrains us to beguile them with pro-
ceedings which--how shall I say--which may at first 
sight seem reasonable until they become a habit. 109 
Habit is the great deadner and forces all actions to become routine. 
The act of waiting can become a deadly habit, and the tramps are pulled 
bet-ween leaving and staying knowing full well by remaining they may be-
come the victims of habitual behavior. As Vladimir says, "We have time 
to grow old. The air is full of our cries. But habit is a great dead-
ner.11110 The really important moments happen bet-ween habits, or when 
the ~outine is broken to give way to consciousness. It is to experience 
the same awareness of Sisyphus, one of joy and despair. "The periods 
of despair," writes Beckett, "represent the per:ilous zones in the life 
of the individual, dangerous, precarious, painful, mysterious, and 
fertile, when for.§. moment the boredom of living is replaced ,£Y the 
suffering of being. 11111 [My italics] For Beckett, the suffering of 
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being is to allow an individual to experience his own reality without 
being paralyzed by habi~. Memory is subdued by habit, according to 
Beckett, and man falls into a form of mental alienation of waking mad-
ness. Beckett feels that 11habit paralyzes our attention and drugs the 
handmaidens of pe-rception. 11 112 Thus, Beckett's rhetorical heroes tend 
to have defective memories, which provokes a certain limitation of their 
minds. Estragon laments, "That's the way I am. Either I forget im-
mediate]y or I never forget." Vladimir earlier remarks, "Extraordinary 
the tricks that memory plays." 
It is even difficult for Estragon and Vladimir to agree upon what 
should be common moments of memory. Vladimir indicates they have spent 
part of their lives in the "Macon Country," but Estragon replies: 
No,I was never in the Macon country! I've puked by puke 
of a life away here, I tell you! Here! In the Cackon 
country!113 
In the second act, Vladimir is talking about their encounter the previ-
ous day with Lucky and Pozzo, but Estragon lndicates that he does not 
remember. Even though Estragon 1 s leg is festering from the blow given 
him by Lucky, he says that he cannot recall their encounter. 
As mentioned earlier, Beckett views habit as paralyzing our at-
tention and perception. Thus, when Estragon is asked if he recognizes 
the place in the second act, he becomes suddenly furious: "Recognize! 
What is there to recognize? All my lousy life I've crawled about in the 
mud! And you talk to me about scenery! Look at this muckheap! I've 
never stirred from it! 11 Later when confronted with where he thinks 
they spent the night, he responds: "How would I know? In another com-
partment. There's no lack of void. 11114 
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Beckett seems to imply that forgetting may be good since the person 
who observes everything and records may become too clinical and sci-
entific. As Beckett points out in Proust, the man with a good memory 
does not really remember anything because he does not forget anything. 
Memory, for Beckett, serves to reconfirm habit by merely recalling what 
has been experienced without any new insights of the present conscious-
ness. Beckett calls for "involuntary memory," which is not subjected 
to habit, but a primary experience in the present reality. Thus 
Beckett views Proust as having a bad memory since he could think and 
perceive significant insights into the present. "Thinking is learning 
all over again to see," says Camus, "to be attentive, to focus con-
sciousness; it is turning every idea and every image in the manner of 
Proust into a privileged moment. 11 115 · 
Endgame carries this theme to its final conclusion. Clov, whose 
life is the fulfilling of tasks imposed upon him by Harrrrn, exists only 
through his habitual movements of obeying his master 1 s commands. Clov 
says: 
I'll go now to my kitchen, ten feet by ten feet by ten 
feet, and wait for him to whistle me. Nice dimensions, 
nice proportions, I'll lean on the table, and look at 
the wall, and wait for him to whistle me.116 
Hamm, realizing that Clov lives only through the fulfilling of various 
habitual duties, predicts that individual perception no longer prevails, 
and hence the failure of individual existence. He remarks: 
One day you'll be blind, like me. You 1 ll be sitting there, 
speck in the void, in the dark, forever, like me. You'll 
look at the wall a while, then you'll say, I'll close my 
eyes perhaps have a little sleep, after that I'll feel bet-
ter, and you'll close them. And when you open them again 
there'll be no wall any more. Infinite emptiness will be 
all around you, all the resurrected dead of all the ages 
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wouldn't fill it, and there you'll be like a little bit 
of grit in the middle of the steppe.117 
Although Clovis free to leave at the end of the play, it is impossible 
since he is a '~creature of habit." He remains in a hopeless state of 
futility and immobility as a result of the responsibility of his "dread-
ful freedom." 
It is an understatement to say that for Samuel Beckett language and 
the Theatre of the Absurd is a way of life. Beckett views theatre as 
the only means to shock man into a reality of his presence and serve as 
a form of salvation. If there is anything close to a purpose in 
Beckett's plays, it is the view that the playwright must bring "meta-
physical ideas" onto the stage and create some type of consubstantiality 
with the spectator. Beckett wishes to disorient the audience and shake 
them loose from a dead language as well as values based on materialistic 
myths. Beckett attempts to show, rather than merely talk about., how 
words can be used as things and also change humans into things or ob-
. 
jects. Beckett wishes for us to be tormented and pushed to the point 
where we become aware of our habitual patterns of behavior and exis-
tence. In short, Beckett is interested in modern man's precarious 
position in the universe. 
Although his plays deal with nihilistic tendencies, Beckett feels 
man must view his naked reality and not hide behind societal masks. In 
this sense, his plays are more optimistic than all the slick and frothy 
comedies written in this decade. It is difficult to find a clear-cut 
interpretation of Beckett's language since he tends to develop concepts 
rather than descriptions. Thus, Kenneth Burke provides us with several 
good insights in attempting to understand the strategic motives of 
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Beckett's writing. With the help of Burke, we have attempted to 
establish an interpretation based on rhetorical insights. Beckett, 
like all great philosophers, formulates questions rather than answers. 
In our study we attempt to analyze some of these questions, and in the 
process, perhaps we too, have formulated some philosophical problems. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE DIALOGUE OF THE COMIC , 
The bitter, the hollow and--Haw! Haw!--the mirthless. 
The bitter laugh laughs at that which is not good, it 
is the ethical laugh. The hollow laugh laughs at that 
which is not true, it is the intellectual laugh. Not 
good! Not true! Well well, But the mirthless laugh 
is the dianoetic laugh, down the snout--Haw!--so. It 
is the laugh of laughs, the risus purus, the laugh 
laughing at the laugh, the beholding, the saluting of 
the highest joke, in a word the laugh that laughs--
silence please--at that which is unhappy. 
--Watt 
Since the Greeks, tragedy has been regarded as a high art of 'drama. 
Yet comedy has never been considered by the critics to have reached the 
same artistic value. Only in this century have essays emerged surveying 
in a critical and comprehensive manner the elements of the comic genre. 
The most notable of these was "Laughter" written by Henri Bergson. This 
essay may have had some influence on Beckett's choice of the comic 
technique. 
It is to the comic strategy that Beckett turns in his plays to pro-
vide his view of man and society. Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter is: (1) to explore the nature of comedy and the comic frame; 
(2) to analyze the method of the comic scapegoat; and (3) to view the 
various modes of comic strategies in his plays. 
142 
143 
The Philosophy and Nature of Comedy 
If we can describe man as a symbol-using and symbol-making animal, 
then we can also depict him as an animal who laughs. Man is the only 
animal conscious of his miseries, and the only one given the privilege 
to laugh at these miseries. The comic spirit is man 1 s ability and 
desire to keep going no matter how many times he may get knocked down. 
Perhaps comedy is man's capacity to endure and become aware of his dif-
ficulty in "being." While tragedy presents a noble being in conflict 
against insurmountable odds, the comic spirit allows man to laugh at 
his short-comings and pretensions. Sometimes the laughter may be 
tongue-in-cheek while other times it may be serious, abusive--even 
brutal and violent. Yet comedy always remains a strong force in 
revealing social injustices and confronting individuals with an aware-
ness of personal behavior. Hugh Duncan wisely states: 
We submit to the discipline of comedy because we believe 
it is necessary to social solidarity and group survival. 
Communication is kept open and free through laughter 
because laughter clarifies where tragedy mystifies, 
Tragic art and religious ritual lead to victimage and 
mystification because the ultimate audience of ritual is 
supernatural power. When the tragic artist and his 
audience are in complete accord, the most terrible vio-
lence and death may, indeed, must be, visited upon victims 
who symbolize threats to social order. But comedy opens 
to reason the mystifications of social hierarchy, whose 
pomp and wonder is so often enhanced by secular vari-
ations of priestly art •••• As we laugh together, loneliness 
and alienation vanish. Such laughter is a moment of reaf-
firmation. We recreate our social bonds even as we 
recognize our differences. 1 
In order to have laughter and the comic spirit, it must be placed into 
a social environment. "Above all we must determine the utility of its 
function," says Bergson, "which is a social one •••• Laughter must answer 
to certain requirements of life in common. It must have a social 
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signification." 2 Much of comedy is founded on issues which we can 
readily identify. Yet if these same incidents happen to us, the feel-
ing might not be quite as pleasant. As a result, comedy requires an 
element of perspective and detachment. "Here I would point out," 
remarks Bergson, "as a symptom equally worthy of notice, the absence 
of feeling which u~ually'accompanies laughter; it seems as though the 
comic could not produce its disturbing effect unless it fell, so to 
say, on the surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and unruffled. 113 
This does not mean that the comic strategy fails to encompass a process 
of identification, but rather that the spectator views the situation 
with a greater degree of detachment and sympathy than in tragedy. 
Comedy may be as Christopher Fry asserts a "narrow esca-pe into faith." 
He argues: 
If I had to draw a picture of the person of Comedy it 
is so I should like to draw it: the tears of laughter 
running down the face, one hand still lying on the 
tragic page which so nearly contained the answer, the 
lips about to frame the great revelation, only to find 
it had gone as disconcertingly as a chair twitched away 
when we went to sit down. Comedy is an escape, not 
from truth but from despair: a narrow escape into 
faith. It believes in a universal cause for delight, 
even though knowledge of the cause is always twitched 
away from under us, which leaves us to rest on our own 
buoyancy. In tragedy every moment is eternity; in 
comedy eternity is a moment. In tragedy we suffer 
pain: in comedy pain is a fool, suffered gladly. 4 
We laugh at the seriousness of the attack on the issues or the devoted 
quests of the maJor characters. Yet in all great comedy there is a 
cross-current of the tragic, which underlines the laughter. Oftentimes 
the line which separates the comic and the tragic art is a narrow and 
precarious one. We may even find in the modern theatre a difficulty 
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in noticing where the comic ends and the tragic begins. Christopher 
Fry illustrates this conflict: 
Laughter did not come by chance, but how or why it came 
is beyond comprehension, unless we think of it as a kind 
of perception. The human anfo1al, beginning to feel his 
spiritual inches, broke in on to an unfamiliar tension 
of life, where laughter became inevitable. But how? 
Could he, in his first unlaughing condition, have con-
trived a comic view of life and then developed the 
strange rib-shaking response? Or is it not more likely 
that when he was able to grasp the tragic nature of time 
he was of a stature to sense its comic nature also; and, 
by the experience of tragedy and the intuition of comedy, 
to make his difficult way? The difference between 
tragedy and comedy is the difference between experience 
and intuition •••• The bridge by which we cross from 
tragedy to comedy and back again is precarious and narrow. 5 
Beckett views the nature of man as a combination of the tragic and the 
comi.c. Yet his plays lean more toward the comic spirit than to the 
tragic. This is one of the reasons it is difficult to categorize his 
plays into Comedy of Manner£, High Comedy, Romantic, or Intellectual 
Comedy. Perhaps a better label might be Painful Comedy, or what 
Beckett calls "the bitter, the hollow, and the mirthless laughter, 
which strictly speaking are not laughs." 
"The comic," writes Robert Corrigan, "has become a transparency 
through which we see to the serious. Comedy is unquestionably the 
proper mirror of our times; but it is also true that it reveals our 
life to us as 'through a glass darkly. 111 6 This may serve as one of 
the major reasons why Beckett labels all his major plays as tragic-
comedies. And is the perfection of this genre a small accomplishment? 
For it is in the two extremes, man weeping and laughing, that Beckett 
sees the capabilities of the self-revelation of men united. Karl 
Guthke argues for the method of the tragicomedy: 
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Man is the only being that can laugh and weep. Laugh-
ing and weeping can both be reactions to the perception 
of the human condition in extremis. They are, among 
many other things, the ~otions aroused by comedy and 
tragedy, respectively. Comedy and tragedy, however, 
confront man with the most extreme situations that he 
can experience. If, now, the comic and the tragic 
visions are such distinctly human phenomena and conse-
quently of prime importance for our understanding of 
the nature of man, are we not justified in assuming 
that the union of the two is ljkely to throw a light 
on the human condition that promises to be particu-
larly illuminating? Again, we have no intention of 
elevating tragicomedy at the expense of other literary 
genres which may seem to originate in a less compre-
hensive, less "total" vision of life and the world. 
We simply ask: what does it mean for the image of man 
that he is capable of viewing himself and his world as 
comic and tragic at the same time?7 
While we laugh at Estragon's and Vladimir 1 s vaudeville antics, we sym-
pathize with their endless waiting. As we laugh at the slapstick 
~omedy of Pozzo and Lucky falling to the floor, we have pity for the 
decadence of their senses. The union of the two feelings is lyrically 
expressed by Pozzo: 
He's stopped crying. (To Estragon.) You have replaced 
him as it were. (Lyrically.) The tears of the world 
are a constant quantity. For each one who begins to 
weep somewhere else another stops. The same is true of 
the laugh. Let us not then speak ill of our generation, 
it is not any unhappier than its predecessors. Let us 
not speak well of it either. Let us not speak of it at 
all. (Pause. Judiciously.) It is true the population 
has increased.8 
The nature of the hollow, the bitter, and the mirthless laugh is ex-
pressed throughout Beckett's plays and novels. Nell in Endgame pro-
vides us with the essence of that feeling. She says: 
Nothing is funnier than unhappiness, I grant you that. 
But-- .•.• Yes, yes, it's the most comical thing in the 
world. And we laugh, we laugh, with a will, in the 
beginning. But it's always the same thing. Yes, it's 
like the funny story we have heard too often, we still 
find it funny, but we don~t laugh any more.9 
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The tension which develops between a social norm and an individ-
ual's reality lends itself to both tragic and comic elements. If an 
individual fails to recognize the norms as well as the reality, he can 
become both tragic and comic. This disparity is cited by Cyrus Hoy: 
What our argument comes to, then, is this: that in 
serious drama, comic or tragic, we are confronted with 
what is, at bottom, a sin13Jle truth about the human 
condition. Man is possessed of an ideal of human con-
duct, but circumstances together with his own inherent 
failings conspire to make the belief that the ideal 
can be fulfilled a finally illusory one. But man per-
sists in despite of all the odds, and in his persis-
tence he may appear as nobly enduring, stubbornly un-
yielding, foolishly blind, or a combination of all 
three. The more forcibly and apparently these diverse 
qualities are linked in combination, the more surely 
sounds the note of tragicomedy.lo 
The dualistic nature of man is expressed throughout Beckett's works. 
As we mentioned earlier, the "psuedocouples" of the plays serve to pro-
voke a nature composed of dialectical yet complementary elements •. Yet 
Beckett does not stop here. He fixes at the center of this nature the 
tragic-comic reality of man. The opening scene of Godot indicates the 
dualistic feature of the play: 
Vladimir: Ah yes, the two thieves. Do you remember 
the story? 
Estragon: No. 
Vladimir: Shall I tell it to you? 
Estragon: No. 
Vladimir: It'll pass the time. Two thieves, crucified 
at the same time as our Savior. One--
Estragon: Our what? 
Vladimir: Our Savior. Two thieves. One is supposed to 
have been saved and the other ••. (he searches 
for the contrary Q.f ~) darnned-=-11 
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The dualistic nature is later expressed when Estragon complains of one 
boot fitting while the other pinches his toes. He later complains of 
being beaten while spending the night in a ditch. Although Vladimir is 
accused of having stinking breath (the same charge leveled at the 
groundlings at the Globe Theatre), he seems to be spared the miseries 
of Estragon. As we discussed earlier, Vladimir represents the intel-
lectual and practical thinker who understands their situation while 
waiting for Godot. Estragon is more emotional, pities himself, and 
lives for individualized habits. Beckett might even imply that the 
'character of Vladimir stands for the thoughtful, intellectual, and 
dialogical comic spirit of man while Estragon represents the ego-
centered, emotional, and tragic-comic element. 
Perhaps one of the important discoveries of Beckett is that the 
tragic and comic views of reality cannot exclude each other. Bec~ett 
proves that tragedy and comedy are akin, and they touch each other at 
the extreme ends of human experience. "Perhaps today there is some-
thing to be called the 'black mask of comedy,'" writes Richard Duprey. 
"It may be that in our times we can find a certain new dramatic di-
mension which can serve as a social corrective--a leaven to bring 
forth this reasoned disgust of which we speak so as to precipitate 
meaningful and effective action. 1112 
This new appreciation for the combined genre of the comic and the 
tragic lends itself to the Theatre of the Absurd. Wylie Sypher suggests 
how this genre serves as the important strategic design for the Absurd-
ist movement. He writes: 
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Wherever man has been able to think about his present 
plight he has felt "the suction of the absurd." He 
has been forced to see himself in unheroic positions. 
In his sanest moments the modern hero is aware that he 
is J. Alfred Prufrock, or Osric, an attendant Lord--
"Almost, at times, the Fool." Or else Sweeney, the 
apeneck, seeking low pleasures while death and the 
raven drift above. We have, in short, been forced to 
admit that the absurd is more than ever inherent in 
human existence: that is, the irrational, the inex-
plicable, the surrrising, the nonsens1cal--in other 
words, the comic. 3 
Beckett's plays deal with the miseries of the human condition but pro-
posed to the point that we can laugh at the absurd situation. Comedy 
opens the path for us to look at the situation of the Absurd, and we 
may even end up laughing at ourselves. "Men must live in reason," says 
Duncan, "for only so long as we confront the miseries of life and keep 
staring them hard in the face is there any hope of controlling them. 1114 
Perhaps the nature of the comic spirit in the Beckett theatre is best 
expressed by Ruby Cohn. She writes: 
With consummate verbal skill, Beckett involves us more 
deeply in his her-oes, as they become more obsessively 
involved with themse 1 ves. And at the same time, we 
are more involved with ourselves. Beckett's fellow 
playwright Ionesco speaks for Beckett's heroes too when 
he writes: "By expressing my deepest obsessions, I ex-
press my deepest humanity." Instead of laughing in a 
civilized and detached way at comic figures whom we do 
not resemble, instead of reforming after laughing at 
our own weakness as seen in another, we come in Beckett's 
work, to doubt ourselves through our laughter. But 
through the obsessions of Beckett's heroes, we understand 
our own deepest humanity.15 
Beckett, then, utilizes comedy to confront man with the reality of liv-
ing. For Beckett, it is a method of the comic to help each man realize 
his own humanity. 
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The Comic Frame 
All history, Kenneth Bruke contends, can be viewed through cate-
gories or frames of "acceptance" or "rejection." Man defines through 
these frames the human condition and decides which relationships are 
friendly or unfriendly. Burke argues that man approaches the events 
of history through the framework of acceptance or rejection. As a re-
sult, if we are to understand man's charting of motives, it is through 
the literary forms that the approach is revealed. He writes: 
Our way of approaching the structures of symbolism might 
be profitably tested by the examination of various literary 
categories, as each of the great poetic forms stresses its 
own peculiar way of building the mental equipment (meanings, 
attitudes, character) by which one handles the significant 
factors of his time .16 
For Burke, these forms of literary types are divided into two categor-
ies of "positive" and "negative," which he equates with the frames of 
acceptance and rejection. Frames of acceptance, Burke feels, include 
the three literary forms of the epic, the tragedy, and the comedy. The 
epic frame Burke views as being designed under primitive conditions. 
It is primarily designed to make the humble man accept war and conflict 
by the process of identification with the representative hero. Accord-
ing to Burke, it accepts the rigors of war by magnifying the role of 
the warlike hero. "The hero, real or legendary," says Burke, "thus 
risks himself and dies that others may be vicariously heroic •.•. The 
social value of such a pattern resides in its ability to make humility 
and self-glorification work together. 1117 
The tragic frame is based on the same sense of personal limits, but 
it is a product of a more sophisticated, urban, and complex society. 
The tragic writers make pride the basic sin and surround it with the 
connotations of crime. 
151 
Burke agrees with Meredith that comedy is the most civilized form. 
For Burke, the comic frame provides the necessary perspective to ob-
serve human behavior. Yet Burke warns that "a frame becomes deceptive 
I 
when it provides too great plausibility for the writer who would condemn 
symptoms without being able to gauge the causal pressure behind the 
symptoms. nl8 Burke explains that like tragedy, comedy warns against 
the dangers of pride, but its emphasis shifts from crime to stupidity. 
"Comedy deals with m in society, 11 says Burke, "tragedy with cosmic 
man."19 Burke feels that "comedy is essentially humane, leading in 
periods of comparative stability to the comedy of manners, the dramati-
zation of quirks and foibles. 1120 Burke argues that the Comic frame 
avoids saying that man is good or bad as long as he retains some ele-
ment of perspective. The Comic frame encompasses man's capacity for 
both evil and good traits, and--we might add--i t encompasses his e~10-
tional and intellectual capabilities. Burke sees the Comic frame as 
the ambivalent side, which presents a realistic element of human moti-
vation. Thus, the nature of the Comic frame can provide an overall 
backdrop for the strategy of the tragic-comic genre. Karl Guthke hints 
at this interaction: 
The tragic and the comic are here not only simultaneous 
and identical, but also that they heighten each other. 
That is: on the one hand, the tragic implication adds 
poignancy to the comic in giving it more depth or more 
obstacles to be "overcome" by laughter, making the comic 
incongruity all the more appreciable for its increased 
crassness. On the other hand, the undeniably comic con-
stellation gives acumen to the bitterness of tragedy. 
And both kinds of interaction happen at once, depend on 
each other, and progressively and mutually increase each 
other.21 
Burke warns that we cannot confront the dual nature of the comic with 
only humor. He indicates that this dwarfs the situation and thereby 
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dwarfs the human experience. Yet humor still provides a double per-
spective in which the characters see themselves and the spectator views 
reality. Burke writes: 
We might, however, note an important distinction between 
comedy and humor, that is disclosed when we approach art 
forms as "frames of acceptance," as "strategies" for liv-
ing. Humor is the opposite of the heroic. The heroic 
promotes_acceptance by magnification, making the hero's 
character as great as the situation he confronts, and 
fortifying the nonheroic individual vicariously, by 
identification with the hero; but humor reverses the 
process: it takes up the slack between the momentousness 
of the situation and the feebleness of those in the situ-
ation by dwarfing the situation. It converts downwards, 
as the heroic converts upwards. Hence it does not make 
for so completely well-rounded a frame of acceptance as 
comedy, since it tends to gauge the situation falsely. 22 
The "ambivalence" of the Comic frame, as suggested by Burke, is obvious-
ly portrayed by the Beckett characters. At times in Waiting for Godot, 
it appears that Vladimir breaks out of his role entirely to comment on 
the action of the play. In one passage he comments about the play, 
"This is really becoming insignificant." At another point he hastens 
toward the wings and is momentarily stopped by Estragon, who shouts, 
"End of the corridor, on the left." Vladimir replies: "Keep my seat." 
Later in the play Vladimir takes Estragon by the arm and drags him 
toward the front of the stage. He gestures toward the audience and 
says, "There! Not a soul in sight. Off you go." Vladimir pushes 
Estragon toward the audience, but he recoils in fear. Vladimir con-
templates the auditorium and remarks, "Well I can understand that." 
Although Vladimir and Estragon comment on their own feelings and 
behavior, they often look objectively at the play and discuss the audi-
ence. In the opening passages, Estragon faces the audience and re-
torts, "Inspiring prospects." A few lines later Vladimir turns to the 
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auditorium and says, "That bog." At another point in the same act, 
Estragon comments on the play from a spectator's perspective in saying, 
"Nothing happens, nobody comes, nobody goes, its awful." Finally, when 
the boy appears in the last scene to talk with the tramps about Godot, 
Vladimir turns to the audience and says, "Off we go again." 
Endgame carries the same type of comic ambivalance with the major 
characters. Hamm is aware of his own theatrical ambition and he contin-
ually ends his speeches with such comments as, "No, I've done that bit;" 
or "Nicely put that"; and "A bit feeble that." At one point, Hamm com-
ments about his own narrative and the inspiration needed for his own 
style of performance. He states: 
I'll soon have finished with this story. Unless I bring 
in other characters. But where would I find them? Where 
would I look for them? •••• Oh not very far, not very far. 
There are days like that, one isn't inspired. Nothing 
you can do about it, just wait for it to come. No forcing, 
no forcing, it's fatal. I've got on with it a little all 
the same. Technique, you know. I say I've got on with 
it a little all the same. 23 
Hamm and Clov appear, as Beckett's other characters, to break away from 
their roles and view themselves from a distance. Following one exchange 
of dialogue, Hamm replies to the audience: "This is deadly." At this 
point of action in the play, Clov goes toward the ladder with a tele-
scope. He gets up on the ladder, raises the telescope, and lets it 
fall. He replies to the audience, "I did it on purpose." Clov gets 
down from the ladder, picks up the telescope, and turns it toward the 
audience. He shouts: "I see ••• A multitude ••• in transports ••• of joy. 
That's what I call a magnifier. Well? Don't we laugh?" Toward the 
end of the play, we find the following exchange with the same situation 
of Clov on the ladder with the telescope: 
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Ri:tmmi: And me? Did anyone ever have pity on me? 
Clmr: (Lowering the telescope, turning towards Harrm1): 
'What? (Pause.) Is it me you' re referring to? 
lllimml: (Angrily): An aside, ape! Did you never hear 
an aside before? I'm warming up for my last 
soliloquy. 24 
Just before HanIDt's final oration, Clov dresses in an overcoat and hat 
with the intention· of leaving. He turns to the audience and replies: 
"This is wfue:t we call making an exit." The comic ambivalance persists 
throughout Beckett's plays. His characters appear to stand at acer-
tain distance from their roles to provide an element of perspective. 
The strategy of this technique is summarized by Nathan Scott: 
This same double consciousness of themselves as actors 
and as spectators of their own performances persistently 
figures in all the major characters in Beckett's theatre. 
Ibey strike us as standing at a certain distance from 
11hat they say and do on the stage, at a distance great 
enough indeed to view their stage-presence with sucn a . 
quizzical bemusement as prevents their taking their roles 
'ftlith any large measure of seriousness. They are in fact 
all the time seeming to be about to break out of their 
:roles altogether. 25 
The nature of the Comic frame, as a_ type of double consciousness, is a 
realistic view of man's motivation. Burke feels that the Comic frame 
provides a psychological device whereby the mind equips itself to name 
and confront_its situation. Burke contends that true comedy avoids the 
antitheical dangers of cynical debunking that paralyze social relation-
ships by constantly discovering the materialistic ingredients of human 
affairs. Thereby, the Cornie frame is charitable and shrewd, but not 
gullible. f·a.r Burke, the Cornie frame requires the awareness of the 
forensic material accumulated in social structures. It allows man to 
poke fun at himself and view his acts with a degree of detachment. For 
155 
Burke and Beckett, great comedy is born with an affection of man at-
tempting to make sense out of his world. As a result, the Comic frame 
appears the most servicable for objectifying the moral values of human 
relationships in these troubled times. "There are times in the state 
of man," says Christopher Fry, "when comedy has a special worth, and, 
the present is one of them: a time when the loudest faith has been 
I 
faith in a trampling materialism. 1126 Comedy leads to a love of man and 
the philosophy that reason leads to good social relationships. Hugh 
Duncan summarizes the importance of the Comic frame within society: 
Thus all comedy is highly moral, but it is the morality 
of reason in society. It seeks to unmask vices by con-
fronting ends or ideals with means or practice. The 
final transcendence in comedy is society itself, people 
who in hate and love try to resolve differences. Laugh-
ter is the scourge of vice, just as tears are the purge 
of evil. Vice is ridiculous, for its pleasures turn 
into pain and suffering. Great comic artists distrust 
tragedy, not because they do not suffer or take a melan-
choly view of life, but because they think tragedy alone 
is not enough to purge men of folly. 27 
Burke agrees with Duncan in the nature of comedy, and he views himself 
as well as other great comic writers as moving toward the concept of 
satire. Although Burke characterizes the strategy of satire in the 
framework of rejection in his earlier works, he appears to be moving 
toward the satirical attitude with his later writings. Burke points 
out. that the satirist attacks in others the weaknesses and temptations 
that really are within himself. He writes: 
The satiric projection could be charted roughly as follows: 
A and B have a private vice in common (both are klepto-
mainiacs, homosexuals, sadists, social climbers, or the 
like, in varying degrees of latency or patency). At the 
same time, on some platform of the public arena they are 
opponents (they belong to clashing forensic factions). A 
is a satirist. In excoriating B for his political views, 
A draws upon the imagery of the secret vice shared by both. 
A thereby gratifies and punishes the vice within himself. 
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Is he whipped with his own lash? He is •••• To which we 
should agree, if v,e are permitted to add the reservation, 
"an approach from without to something from within. 1128 
Burke feels that what most vaiters label as satire is a form of bur-
lesque. "The writer of Burlesgue," says Burke, "makes no attempt to 
get inside the psyche of his victim. Instead, he is content to select 
the externals of behavior, driving them to a 'logical conclusion' that 
becomes their reduction to absurdity. 1129 
Thus, we must conclude that most of Beckett's rhetorical heroes 
fall into the category of the burlesque. The vaudeville antics with 
the hats, the boots, the tapes, the telescope, and the wheelchair finds 
the comic in the burlesque and even at times seems reduced to absurdity. 
Yet their consciousness of Time, waiting, and existence appears to for-
mulate their behavior into a form of satire. Thus, Beckett may be 
taking an app:rodch from without to s0111ething f:com within but adding the 
externals to drive his characters to a state of absurdity. This brings 
us to one of the most important elements of the Comic frame, whJch is 
the strategy of the comic scapegoat. 
The Strategy of the Comic Scapegoat 
In the last chapter, we discussed the strategy of "religiosity" or 
"spiritualization11 in Beckett's usage of "God" and "devil" terms. Part 
of that strategy can be classified according to how a writer or speaker 
views the nature of scapegoating. Beckett attempts this method not 
from the tragic perspective but the comic one. Thus, his plays tend to 
lean more toward the comic method. 
One of the major processes of identification for Beckett is the 
strategic use of the scapegoat method of the comic victimage. According 
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to Burke, this process of scapegoating or victimization serves as one 
of the seven interlocking moments to the grand design of all human moti-
vation. The great moments of the interlocking drama are the Negative. 
Hierarchy, Guilt, Mortification, Victimage, Catharsis, and Redemption. 
Rueckert explains how each of these relate to the overall design of 
human motivation: 
Briefly, the seven moments are related to each other 
in the following way: the whole drama is made possi-
ble--or inevitable--by language, which introduces the 
negative into human experience; with language and the 
negative man creates various kinds of hierarchic or-
ders, all of which have hundreds of "thou-shalt-nots" 
in them; every hierarchy is experienced by a man as a 
kind of covenant, but no man is capable of meeting all 
the terms of the agreement and in some way he will 
fail or disobey. Failure and disobedience--the "fall"--
cause guilt, which in turn makes necessary the whole 
machinery of catharsis. The two principle means of 
purification are mortification and victimage; and the 
end result of both is redemption, or the alleviation 
of guilt.30 
Man consistently establishes his own hierarchies and then he vows 
to live within them. While searching for the covenants, man falls and 
experiences guilt. The experience of guilt leads to the purgation of it 
through mortification and victimage. This action provokes a state of 
catharsis, which alleviates guilt and redeems man to a state of peace. 
Since man can be characterized as "goaded by the spirit of hierarchy," 
he Gontinually breaks covenants and forms new ones to take the place of 
the old system. The cycle constantly repeats itself and the task of 
purging and catharsis is always with man. The hierarchy each man formu-
lates determines in part his motivation and social needs. 
Without going into great detail on the explanation of hierarchy, 
we mention it as the backdrop for the comic victimage and social 
redemption. "Comic and tragic art," says Duncan, "offers formal 
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dramatic expression of the problem of hierarchy. 1131 The difference 
between comic and tragic art is the method of purging and atonement. 
Duncan clearly reasons for the comic catharsis: 
Tragedy purges through sacrifice of victims whose suf-
fering and death serves as a vicarious atonement for 
our guilt. The sacrifice of such victims wards off 
threats to our group. Comedy purges through victims 
who assume our degradation and suffering so we can con-
front it together in rational discourse. Both depict 
struggle between good and bad social principles. 
Tragedy begins with a firm statement of belief in some 
social principle and dooms those who threaten it. Com-
edy begins with exploration of a social principle and 
ridicules those who place it beyond reason. Tragic 
heroes and villains cannot be saved, nor can they save 
themselves. The villain is beyond hope, he is an enemy 
who must be destroyed, for if he is not he will destroy 
us. The comic villain can be saved once he allows 
laughter to be turned against him. He can be laughed at 
but he is also being laughed with. We are laughing at 
him to purge him--and ourselves--of folly, not to tor-
ture and kill him. 32 
Duncan also considers that the counterpart of the scapegoat is the mor-
tification within the individual self. When there are social acts or 
burdens we cannot understand, we are led to a sacrificial attitude. Yet 
the frustration must come from within the Self. Duncan argues this 
point in understanding the motive of the scapegoat: 
When we accept commandments of authority as our duty, 
we kill within us motives we think unruly or impious. 
In highly stylized acts of mortification we systemize 
ways of saying "no" to disorder as we obediently say 
"yes" to its opposite, order, and "maybe" to express 
doubt over either. We seek to overcome the deep pain 
of inner contention by projecting it upon a scapegoat 
(tragic or comic as the case may be), who becomes the 
sacrificial vessel upon which we vent, as if from 
without, a turmoil that is actually within. When we 
cannot do this, the body itself may be victimized, as 
in psychogenic illness: our socially goaded entangle-
ments literally tear us to pieces as we suffer from 
"stress11 diseases.33 
Where there is no means for individuals or a community to relieve its 
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frustrations on a symbolic scapegoat, they turn to violence, crime, and 
war. Burke points out the strategy of this motive in the pious overtone 
of war. He writes: 
The ultimate sacrifice does involve a dying. And a dying 
may involve a killing, by another or by the self. Where-
upon, one may come to displace the emphasis, until the 
element of sacrifice retreats behind the element of murder 
(or its recent Existentialist variant, suicide). By that 
time, things have become quite reversed; and whereas 
sacrifice is the very essence of peace, it becomes instead 
the essence of war, with men piously persuading themselves 
that they are never so comforted as when contemplating a 
blood-bath.34 
Thus, the importance of good drama to serve as a symbolic scapegoat to 
help relieve hostility. And we argue for the nature of the comic scape-
goat as the basis to tell us what the guilt means through open and free 
communication. "The social distance we create in comedy," says Duncan, 
"is not to prepare the victim for sacrifice, but for dialogue. 1135 The 
comic scapegoat can mend his way and return to the group while the 
tragic hero must suffer and die. Duncan continues: 
The tragic villain, the "bad guy," seeks to destroy 
the group. He must suffer and die, or we suffer and 
die. He does not, like the clown, live in error, but 
in sin. If he is killed, the sin is killed. But it 
is not necessary to kill the clown, for he can mend 
his ways. He can return to the group, even though he 
has suffered every kind of indignity. His return may 
only be a promise, and his acceptance far off in a 
distant future, but he can return because atonement 
in comedy is atonement for the group as the final 
principle of life. Comic atonement knows no principle 
of purgation beyond the social principles which bind 
the group together.36 
Rather than banishing a victim loaded down with sins, we laugh at our 
own vices which we attempt to hide. Rather than attempting to purge 
a victim through sacrifice and death, we can unmask our own corruption 
and hypocrisy. "The morality of the comic hero," writes Duncan, "lies 
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in the_clarity of reason. Self-love becomes more horrible as it is 
more clearly seen. 1137 The important point is that comedy enables us to 
relieve frustrations without resorting to crime and war. We can liber-
ate ourselves through a rational discourse with others. If we can laugh 
at ourselves, the sense of fear and anxiety can be lifted. Wylie 
Sypher, like Duncan and Burke, notes the palliative as well as the 
corrective nature of the comic scapegoat: 
At its most triumphant moments comic art frees us from 
peril without destroying our ideals and without muster-
ing the heavy artillery of the puritan. Comedy can be 
a means of mastering our disillusions when we are caught 
in a dishonest or stupid society. After we recognize 
the misdoings, the blunders, we can liberate ourselves 
by a confident, wise laughter that brings a catharsis 
of our discontent. We see the flaws in things, but we 
do not always need to concede the victory, even if we 
live in a human world. If we laugh wisely enough at 
ourselves and others, the sense of guilt, dismay, anxiety, 
or fear can be lifted. Unflinching and undaunted we see 
where~ ~.38 
Beckett's plays are largely described as tragic-comedies, yet he resorts 
to the method of the comic scapegoat. When Waiting for Godot opens, we 
are told that Estragon is beaten while spending the night in a ditch. 
Later m the same act, he is kicked violently in the shins by Lucky. 
Again, when the second act opens, we are told that he is victimized the 
previous night. Estragon suffers the indignities of the comic victim. 
The physical cruelties are visited upon him, as far as Estragon can 
tell, -with no apparent reason or motive. Perhaps the beatings serve as 
a catharsis and redemption for Estragon. 
Vladimir: I wouldn't have let them beat you. 
Estragon: You couldn't have stopped them. 
Vladimir: Why not? 
Estragon: There was ten of them. 
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Vladimir: No, I mean before they beat you. I would 
have stopped you from doing whatever it 
was you were doing. 
Estragon: I wasn't doing anything. 
Vladimir: Then why did they beat you? 
Estragon: I don't know. 
Vladimir: Ah no, Gogo, the truth is there are things 
· escape you that don't escape me, you must 
feel it yourself. 
Estragon: I tell you I wasn't doing anything. 
Vladimir: Perhaps you weren't. But it's the way of 
doing it that counts, the way of doing it, 
if you want to go on living. 
Estragon: I wasn't doing anything. 
Vladimir: You must be happy too, deep down, if you 
only knew it. 
Estragon: Happy about what? 
Vladimir: To be back with me again.39 
Although Estragon receives beatings from unknown assailants and a 
painful kicking from Lucky, he does not represent the significant comic 
scapegoat in Godot. The character who qualifies as the typical scape- ' 
goat is Lucky. He is beaten, kicked, ridiculed, and cursed by his mas-
ter, Pozzo. Lucky appears more like a beast of burden than a human 
being in having to carry all of his master's possessions, which include 
sacks filled with sand. From a rope attached around his neck, Lucky 
is commanded to sit, act, dance, and even speak for his master. Lucky 
never questions or defies Pozzo's commands. And the only sympathy 
and pity that Lucky receives comes from the two tramps. Supposedly 
Lucky has taught Pozzo all the finer things in life, yet Pozzo is going 
to sell him at the local market. 
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Vladimir: And now you turn him away? Such an old and 
faithful servant. 
Estragon: Swine. 
Vladimir: After having sucked all the good out of him 
you chuck him away like ••• like a banana 
skin.40 
Lucky's grotesque dance is named the "Scapegoat's Agony" by Estra-
gon, and "The Hard-Stool" by Vladimir. Pozzo refers to the dance as 
"The Net," since Lucky thinks of himself as being entangled in a large 
fish net. Lucky's speech, which is a series of metaphors attached 
without any logical pattern, never reaches a climax or conclusion. The 
speech sounds as absurd as his dance appears. As we mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Beckett seems to imply that we need to become aware 
of scientific thinking and intellectual jargon. He also makes a strong 
argument for the use of words as chatter and blathering. 
When we see Lucky in the second act, he is burdened as before-with 
the heavy luggage. He is dumb, but his agonies are still met with abuse 
and ridicule. 
Vladimir: What exactly should he [ Estragon] do? 
Pozzo: Well to begin with he should pull on the 
rope, as hard as he likes so long as he 
doesn't strangle him [Lucky]. He usually 
responds to that. If not he should give 
him a taste of his boot, in the face and 
the privates as far as possible. 
Vladimir: (To Estragon). 
be afraid of. 
You see, you've nothing to 
It's even an opportunity to 
revenge yourself. 
Estragon: And if he defends himself? 
Pozzo: No no, he never defends himself. 
Vladimir: I'll come flying to the rescue. 
Estragon: Don't take your eyes off me. 
He goes towards Lucky. 
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Vladimir: Make sure he's alive before you start. 
No point in exerting yourself if he's dead. 
Estragon: (Bending~ Lucky). He's breathing. 
Vladimir: Then let him have it. 
With sudden fury Estragon starts kicking 
Lucky, hurling abuse at him as he does .§.9.· 
But he hurts his foot and moves away, 
limping and groaning. Lucky stirs. 
Estragon: Oh the brute!41 
Lucky represents the comic scapegoat who accepts the beatlngs and the 
punishment in order to be accepted by his master. "For, so long as he 
[ comic scapegoat] tries to command, 11 writes Duncan, "(however ridicu-
lous) or gives conmrands (however impossible to fulfill), he upholds the 
spirit, if not the truth, of the principles which sustain order within 
the group~"42 As we mentioned earlier, Pozzo represents the old 
socialized n1yth or hierarchy, which Beckett is placing before us as be-
ing absurd and comical. Yet the punishment and the abuse of Lucky 
continue since Pozzo is not willing to come to grips with a broken and 
scattered myth. Duncan indicates the treatment of the comic victim: 
The comfo victim--the clown who is being beaten--like 
the tragic victim, suffers indignity, torture, and 
death. He is beaten, kicked, cuffed, cursed, drenched 
with garbage of offalG All kinds of cruelties are 
visited upon him. He dies terrible deaths. His lin-
gering agonies are met with indifference, sometimes 
even ridicule. Even when dead he is treated with con-
tempt. The dead clown is simply thrown away, like a 
broken doll. These terrible symbolic sufferings at 
WJhich we laugh so readily are possible only because we 
have created great social distance between ourselves 
and the clown. We c1~eate social distance in comedy by 
making the clown a caricature or a complete negation 
of our virtues. 43 
The comic scapegoat for Endgame comes in the personage of Clov. 
From the be.ginning of the play to the final curtain, he is ridiculed 
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and the victim of Hamm's tyrannical orders. Clov serves for Beckett as 
the comic victim of the old social order that is slowly crumbling. 
Hamm: You loved me once. 
Clov: Once. 
Hamm: I've made you suffer too much. Haven't I? 
Clov: It's not that. 















I heard you. 
Ah you gave me a fright! (Coldly). 
(Loudly). I said, forgive me. 
Have you bled? 
Less. Is it not time for my pain-killer? 
No. 
How are your eyes? 
Bad. 
How are your legs? 
Bad. 
But you can move. 
Yes. 
(Violently). Then move! 
. . . . . . . . 
Hamm: All right, be off. I thought I told you to 
be off. 
Clov: I'm trying. (He goes to door, halts.) Ever 
since I was whelpect.44 
Later on, Clov is asked to fulfill one of Hamm' s demanding tasks. Clov' s 
response indicates a moment of consciousness. 
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Clov: Do this, do that, and I do it, I never 
refuse ••• why? 
Hamm: You're not able to. 
Clov: Soon I won't do it anymore. 
Hamm: You won't be able to anymore. Ah the creatures, 
the creatures, everything has to be explained to 
them. 
• • • • • 0 • • 
Clov: There's one thing I'll never understand. Why I 
always obey you. Can you explain that to me? 
Hamm: No ••. Perhaps it's compassion. A kind of great 
compassion. Oh you won't find it easy. You 
won't find it easy.45 
The nature of the relationship in terms of comedy can be a method 
of examining society's goals. Duncan provides us with an insight to 
this incongruity: 
We learn in comedy that the virtues of superiors are 
not so great after all, the humility and loyalty of 
inferiors are not without limits, and that friends and 
peers sometimes deceive us. But guilt lightens in 
laughter as I admit that if they are rascals, so too 
am I. We begin by laughing at ourselves. The strain 
of rigid conventions, of majestic ideals, of deep 
loyalties, is lessened, for now they are open to exam-
ination. They can be questioned, their absurdities 
can be made plain. Now that we can openly express our 
vices, there is hope for correction. At least we now 
have company in misery; we are no longer alone and can 
take heart for another try. For when all is said and 
done, what do we have but each other? So long as we 
can act together we have all the good there is in life. 46 
The expression of this theory is found with Endgame. Since Clovis a 
creatuxe of order and habit, he consistently takes abuse from Hamm. 
Beckett is making a mockery of the old mythical father-son order as well 
as the master-slave relationship. Beckett is poking fun at Clov who 
spends his time in performing tasks in the right way or manner. Yet 
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Clov finds moments of consciousness and questions Harrm on why he con-
tinues to carry out the demanding tasks. Like the great figure of 
Sisyphus, Clov must continue the absurd and endless process. Clov's 
final speech is a movjng piece that indicates how he is caught between 
the tragedy of knowing and the absurdity of continuing: 
How easy it is. They said to me, That's friendship, 
yes, yes, no question, you've found it. They said to 
me, Here's the place, stop, raise your head and look 
at all that beauty. That order! They said to me, 
Come now, you're not a brute beast, think upon these 
things and you' 11 see how all becomes clear. And 
simple! They said to me, What skilled attention they 
get, all these dying of their wounds •.•• ! say to my-
self--sometimes, Clov, you must learn to suffer better 
than that if you want them to weary of punishing you--
one day. I say to myself--sometimes, Clov, you must be 
there better than that if you want them to let you 
go--one day. But I feel too old, and too far, to form 
new habits. Good, it'll never end, I'll never go. 
Then one day, suddenly, it ends, it changes, I don't 
understand, it dies, or it's me, I don't understand, 
that either. I ask the words that remain--sleeping, I 
open the door of the cell and go. I am so bowed I only 
see my feet, if I open my eyes, and between my legs a 
little trail of black dust. I say to myself that. the 
earth is extinguished, though I never saw it lit. It's 
easy going. When I fall I' 11 weep for happiness. 47 
Beckett. implies through this speech that the hard pride of the self is 
broken, which opens the way to human relationships. The speech becomes 
a form of confession for Clov in which he addresses the inner as well as 
the outer self. Beckett, like Duncan, is attempting to resolve the in-
congruities by a form of exposure. Duncan writes: 
The difference between tragedy and comedy is not so much 
in tragedy's "seriousness" concerning evil, for comedy is 
equally serious; it is rather in the form of exposure and 
the principles invoked to resolve incongruities. Address 
in tragedy is to some supernatural power beyond question, 
and thus beyond reason. The tragic actor must keep alive 
belief rn the mysterious and dread power of the principle 
he invokes. The paradox he must explain is why an all-
powerful being can be threatened at all. He resolves this 
167 
by letting man sin (as an indication of his dignity and 
freedom), but at the same time he rescues man from sin 
by making a scapegoat out of the villain whose punishment 
and death purge him of sin. Comedy teaches us that men 
can endure much if they can endure it in rational dis-
course with each other. When we cannot communicate in 
reason we are ready for the tortured image of tragedy.48 
What Duncan suggests, then, is that we may have two levels of scapegoat-
ing evident in Beckett 1 s plays. The first level is more compassionate 
and does not involve as much brutality and violence. This process in-
volves the kind of comic victimage visited upon Estragon as well as Nagg 
and Nell. The second method of the comic victim as found in Clov and 
Lucky appears to involve more cruelties. Perhaps with these relation-
ships Beckett is making a strong argument against the master-slave 
philosophy. It also appears that Beckett is poking fun at the strict 
order and habit of life, the sacrifice and suffering to authority, and 
the myth of the close faniily relationships. "As we laugh at our own 
follies," says Duncan, "we begin to understand ourselves because we take 
the attitude of others toward us. 1149 
It might even be assumed that through the strategy of using two 
levels of scapegoating Beckett is attempting to pull mankind down to a 
level of comic victimage rather than lift him up to tragic proportion. 
The analysis of this device is depicted by Burke in the method by which 
Swif~ turns a tragic scapegoat into a satiric one. It appears to be 
worth our discussion: 
The operations of this salvation device in the invest-
ment field has its counterpart in the "curative" doctrine 
of "original sin" whereby a man "socializes" his personal 
loss by holding that all men are guilty. It suggests, 
for instance, the ingredient of twisted tragedy behind 
Swift's satire, whereby he uses such thinking, not to lift 
himself .1m, but to pull all mankind down (the author him-
self being caught in the general deflation). "I have 
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even hated all nations, professions, and communities; 
and all my love is towards individuals •••• Swift, be-
ing essentially religious, was essentially tragic; but 
over-individualistic emphasis turned the tragic scape-
goat into a satiric scapegoat, thereby turning a device 
for solace into a device for indictment.50 
Beckett perfects this strategic device of the comic scapegoat with his 
rhetorical heroes. Yet he adds another dimension of the comic sug-
gested by Henri Bergson, which is the emphasis on the laughable element 
of the "mechanical inelasticity." This brings our discussion to several 
of the comic strategies that Beckett utilizes in his plays. 
The Modes of Comic Strategies in Beckett's Plays 
Beckett utilizes three basic comic strategies in his plays: the 
circus or vaudeville clown, the music-hall dialogue, and the action of 
the slapstick. The clownery of Beckett's characters is a dramatic form 
that is easily recognizable and widely popular. The various actions of 
Estragon and Vladimir follow a theatrical quality borrowed from the art 
of the circus clown: Beckett also borrows from Charlie Chaplin the 
identification of his characters with the mythical "little man." "All 
the characters wear bowler hats," writes Jacques Guicharnaud, "as a sign 
of their participation in the myth; for Chaplin's Tramp is the myth of 
man who despite everything, plays at being a man. 1151 The clown char-
acte~ also provides a means of laughter through mechanical rigidity. 
"The attitudes, gestures and movements of the human body," says Bergson, 
"are laughable in exact proportions as that body reminds us of a mere 
machine."52 The more a person and a machine fit into each other the 
more striking is the comic effect. Bergson continues: 
I find that a certain movement of head or arm, a move-
ment always the same, seems to return at regular 
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intervals. If I notice it and it succeeds in diverting 
my attention, if I wait for it to occur and it occurs 
when I expect it, then involuntarily I laugh. Why? 
Because I now have before me a machine that works auto-
matically. This is no longer 1 if e, it is automatism 
established in life and imitating it. It belongs to 
the comic. 53 
To illustrate this technique, the following stage business occurs in 
Waiting for Godot: 
Vladimir: Look at me. (Estragon does not raise his 
head.) (Violently.) Will you look at me! 
Estragon raises his head. They look at 
each other, then suddenly embrace clapping 
each other on the back. End of embrace. 
~agon nolongersupporw,a:1most falls. 54 
The two actors go through a mechanical type of movement which includes 
rejection, mutual embrace, and the near falling when the embrace ends. 
The comedy of the situation ensues because of the "mechanical inelastic-
ity" that creates the action between the characters. The same type of 
mechanical movement is expressed with Endgame. The opening of the.play 
finds Clov moving around the stage like a machine that works auto-
matically. Even his brief laughs appear to return at regular intervals. 
His actions and body remind us of a machine: 
Clov goes and stands under window left. Stiff, stag-
gering walk. He looks up at window left. He turns and 
looks at window right. He goes and stands under window 
right. He looks up at window right. He turns and looks 
at window left. He goes out, comes back immediately 
with a small step-ladder, carries it over and sets it 
down under window left, gets up on it, draws back curtain. 
He gets down, takes six steps (for example) towards window 
right, goes back for ladder, carries it over and sets it 
down under window right, gets up on it, draws back 
curtain. He gets down, takes three steps towards window 
left, goes back for ladder, carries it over and sets it 
down under window left, gets up on it, looks out of 
window. Brief laugh. He- gets down, takes one step 
towards window right, goes back for ladder, carries it 
over and sets it down under window right, gets up on it, 
looks out of window. Brief laugh. He gets down, goes 
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with ladder towards ashbins, halts, turns, carries back 
ladder and sets it down under window right, goes to ash-
bins, removes sheet covering them, folds it over his arm. 
He raises one lid, stoops and looks into bin. Brief 
laugh. He closes lid. Same with other bin. He goes to 
Hamm, removes sheet covering, folds it over his arm. In 
a dressing-gown, a stiff toque on his head, a large blood-
stained handkerchief over his face, a whistle hanging from 
his neck, a rug over nis knees, thick socks on his feet, 
Hamm seems to be asleep. Clov looks him over. Brief 
laugh. He goes to door, halts,turns towards auditorium. 56 
The laughter from these two scenes results because of a transformation 
of a person into a thing. As Bergson points out, we laugh every time 
a person gives us the impression of being a thing. 
The dialogue between Estragon and Vladimir often gives us the 
impression of two vaudeville characters or clowns. This kind of dia-
logical exchange is often referred to as cross-talk or music-hall 
laughter. The following type of exchange occurs often in Godot: 
Vladimir: Charming evening we're having. 
Estragon: Unforgettable. 
Vladimir: And it's not over. 
Estragon: Apparently not. 
Vladimir: It's only beginning. 
Estragon: It's awful. 
Vladimir: Worse than the 
Estragon: The circus. 
Vladimir: The music-hall. 
Estragon: The circus. 
Estragon: Oh I say. 
Vladimir: A running sore! 
pantomime. 
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Estragon: It's the rope. 
' 
Vladimir: It's the rubbing. 
Estragon: It's inevitable. 
Vladimir: It's the knot. 
Estragon: It's the chafing. 56 
The same technique _of music-hall dialogue is exploited with the char-
acters in Endgame. The following is a typical example: 
Clov: So you all want me to leave you. 
Hamm: Naturally. 
Clov: Then I'll leave you. 
Hamm: You can't leave us. 
Clov: Then I won't leave you. 
Hamm: Why don't you finish us? I'll tell you the 
combination of the cupboard if you promise 
to finish me. 
Clov: I couldn't finish you. 
Hamm: Then you won't finish me. 
Clov: I'll leave you, I have things to do. 57 
Another one of the methods of the music-hall dialogue is the use of the 
gag-line. The following examples from the two plays provide us with an 
obvious use of this comic strategy: 
Pozzo: I used to have wonderful sight--but are you 
friends? 
Estragon: (Laughing noisily.) He wants to know if we 
are friel}ds. 
Vladimir: No, he means friends of his. 
. . . ., . . . . 
Nagg: Can you hear me? 
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Nell: Yes. And you? 
Nagg: Yes. Our hearing hasn't failed. 
Nell: Our what?58 
Not only does Beckett enjoy the vaudeville use of the gag line, 
he concentrates much of his comic dialogue on the method of repetition. 
Bergson suggests this strategy as being one of the usual processes and 
practices of comedy. He writes: 
The repetition of a word is never laughable in itself. 
It makes us laugh only because it symbolizes a special 
play of moral elements, this play itself being the sym-
bol of an altogether material diversion. It is the 
diversion of the cat with the mouse, the diversion of 
the child pushing back the Jack-in-the-box, time after 
time, to the bottom of his box--but in a refined and 
spiritualized form, transferred to the realm of feelings 
and ideas. Let us then state the law which we think 
defines the main comic varieties of word-repetition on 
the stage: In i!. comic repetition of words we generally 
find two terms: .2, repressed feeling which goes off like 
i!. spring, and~ idea that delights in repressing the 
feeling ~.59 
Beckett uses a certain word or phrase in successive sentences to give a 
special tempo as well as a comic flavor. This technique occurs often 
with dialogical exchanges between Vladimir and Estragon: 
Vladimir: Say you are, even if it's not true. 
Estragon: What am I to say'? 
Vladimir: Say, I am happy. 
Estragon: I am happy. 
Vladimir: So am I. 
Estragon: So am I. 
Vladimir: We are happy. 
Estragon: We are happy. (Silence.) What do we do now, 
now that we are happy?60 
173 
Beckett provides an extended version of the word-repetition in a 
scene from Endgame. Hamm demands that Clov get the telescope or glass 
to look out the window, and the following comic repetition ensues: 
Clov: I've looked. 
Hamm: With the glass? 
Clov: No need of the glass. 
Hanim: Look at it with the glass. 
Clov: I'll go and get the glass. (Exit Clov.) 
Hamm: No need of the glass! (Enter Clov with telescope.) 
Clov: I'm back again, with the glass. (He goes to window 
right, looks :y.:e at it.) I need the steps. 
Hamm: Why? Have you shrunk? (Exit Clov with tel es cope.) 
I don't like that, I don't like that. (Enter Clov 
with ladder, but without telescope.) 
Clov: I'm back again with the steps. (He sets down ladder 
under window right, aets on it, realizes he has 
not the telescope, gets down-:-Y I need the glass. · 
(He goes towards door.) 
Hamm: (Violently.) But you have the glass! 
Clov: (Halting, violently.) No, I haven't the glass. 
(Exit Clov.) 
Hamm: This is deadly.61 
The constant repetition of the word "glass" builds the scene to one of 
humor in terms- of expectation as well as toward Hamm' s final punch line, 
"This'is deadly." The repetition of the mechanical movement on the part 
of Clov also creates laughter. 
Beckett enjoys playing with the sounds of words, and the comedy 
which results from this juxtaposition of word repetition. This is 
noticed in the first meeting of the tramps with Pozzo as well as the 
argument which develops between Hamm and Clov. 
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Estragon: You're not Mr. Godot, Sir? 
Pozzo: (Terrifying voice.) I am Pozzo! Pozzo. Does 
that name mean nothing to you? (Silence.) I 
say does that name mean nothing to you? 
Estragon~ (Pretending to search.) Bozzo ••• Bozzo ••• 
Vladimir: (Ditto.) Pozzo ... Pozzo ••• 
Pozzo: PPPOZZZO! 
Estragon: Ah! Pozzo ••• let me see ••• Pozzo ••• 
Vladimir: Is it Pozzo or Bozzo? 
Estragon~ Pozzo ••• no ••• I'm afraid I ••• no ••• r don't seem 
to ••• 
Vladimir: I once knew a family called Gazzo. The 
mother had the clap. 
0 e • • 0 • • • 
Hamm: Let him have it! (Clov loosens the top of his 
trousers, oulls it forward and shakes powder 
into the aperture.) 
Clov: The bastard. 
Hamm: Did you get him? 
Clov: Looks like it. (He drops the tin and adjusts his 
trousers.) Unless he's laying tloggo. 
Hamm: Laying! Lying you mean. Unless he's lying doggo. 
Clov: Ah? One says lying? One doesn't say laying? 
· Hamm: Use your head, can't you. If he was laying 
we'd be bitched.62 
The third method of Beckett's comic strategy is the pratfall or the 
slapstick device. It is designed to express unexpected or unwarranted 
pain. Beckett has his characters falling over each other, pulling on 
and off ill-fitting boots, and exchanging each others bowler hats. Two 
examples of the slapstick business occurs between Estragon and Vladimir: 
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Vladimir: (Impatiently.) Yes yes, we're magicians. 
But let us persevere in what we have re-
solved, before we forget. (He picks~~ 
boot.) Come on, give me your foot. 
(Estragon raises his foot.) The other, 
hog! (Estragon raises the other foot.) 
Higher! (Wreathed together they stagger 
about the stage. Vladimir succeeds final-
1.Y in getting Q!l the boot.) Try and walk. 
{Estragon walks.) Well? 
Estragon: It fits. 
. . . . . . . . 
Vladimir: Show all the same. (Estragon loosens the cord 
that holds~ his trousers which, much too big 
for him, fall about his ankles. They look at 
the cord.) It might do at a pinch. But is it 
strong enough? 
Estragon: We'll soon see. Here. 
of the cord and pull. 
fall.) - -
Vladimir: Not worth a curse. 63 
(They~ take .fill end 
It breaks. They almost 
In another scene in Act II, Pozzo falls to the ground and begs the· tramp 
for help. Estragon and Vladimir debate whether they should help him 
while he moans and groans for assistance. Finally the tramps agree to 
help Pozzo, but they in turn stumble and fall to the ground. There fol-
lows a scene where all the characters fall into each other with cries 
of pity and sympathy. "The comic routines," writes Frederick Hoffman, 
"are involved crucially in the play' s development. Occasionally con-
cerned with the larger questions of time and the prospects of eternity, 
they are otherwise devoted to the task of collapsing pretensions of any 
and a 11 kinds • "64 
When the rigidity of the human soul takes on the image of a machine, 
the association evokes laughter in the spectator. Repetitious activi-
ties and n1echanical gestures hide the inner essence of the soul and 
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distort its true nature. Even the physical movements and the clothes a 
man wears may mask the true essence of his moral self. This disparity 
evokes the nature of the comic. "Any incident is comic," says Bergson, 
"that calls our attention to the physical in a person, when it is the 
moral side that is concerned. 1165 The importance of the comic strategy 
of slapstick routine is further argued by Frederick Hoffman. He views 
the nature of the comic and burlesque routines as being significant to 
the deflation of traditional values. He argues: 
This point cannot be stressed enough; for, while Godot 
does address itself to some ideas and implies a view 
of many others, it is concerned above all with men with-
out property and without authority. If it has any gen-
eralizing function, it is that the faculty for making 
generalities is invariably defective. For this reason, 
the dependence upon comic and burlesque routines is im-
portant. The circus clown, for example, often comes 
upon the scene just after a magnificent display of skill 
and grace; and, in the following routine (as a drunk 
trying the straight line, as a man who disgracefully 
fails in an elaborately planned demonstration of strength, 
or succeeds too easily), the clown brings the entire scene 
d0\A1n to earth. 66 
Krapp's Last Tape depicts several of the comic techniques that we 
have been discussing. Krapp's character is deliberately clownish with 
a description for his makeup of a white face with a purple nose. Krapp 
listens with puzzlement to his voice recorded on tape and continually 
goes off stage to get a drink of wine. Krapp is near-sighted, hard of 
. 
hearing, and walks laboriously. All these ingredients are strategi-
cally included to make Krapp a clownish individual. Beckett even goes 
so far as using the old vaudeville gag of having Krapp slip on a banana 
peel. The opening sequence of the play indicates the comic method sug-
gested by Bergson of rigidity, mechanical inelasticity, and repetition: 
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Krapp remains a moment motionless, heaves a great sigh, 
looks at his watch, fumbles in his pockets, takes out an 
envelope, puts it back, fumbles, takes out a small bunch 
of keys, raises it to his eyes, chooses a key, gets up 
and moves to front of table. He stoops, unlocks first 
drawer, peers into it, feels about inside it, takes out a 
reel of tape, peers at it, locks drawer, puts keys back 
in his pocket. He turns, advances to edge of stage, 
halts, strokes banana, peels it, drops skin at his feet, 
puts end of banana in his mouth and remains motionless, 
staring vacuously before him. Finally he bites off the 
end, turns aside and begins pacing to and fro at edge of 
stage, in the light, i.e., not more than four or five 
paces either way, meditatively eating banana. He treads 
on skin, slips, nearly falls, recovers himself, stoops 
and peers at skin and finally pushes it, still stooping, 
with his foot over the edge of stage into pit. He re-
sumes his pacing, finishes banana, returns to table, 
sits down, remains a moment motionless, heaves a great 
sign. 67 
The genius of Beckett lies in his ability to uncover the human con-
dition.through the comic genre. The strategy of characterizing the 
comic scapegoat as well as utilizing several of Bergson's concepts toward 
comedy makes Beckett one of the great satirical artists of our time. 
Beckett provides us with the seriousness of laughter and what he calls 
the "earnest jest." Yet he firmly believes that through laughter we 
become essentially and incurably human. The nature of the comic genre ' 
as perfected by Beckett can best be summarized in the words of Josephine 
Jacobsen and William Mueller: 
The range of Beckett's comedy is remarkable. His fine 
sense of language produces a sparkling wittiness. Mas-
ter of the comedy of situation, he skillfully calls 
into play the mechanical repetition and the clowning 
gestures integral to much that is comic. He moves from 
sheer comedy, from the laugh which is spontaneous laugh, 
to the bitter, hollow, and mirthless responses, "the 
laughs that strictly speaking are not laughs." That he 
occasionally writes in a pathetic vein, as his compas-
sion for humanity overcomes his comic spirit, is a fact, 
and he can indeed be movingly tender. And that he at times 
approaches, the tragic, as he notes the grievous waste 
of man's bold efforts and the frustration that attends 
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his every motion, is also true. But Beckett's primary 
genre is comedy, bitter, hollow, and mirthless as it 
may be.68 
Beckett combines the bitter, the hollow, and the mirthless laughter to 
develop his rhetorical heroes into comic as well as tragic figures. 
For Beckett, the modern artist must understand the dualistic nature of 
man as being orderly as well as chaotic, unstable, and irrational. 
Beckett attempts to dramatize that the cOITlic and tragic conditions of 
man must include rather than exclude each other. It is only through the 
confrontation of this reality that Beckett feels rr@n can fully under-
stand the miseries of life. Thus, Beckett's range of the comic per-
spective is broad, deep, and provocative. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
We have no elucidations to offer of mysteries that are 
all of their making. My work is a matter of fundamen-
tal sounds (no joke intended) made as fully as possible, 
and I accept responsibility for nothing else. If people 
want to have headaches among the overtones, let them. 
And provide their own aspirin. Hamm as stated, and Clov 
as stated, together as stated, nectecum sine te, in 
such a place, and in such a world, that's all I can 
manage, more than I could. 
--Samuel Beckett 
The main purpose of this study has been to elucidate some of 
Beckett's ideas toward language and speech communication as well as to 
evaluate the strategies of his plays through the help of Kenneth Burke's 
insights. The study has sought to discover in Burke the basis for a 
different approach to Beckett's writings. Its purpose has been not to 
explain Burke's rhetorical theory, but to discuss several of his con-
clusions in relation to Beckett's ideas • 
• Beckett provides no explanation of his theory except through a 
study of his plays and novels. These works leave us with no clear-cut 
understanding of his view of man. Therefore, in addition to examining 
Beckett•s work, we have consulted such contemporary philosophers as 
Burke, Martin Buber, Hugh Duncan, Henri Bergson, and William Barrett in 
an effort not only to define Beckett's view of man but also to place it 
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in an appropriate social and philosophical perspective. If we have dis-
torted Beckett's view of man, we have done so in an honest attempt to 
understand his nature of the Self, language, and rhetorical theory. 
Summary of Beckett's View Toward 
Man, Self, and Language 
Beckett's primary interest is the basic relationship of man with 
his reality. His novels and plays attempt to throw some light on the 
condition of contemporary man. Faced with a meaningless, irrational, 
and non-Aristotelian universe, Beckett's rhetorical heroes attempt to 
make sense of this world and to find certain accorrm1odations for the 
Self. Beckett suggests in Proust that the artist must revolve his 
works around a fundamental study of the Self. "Allusion," says 
Beckett, "has been made to his contempt for the literature that 
'describes' for the realists and naturalists worshipping the offal of 
experlence •••• and content to transcribe the surface, the facade, behind 
which the Idea is prisoner. 111 Beckett attempts to find identity and 
the essence of the Self through its relationship with the Other. Al-
though the characters constantly rely on objects (hats, boots, and 
tapes), Beckett feels that knowledge of Self can only come through a 
relationship with another human being. It is the process of "becoming" 
which seems important to Beckett, and this can only be accomplished 
through a relationship with the Other. 
Beckett, like Burke, suspects the illusion of language since words 
can only provide names for experience and reality. Beckett pokes fun 
at social hierarchies, patterns of habit, and voluntary memory, which 
tend to cloud the comprehension of reality. He also ridicules the 
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pattern of scientific thought and the methodology of a fixed language. 
Beckett attempts to uncover the essence of the Self, which lies 
beneath societal masks. 
In a world where the sky is falling on our heads, there is a 
fundamental breakdown in the logical use of language. When there is 
no stability to a ~ause and effect relationship, it becomes difficult 
for the Beckett character to find a logic in the traditional language. 
The Beckett hero is aware that he is not a tree, a boot, or a bowler 
hat, but he also realizes that it is difficult to comprehend the Abso-
lute with any degree of certainty. 
Nonetheless, there is a strong obligation on the part of the 
Beckett heroes to continue living and speaking. Reaching the Ultimate, 
Beckett implies, which is the completion of the Self, comes only through 
silence and death. Thus, man must continue to use speech and lang~age 
as means to a living relationship. To do otherwise makes him less than 
human. 
Beckett agrees with Burke that we see life through "terminated 
screensc" Bec,kett's characters find it hopeless to perceive completely 
anything beyond their own emotional experience. The more each char-
acter attempts to seek ontological security, the more things seem to 
change. It is a constant tension of the dialectical process between 
permanence and change. The more each character attempts to find 
values and systems to give his life meaning, the more he becomes aware 
of the nature of his existence. And with the contemporary writers, 
man's exfstence in the cosmos is an absurd one. 
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Beckett's biting satire probes the identity of modern man as a 
socialized animal. He makes a point of dramatizing as well as laughing 
at man's social habits, rituals, and word-games. Beckett feels like 
Buber that if we employ the '·I-Thou" relationship we can gain the 
essence of man to man as well as valuable knowledge about the Self. 
The "I-It" philosophy treats language as a tool and the nature of man 
as an object or thing. It seems only natural that Beckett treats his 
characters with the "I-It" relationship as comic scapegoats and 
burlesques the composition of their language. 
Beckett's theatre is one of mental anguish and physical pain. 
But the pain is often treated comically in having the characters beaten, 
kicked, slapped, and knocked down. The mental anguish comes in the 
characters becoming aware of the realistic nature of their existence. 
Thereby, the major plays of Beckett are termed tragic-comedies. The 
anguish and the comic pain provide us with an artist who is weeping 
one moment but laughing the next. 
Beckett's characters are aware of their dualistic nature as comic 
and tragic heroes. Although they often contemplate suicide, there is 
a self-affirmative will to continue living. It is a growing strength 
that happens in Godot. And toward the end of the play, the chaTacters 
can truthfully say, "We are men." This growing awareness is no acci-
dent on Beckett's part. It is in the interaction of the comic with 
the tragic that Beckett provides us with a definition of man who is a 
laughing and weeping animal. The union of the two throw light on 
Beckett's view of a world that may be both tragic and comic at the 
same time. 
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Becket.t attempts to use the Burkeian strategies of "identification" 
through the techniques of "ambiguity," "properties," and "spirituali-
zation0 (c,tllildc scapegoat) of language to provide a reflection of the 
a~dience w modern man's situation. Beckett utilizes the techniques of 
the Absurdists to call attention to the nature of life. The technique 
is one of a -r•thea tre of cruelty" to shake the foundations of modern 
man.. Martilnl Esslin suggests the importance of this strategy to the 
Beckett theatre: 
The Theatre of the Absurd has renounced arguing about 
the absurdity of the human condition; it merely presents 
it in being--that is, in terms of concrete stage images 
of the absurdity of existence. This is the difference 
.between the approach of the philosopher and that of the 
poet; the difference, to take an example from another 
sphere, between the idea of God in the works of Thomas 
Aquinas of Spinoza and the intuition of God in those of 
St. John of the Cross or Meister Eckhart--the difference 
.between theory and experience. 2 
Rather than having the characters describe the situation in theory, 
Beckett attempts to involve the spectator through the process of Burke's 
"identification." This process causes audience confrontation and re-
action, which makes each spectator a participant within the event. 
Beckett utilizes sound, gesture, and silence to provoke a visual as 
well as aural image of the human condition. He also uses limited 
space, small-number of characters, and burlesque action to make the 
audience face an awareness of their situation. "Beckett's use of the 
stage, .. writes Esslin, "is an attempt to reduce the gap between the 
limitations of language and the intuition of being, the sense of the 
human situation he seeks to express in spite of his strong feeling 
.that words axe inadequate to formulate it." The nature of the modern 
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stage, he continues, is that it "can be used to add new resources to 
language as an instrument of thought and exploration of being. 113 
As suggested by Burke, one of the significant characteristics of 
the modern theatre is a theory of "expectation as expectation." The 
audience waits in hopes of fulfilling their expectations of the outcome 
of the plot and th~ characters' 1actions. The characters on stage wait 
in hopes that another person will come to relieve them of suffering and 
explain their meaning in the universe. The success of the "identifi-
cation" strategy is the method of "consubstantiality" in which ~e 
feeling of waiting involves the total psyche of the spectator as well 
as the characters on the stage. Rather than following the traditional 
structure of a cause-to-effect pattern, the audience is involved in 
wondering what to expect next, if anything. It is truly an excellent 
strategic design of involving the audience through a process of 
"expection as expectation." 
Beckett's plays individually and his works collectively pose 
philosophical questions without any definite answers. Beckett does not 
advocate a point of view or propose a resolution. It is, as we sug-
gested earlier, the shape of the ideas that matter. Beckett is not 
interested in solving problems through neat classifications and formu-
lations. Beckett's interest is, as J. Mitchell Morse puts it, "not to 
solve but to contemplate problems.114 The basic situation of Beckett's 
writing is to evoke a sense of awareness. Rather than advocating 
ready-made solutions, Beckett provokes the attitude that existence 
remains complex and unpredictable, and that it cannot be reduced to . 
mathematical equations or laboratory experiments. 
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Beckett, like other contemporary writers, questions all human 
motives and social institutions. He even questions the values and 
forms of his own creative efforts. Since the form can be reduced to 
a statement about the concepts of the writer, Beckett proposes the 
questions of doubt and uncertainty with his characters. Beckett's 
heroes can never arrive upon any ontological security since it is 
impossible for a creative artist to arrive upon a definitive conclusion. 
It is, as we argued earlier, a process of "becoming" with both Beckett 
and his rhetorical heroes. 
Beckett's prophecy leaves room for hope only if man can create new 
myths and become aware of the old illusions. Once the underside of 
both good and evil are exposed, what is there left for man to cling to? 
Can man live in hope without some form of illusion or myth? We think 
not. It is a burden of responsibility that Beckett may be asking too 
much of modern man. Yet, as we suggested earlier, Beckett agrees with 
Burke that man is characterized by his symbol-making and symbol-using 
capacity. Without this process, it is impossible for man to survive 
the jungle and live with any semblance of hope. Are we to conclude, 
then, that Beckett sees no salvation for modern man? This we most 
strongly den'}-'.· Throughout Beckett's plays there remains a constant 
argu~tent to substitute new myths or hierarchies for the old worn-out 
ones. As Beckett suggests, the new form of art must be a type that 
admits the chaos and does not try to say that the chaos is something 
else. The task of the artist, according to Beckett, is finding a form 
to accornr~todate the mess. Some critics would relegate Beckett to a 
nihilistic position with the assumption that his characters live with-
out hope or illusions. We argue that Beckett is not interested in man 
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living without myths, but in being certain that he recognizes the mess 
for what it is. Thus, the task of contemporary man is finding new 
hierarchies and myths that may accommodate the changing times. 
Since the human animal is "goaded by a spirit of hierarchy," it 
seems unlikely that man can continue to survive as a social being with-
out some form of myth, and social institutions.,; Beckett seems to agree. 
What he wishes is that we recognize the change and establish a new order 
of social relationship and institutions rather than persistently cling-
ing to the old ritual and social habits. In short, it is Beckett's 
desire that man come to terms with the reality of the moment and his 
changing environment. And the theatre appears to Beckett to provide 
the best medium to get his ideas across to an audience. Esslin urges 
on acceptance of Beckett and the strategy of the Absurd Theatre: 
Ultimately, a phenomenon like the Theatre of the Absurd 
does not reflect despair or a return to dark irrational· 
forces but expresses modern man's endeavor to come to 
terms with the world in which he lives. It attempts to 
make him face up to the human condition as it really is, 
to free him from illusions that are bound to cause con-
stant maladjustment and disappointment •••• Today, when 
death and old age are increasingly concealed behind 
euphemisms and comforting baby talk, and life is 
threatened with being smothered in the mass consumption 
of hypnotic mechanized vulgarity, the need to confront 
man with the reality of his situation is greater than 
ever. For the dignity of man lies in his ability to face 
reality in all its senselessness; to accept it free15, without fear, without illusions--and to laugh at it. 
It is to the genre of the comic that Beckett owes his greatness and his 
dignity as creative artist. The laugh of the Beckett theatre is often 
times a mirthless, a hollow, and a bitter one. Yet Beckett perfects 
the strategy of the comic scapegoat, the vaudeville word-games, and the 
business of slapstick actions. The combination of the joy with the sad 
gives us Beckett's bifocal view of reality. It is comedy, as we 
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discussed, that "strictly speaking is not laughter." As Josephine 
Jacobsen and William R. Mueller wisely observe= 
To this sadness, Beckett brings his comedy, that recourse 
of those in whom the wild beast of earnestness does not 
cease to pad. Beckett has himself given us the measure 
of the seriousness of his laughter; he speaks in "earnest 
jest." Under its frequent hilarity, under its classically 
grotesque·postures, it is in the end this laughter, tgese 
kinds of laughter, which attest to his true concerns. 
We support the legacy of Beckett's true concern that comedy paves the 
way for compassion and truth. Comedy provides the means to dialogue 
which unmasks the pretensions and hypocrises of social relationships. 
Tragedy mystifies and seeks to hide our transgressions without probing 
or questioning. We agree with Beckett and Burke that through laughter 
man can ease his way through the "flurries and flare-ups of the Human 
Barnyard." 
The Implication of Beckett's Theory and Philosophy 
Beckett makes his greatest contribution to rhetorical theory in 
showing rather than describing the attitudes of hierarchies and social 
relationships. Rather than concentrating on social problems, Beckett 
is interested in attitudes about the condition of man. It is at the 
level of dramatic expression of human relationships that Beckett makes 
his greatest contribution. It is the purpose of this section to discuss 
the "implications of his ideas with those of George H. Mead, Hugh D. 
Duncan, Martin Buber, and Kenneth Burke. 
Mead and Beckett start off on common ground in believing that each 
man needs to begin his creative living with a fundamental focus on the 
Self. Mead argues that the Self is a social product and develops 
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through an interaction with other persons around it. The "I" of Mead 
is the subjective part of the Self while the "me" serves as the objec-
tive side and the attitude of the "generalized other." As a result, 
Mead feels that the "I" and the "me" are engaged in a constant form of 
conversation and interaction. The significance of this conversation is 
to anticipate the reaction of the "generalized other" by having these 
responses reflected with the "me." In taking the role of the "gener-
alized other," the individual actor symbolizes and manipulates the 
response of the other, Mead wishes for the communication to create 
reflective intelligence. This is caused by the individual actor 
internalizing his audience, testing his propositions on them, and then 
accepting or rejecting them. Finally, the Self, for Mead, is a process 
which grows out of the encounter of an individual with the social 
structures and relationships. 
Beckett and Mead differ in their approach to the Other. Mead 
places emphasis on the chosen goals and the pragmatic approach in reach-
ing these objectives. The action of Mead's character is the attempt to 
achieve these goals. The 11 I-me" relationship is a dialogue to find the 
most productive means in achieving success. Mead views the whole method 
of socialization as a process of corr~1unication in which the individual 
actor is "known and knowing that one is known." 
Beckett rejects the approach of Mead in finding suitable acts to 
achieve certain goals. The main objective for the Beckett characters 
is to find some form of ontological security and consideration that they 
exist as human beings. The goals, for Beckett, are not to attain social 
status, wealth, position, but to become aware of the essence of Self. 
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Beckett rejects the concentration that a Self grows by a focus on the 
rational and intellectual side of being. Even though Beckett agrees 
with Mead that we find the essence of man in relationship to the Other, 
he rejects the manipulating of the response through internalizing his 
audience. In this respect, Beckett opposes Mead's philosophy that the 
"me" serves as a mirror to the impulse of the "I." Beckett's approach 
is much broader, and he wishes to show the bifocal traits of men--the 
emotional as well as the intellectual. In a world where the values 
are collapsing, Beckett's characters find it difficult to choose a 
course of action that will leaq to social objectives. The objective, 
then, is to find a true relationship with each other, develop an 
authentic language and avoid the pit of Nothingness. For Beckett, the 
strength of the internal dialogue is an attempt for the mind to under-
stand thf= body. As Hugh Kenner suggests, "the typical Beckett hero is 
a Cartesian Centaur with the mind set on mastering and contemplating 
while the body is a reduction of the quintessential machine. He is a 
man riding a bicycle, ™ in corpore disposito. 117 Mead and 
Beckett start their inquiry together, but they are worlds apart in 
their final analysis of the Self-Other relationship. 
Hugh D. Duncan extends the concept of the "Self-Other" pattern with 
an emphasis on the Comic structure in an approach to understanding 
hierarchies. Duncan argues that we find the essence of humanity through 
shared experiences, which profitably comes through a Comic framework. 
Duncan argues that it is the cult of the comic that allows man to show 
his feelings and opens the channel for authentic communication. Beckett . 
agrees thus far with Duncan, but he differs from him over the 
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restriction of the Comic frame. Duncan posits the view that "comedy is 
ethical because it is rational and rational because it leads to good 
social relationships. 118 Beckett argues that comedy may at times be 
irrational, brutal, and grostesque. TheTefore, he disagrees with 
Duncan's narrow definition and approach to comedy. Duncan feels that 
laughter which passes into the tone of derision, mockery, and grostesque 
no longer serves as 9omedyo He further argues that when the clown 
becomes burlesqued and ridiculed, he loses his identity and becomes a 
nightmare for the spectator.9 As we discussed in the previous chapter, 
Beckett concentrates much of his comedy on the hollow, the bitter, and 
the mirthless laughter. His characters are beaten, ridiculed, kicked 
to a point that it may be a chil1ing world to watch. The weakness of 
the Duncan method is that he feels comedy must appeal to reason and 
the rational side of man. Beckett extends "the human animal beyond 
these limits and proposes a shocking reality of comedy that at times is 
grotesque and violent. 
A final point of similarity comes in revealing hierarchies and 
social relationships through comedy., While Duncan views the social end 
of comedy as the maintenance of roles that guarantee order, Beckett 
envisions the Comic frame as a means to show the crumbling and outdated 
social hierarchies. As one of Beckett's heroes remarks, "Nothing is 
certain, when you are about." Duncan feels that when we enter a group 
to begin corrm1unication, we enter hierarchical relationships which are 
determined by the symbols of the group. Since nothing is certain in 
the Beckett universe, it is difficult for the rhetorical heroes to 
accept the symbols of a group. Thus, Duncan interprets comedy as a 
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means to ward off threats to a group and maintain skill in hierarchical 
address, while Beckett utilizes comedy to provoke a sense of the absurd-
ity in maintaining old hierarchies in the face of ontological insecurity. 
They both make a point in extending the theory that comedy and drama 
provides an excellent means of expressing social hierarchies. While r-
Duncan talks about comedy as a means of finding our humanity, Beckett 
projects these images on the stage. Consequently, the impact is much 
greater. Rather than merely reading about theory, we can see the ideas 
of experience in action with the major characters. 
While Martin Buber stresses the concept of "meeting" in dialogue, 
Beckett emphasizes the nature of "becoming." For Buber, language serves 
as a means to transcend into the world of the Eternal Thou. Buber adds 
a divine dimension and mission on the part of man. He sees the Self 
emerging in relationship with other individuals, but with a maJor. 
emphasis on a relationship with God. It seems difficult for Buber to 
imagine a self emerging without the presence of God. 
Beckett does not view modern man moving toward the Eternal as much 
as moving away from the thought of nothingness and the Void. Beckett 
does not debate the issue of whether God is dead, but he implies that 
the Almighty is merely withdrawn. Beckett suggests that "perhaps" God 
is d~ad, let's wait and see. Buber, of course, cannot accept this 
philosophical position and therefore rejects the emergence of the Self 
in Beckett's writings. 
They both agree that silence is a means of contemplation and an 
important form of communication. Without the element of silence, all . 
speech may become chatter or, as Beckett calls it, nothing more than 
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"blathering." When Estragon is asked in Waiting for Godot what he did 
the previous evening, he responds in this way: 
I suppose nothing in particular. Yes, now I remember, 
yesterday evening we spent blathering about nothing in 
particular. That's been going on now for half a 
century.lo 
The important harmony of Beckett and Buber is with their human 
relationships of "I-Thou" and "I-It~" Beckett portrays on stage in a 
sometime comic and oftentimes moving way these two relationships. 
Obviously Beckett agrees with Buber that self-knowledge and growth can 
only come from an "I-Thou" relationship. Beckett, with the behavior of 
his major characters, pushes the "I-It" philosophy to a point of ridi-
cule and burlesque. Since Burber adds a spiritual dimension to his 
individuals, it ·is difficult to imagine him accepting the Comic frame-
work of Beckett. Buber views human relationships as being either moral 
and immoral qualities in man. He appears to take these relationsnips 
quite seriously. It might be difficult for him to view the burlesque 
and comic scapegoating with the idea that this represents an "I-It" 
philosophy. Thus, Beckett projects- a much broader view of human 
relationships by indicating that mp-n is good and bad, tragic and comic, 
happy and frustrated, and that these traits may occur simultaneously. 
Again, Buber describes his theory of philosophical relationships, but 
it is to the credit of Beckett that we can visualize them in concrete 
form. Obviously we owe some credit to Buber in helping us understand 
the comic hierarchies of the Beckett universe, but it is difficult to 
believe that Buber views man as a laughing animal. 
Philosophically, Beckett and Kenneth Burke appear to have the most 
in common. Both share the basic premise of literature that through the 
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presentation of human motives we can come to the greatest understanding 
of human behavior. Beckett and Burke agree that language serves as the 
essence of the human animal, and that he can be first characterized as 
a "symbol-making, symbol-using, and symbol-misusing animal." It is 
through the use of symbolization that man can lift himself above the 
level of other creatures. 
One of the major points of agreement is with the process of 
"identification." Through a method of establishing "consubstantiality" 
with the spectator, Beckett's heroes attempt to relate an image of the 
world. One of the significant strategies of "identification" in the 
Beckett theatre is through the design of "ambiguity." Both Beckett and 
Burke agree that ambiguity is a necessary ingredient to keep language 
alive and fresh. While Burke seems more interested in how a speaker 
utilizes ambiguity in a public address, Beckett concerns himself with 
the poetic quality of the language on the stage. They both agree that 
the task of any artist or critic Js not to dispense with ambiguity, but 
to attempt to clarify its resources. 
Beckett agrees with Burke that man "transcends upward" or "tran-
scends downward" depending on the choice of terms or words he uses. 
Although his characters may only move from one muckheap to the next, 
Beckett agrees with Burke that man can transcend his situation through 
language. Thus, language, for both writers, is a process of moving, 
linking, and creating some form of hierarchy. 
The strategy of "properties" plays an important role in the Beckett 
theatre as it does in the thinking of Burke. The stage scenery and 
props suggest an image and feeling in the spectator that can only be 
created through a visual moment of association. Burke agrees that a 
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character's association with properties or objects may dictate the 
emotional as well as intellectual behavior. 
One of the main features of agreement with Burke and Beckett is 
the focus on the Comic frame. Burke cannot quite accept the view that 
burlesque as depicted by Beckett can equal the sophistication of high 
comedy. Yet they both agree on the strategy of the comic scapegoat's 
helping to make people aware of society's ills -chrough laughter rather 
than through crime and war. However, Burke may not be ready to concede 
that tragic and comic elements can operate simultaneously within a 
Comic frame; he appears to project the attitude that we have a notice-
able difference between the two genres. Obviously Beckett is concerned 
with the combination of the two although his work leans more toward the 
comic scapegoat and the bitter laughter. 
Both Burke and Beckett feel that man establishes through language 
nterministic screens," a system which selects and directs the attention 
of attitudes. Man's attitudes about reality are implicit in the choice 
of terms he uses. Because of language, man shapes his own perceptions 
towards events and obJects. One of the major reasons why Beckett por-
trays his major characters with a lack of memory, poor eye sight, and 
defective hearing is to make the spectator aware of the habitual 
response to language. Like Burke, he feels that the ~r~use---9f cer-
tain words or phrases to the point of habit covers the essence of the 
Idea as well as the reality of the moment. 
There is common agreement between Beckett and Burke that man is 
"goaded ~ya spirit of hierarchy." Beckett pokes fun at the typical 
modern man, who expends his energies in establishing and maintaining a 
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social hierarchy. While Burke describes the motives of man in forming 
hierarchies, Beckett attempts to operationalize these relationships in 
a dramatic structure. Clov, in a scene from Endgame, expresses 
Beckett's sardonic feeling about the preservation,of hierarchies: 
I'm going to clear everything away. I love order. 
It's my dream. A world where all would be silent 
and still each thing in its last place, under the 
last dust.11 
Although Beckett satirizes the myth for preserva-cion of ritual and 
tradition, he recognizes, like Burke, that man is a creature of order 
and habit. Thus, it is natural for man to demand that each individual 
know his place and the role expected of him. 
Finally, Burke and Beckett both feel that through language man is 
motivated to choose the right symbol for expression. Burke feels that 
the attitude of trying to label something by its "proper" name or speak 
a language in a distinct way provokes a sense of perfection. Beckett's 
rhetorical heroes, Harr~1, Vladimir, and Krapp, continually search for 
the right word or phrase to express their thoughts and feelings. It is 
the impulse for the perfection with these characters which motivates 
them to define a feeling or thought. The sense of perfection in lan-
guage permeates the character's behavior throughout Beckett's plays. 
It is, as Burke suggests, a motive implicit in the nature of our symbol 
system. 
Other implications could be discussed between Beckett and con-
temporary rhetorical theorists, but these four leading thinkers have 
seemed the most beneficial for our purposes. This has not been a 
definitive exploration, but an attempt to draw some similarities between 
Beckett's thinking and that of rhetorical theorists. 
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This study has been concerned with Buber, Burke, and Duncan for 
the insights they may provide on the Beckett universe. A few recom-
mendations for additional study and research seem important for us to 
consider. 
Most obviously, so that understanding of modern plays might be 
enriched, there needs to be further study on the relationships of the 
"I-Thou," "I-It," "Self-Other," and "I-me" concepts used by these 
writers. Finding strategies of II identification" that a playwright 
employs in provoking his message appears the most profitable method of 
analysis. Since it appears difficult to analyze modern drama from the 
vantage point of plot structure, analyzing "identification" strategies 
appears as an excellent means of finding the basic truths of the 
writer. 
Drama formulates experience symbolically and testifies to an 
encounter with reality. A dramatic situation presents in concrete form 
what the playwright regards as significant contemporary issues. Ana-
lyzing social relationships in a drama may be a means of understanding , 
attitudes toward language and concepts of symbolic action. 
At times this study has been frustrating because Beckett is 
abstract and tends to deal with universal qualities of man. It might 
be worthwhile in the future for the researcher to select a playwright 
who focuses on contemporary social problems. A study of such play-
wrights as James Baldwin, Leroi Jones, Edward Albee, and Sam Sheppard 
could provide~orthwhile contributiorir,of symbolic interaction on social 
theories. It appears important for future research to relate how and . 
why these playwrights use certain symbolic substances to convey their 
messages. 
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This perspective suggests a different approach to rhetorical 
criticism compared to the methods employed in the past. Rather than 
attempting to impose a structural analysis on a creative piece, the 
methodology of examination emerges from each researcher and work of 
art under investigation. 
Finally, there is a need to reach out beyond the traditional 
boundaries of rhetorical theory to view drama, art, poetry, and music 
as symbolic acts of man. Furthermore, a drama or rhetorical discourse 
which leads only to rational truth no longer seems appropriate for 
contemporary men. Wi.lllam Barrett argues that "the kind of knowledge 
pursued by the Existentialist cannot come through reason, but through 
living, and perhaps in the end, he cannot even put into words what he 
knows. 1112 Instead of trying to measure creative acts by an ascribed 
set of formulations and criteria, vie need to change it around to neasure 
logic by the concerns of human interaction. Hence, we consider language 
not as strictly epistemology, but as an individual creation of the human 
self. This approach requires a closer association with philosophy in 
order to study the phenomena of human speech and symbolic acts. 
Through hls literature, Beckett provides us with a significant 
view of man and language. It is a consideration that we need to ponder 
in our approach to rhetorical theory. Beckett's ideas and language are 
not easy to understand, but they seldom are from those who are profound 
thinkers. Oftentimes his perceptions about man are more detailed and 
total than most of us wish to understand. 
With a good supply of aspirins, we have attempted in this study to 
view Beckett's plays as more than a "matter of fundamental sounds." We 
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accept the responsibility for attempting to trace down the themes and 
overtones, and what these insights might imply. This study, to borrow 
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